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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal Zeitgeist of the past 20 years-with the United States Supreme
Court providing most of the tail wind-has strongly favored enforcement of
arbitration agreements,1 largely without regard to the quality of consent
attending those agreements 2 and arguably in direct contravention of statutory
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1 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS, Chs. 2 & 3 (2002); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in
United States Law, 40 ME. L. REv. 263, 263-66 (1988) (describing historical
development and growth of arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OQuo ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 669 (2001) (criticizing the Court's enthusiasm for compelling
arbitration and arguing that the Court has overlooked serious Seventh Amendment and
due process concerns); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of
Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 334-54 (1990) [hereinafter Stempel,
Public Policy] (criticizing perceived zeal of some courts in striking down arbitration
agreements on grounds of public policy); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62
BROOK. L. REv. 1381, 1412-28 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel, Consent] (arguing that the
Court has uncritically embraced arbitration as an unalloyed social benefit).
2 See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1335, 1339-45 (1996); Stempel, Consent, supra note 1, at
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language that seemingly removes employment agreements from the reach of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3 This sometimes uncritical embrace of
arbitration by Justices quite removed from the actual operation of arbitration
has attracted considerable academic criticism as well as protests from those
who see themselves as forced into mandatory arbitration. 4 In addition, many
1389-1412; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1032-34 (1996).
3 See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Samuel Estreicher,
Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1344, 1363-72 (1997) (criticizing the Court for supporting the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration agreements required of workers in view of the language of 9 U.S.C. § 1, which
states that the Act's power of specific enforcement of predispute arbitration agreement
does not extend to a "contract of employment"); Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers'
Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification,
17 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996) (same); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP.
REOL. 259, 263-79 (same); Jeremy Kennedy, Comment, The Supreme Court Swallows a
Legal Fly: Consequences for Employees as the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
Expands, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1137, 1153-64 (2002) (same); see also Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1019-46 (2000); Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV.
577, 607-12 (1997) (contending that courts should not enforce arbitration provisions in a
manner inconsistent with statutory rights).
4 See Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283-84 (2002) (criticizing Court's preference for arbitration);
Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 811-20
(2002) (same); Linda Alle-Murphy, Comment, Are Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Contracts Enforceable? A Contractual Analysis, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 129-
37 (2002) (same); Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel:
Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV.
1337, 1341-46 (2002) (same); see also Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, I,
The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INs. L.J. 355, 357 (2003) (observing the
disadvantages of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution: "the legal system should
reconsider the highly favorable stance that it takes toward mandatory, binding arbitration
in general, so as to take account of the negative effects of arbitration lawlessness. A
neutral legal and judicial stance toward binding arbitration would be more appropriate.");
Michelle Andrews, For Patients, Unpleasant Surprises in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2003, § 3, at B8 (describing the increasing use of arbitration agreements in medical
services agreements, suggesting that the manner of contracting leaves prospective
patients little choice so that the significance of the arbitration provision frequently is not
appreciated by the patient); Scott Atlas, Have You Ever Tried to Make Up Your Mind-
About Arbitration?, 29 L1TIG., Fall 2002, at 1, 1 (describing the change in the opinion of
the Chair of the ABA Litigation Section, initially an enthusiast for arbitration as means of
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have come to question the fulcrum on which much of modem arbitration
leverage rests-the Supreme Court's view that the FAA creates substantive
federal law that ousts any contrary state law that targets arbitration.5 Only
general state contract law applies to construction and enforcement of
arbitration agreements. As long as the requisite nexus exists with interstate
commerce, state legislation aimed specifically at perceived problems of
arbitration is preempted by the FAA.6
alternative dispute resolution, who now expresses mixed feelings about the efficacy of
arbitration); Mary P. Gallagher, AAA's Impartiality Challenged by Lawyer Seeking
Alternate Forum, N.J. L.J., Oct. 22, 2002, at 1; Joanne Gordon, Here Come Da Judge:
Usually It's Plaintiffs' Attorneys Whining About Mandatory Arbitration. Now It's the
Corporate Lawyers, FORBES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 60 (noting increasing business
dissatisfaction with arbitration, finding it slower, less decisive, and less substantively
favorable than anticipated); Jackson Williams, Mandatory Arbitration: Ganging up on
Little Guys, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 22, 2002, at A24.
The Supreme Court's strong support of arbitration has been met with both praise and
scorn. Compare Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1454-57 (1996) (approving of arbitration generally and expressing
concern over the tendency to require arbitration to mimic the judicial process once
arbitration has become widespread) and Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better
for Investors than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503, 1505-06 (1996) (approving of
arbitration in general and finding its outcomes more pro-consumer than many court
decisions) with Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the
Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 284-86 (2002/2003) (comparing the Court's rush
toward arbitration as jurisprudential equivalent of tulip bulb craze of 17th century
Holland) and Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1997).
5 See Carrington, supra note 4 at 264-65 (arguing that FAA was intended as a
procedural rule for federal courts rather than as statute creating substantive law). But see
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105-08 (2002) (defending
the correctness of Court decisions characterizing the FAA as creating substantive law
overriding contrary state law).
6 The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a written agreement to arbitration "shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). This section has been interpreted
to forbid application of any state contract law that singles out arbitration clauses for any
special treatment. However, the validity of an arbitration term may be examined
according to a state's general contract law regarding formation, enforcement, breach, and
rescission. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
Section 1 of the Act broadly defines key terms and contains the limitation that
arbitration agreements contained in a contract of employment are not enforceable-a
limitation courts have applied only to contracts involving workers directly involved in
interstate transportation of items (e.g., postal service workers, longshoreman, and
truckers). See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that
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As a result of the new arbitrability regime, formally announced in 1984
with the Southland v. Keating7 decision but with roots dating back to the
Court's 1960s jurisprudence, there has been a dramatic expansion of the use
of arbitration clauses, with a corresponding increase in litigation over
arbitrability. 8 For the most part, those seeking to enforce arbitration clauses
have won the fact specific battles of arbitration as well as the war of
jurisprudential theory. 9 This was particularly true in the first decade after
Southland, when arbitration was required even under circumstances many
would regard as coercive-and in the face of contrary state law or policy. 10
There remained some pockets of resistance in the 1990s as some courts
attempted to resurrect the pre-Southland doctrine that certain statutory claims
were protected from the reach of an arbitration agreement, 11 an approach that
the arbitration clause in a retail sales worker's contract was not exempt from enforcement
under section 1); Stempel, supra note 3, at 262-72. The Act also sets forth certain
procedures governing arbitration, including a provision for staying litigation pending
arbitration (9 U.S.C. § 3) and one authorizing federal courts to compel arbitration (9
U.S.C. § 4), as well as providing for a streamlined process for entering judgment upon an
arbitration award (9 U.S.C. § 9). Arbitration awards are deferentially reviewed by courts,
which under the Act may modify or vacate an award on only limited grounds such as
corruption, fraud, evident partiality, arbitrator misconduct, or arbitration that exceeds the
scope of the contract provision providing for arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also Cortez
Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198-204 (2000) (reviewing the
Act's provisions generally and holding that arbitration awards may be confirmed in any
judicial district with requisite jurisdiction; no requirement that judgment be entered only
in the district where the award was rendered).
7 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
8 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377,
1380-83 (1991) (reviewing the history of arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act as
well as interpretative case law).
9 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 1, at 37-50; IAN R. MCNEIL ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 3 (1995); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 653-74
(1996).
10 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33,
55-66; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 1015-24 (1999).
1 ISee Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens & Co., 144 F. 3d 1182, 1187-1200, 1202-03
(9th Cir. 1998) (finding a Title VH claim not arbitrable because the 1991 Civil Rights Act
evinced congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies); Nelson v. Cyprus
Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 759-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an agreement
to arbitrate employment disputes must be sufficiently consensual); Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining that enforcement of
a provision to arbitrate Title VII claims requires "knowing" consent, implicitly a greater
showing than constructive consent to a standard form).
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is probably impermissible and foreclosed by the Court's modem arbitration
precedents. 12
Beginning in the 1990s, however, lower courts, particularly state courts,
began to take a harder look at arbitration agreements and their enforcement.
Several courts began invoking concepts related to unconscionability in order
to refuse enforcement of arbitration clauses. The phenomenon accelerated in
The Ninth Circuit panel decision in Duffield gained considerably notoriety and
became something of a rallying point for those opposing mandatory arbitration of such
claims. However, the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105 (2001), which enforced such an agreement, effectively overruled Duffield's
"Title VII is beyond the reach of the FAA due to the 1991 Civil Rights Act" approach,
although Duffield did not go gently into the good night. In federal district court, the
EEOC obtained an injunction preventing the Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps law
firm from insisting that employees sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of
employment-something the firm had required of Donald Lagatree, a secretary. A panel
of the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court, dissolved the injunction, and effectively
overruled Duffield on the basis of intervening U.S. Supreme Court precedent such as
Circuit City. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, 303 F.3d 994, 1080
(9th Cir. 2002). Rehearing en banc was granted, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003), and oral
argument was held on March 27, 2003. An en banc decision was rendered. EEOC v.
Luce, Forward, Hamiltion & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Jason
Hoppin, Circuit Grapples with "Duffield," THE RECORDER, Mar. 28, 2003, at 1
(describing lively oral argument).
The en banc Ninth Circuit overruled Duffield, holding that arbitration agreements as
a condition of employment were not prohibited by Title VII or the 1991 Act. Luce,
Forward, 345 F.3d at 744. However, the case was remanded to the trial court to address
the EEOC's argument that discharging an employee for refusing to sign an agreement at a
time when Duffield was still good law in the circuit could constitute impermissible
employer retaliation against a worker insisting on his federal statutory rights and general
right of access to the courts. Id. at 752-53; Hoppin, supra, at 1 (revisiting en banc oral
argument); see also Luce, Forward, 345 F.3d at 754 (Pregerson, J., Reinhardt, J., and
Schroeder, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (concurring as to remand of the retaliation
claim and dissenting as to the continued vitality of Duffield); Al-Safin v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., No. 00-35241, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19153, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002)
(agreeing with the Luce, Forward panel as to the infirmity of Duffield after Circuit City;
appearing to view Prudential v. Lai as continued good law, but remanding to the trial
court for consideration of unconscionability defenses potentially available under
California state law).
12 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987)
(rejecting the argument that claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
exempt from arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (rejecting the argument for exempting antitrust claims from
international arbitration and suggesting no basis for any antitrust exception for domestic
arbitration).
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the late 1990s. The California Supreme Court's Armendariz decision 13 is
probably the most prominent example of this emerging body of law. During
the past five years, courts-particularly state courts-appear far more willing
to strike down an arbitration agreement or limit its enforcement on the
ground that the arbitration agreement is unfair as a matter of the applicable
state's general contract law. 14
Refusing to enforce the literal language of a contract is, of course,
generally considered to be part of the judiciary's "policing" of contract
terms. 15 Although courts and commentators differ over the question of how
frequently and aggressively such policing should occur, everyone agrees that
there are at least some occasions when courts should not enforce the literal
language of a contract. 16 Sometimes the literal language may not be what was
meant. Sometimes literal application of the contract provision would produce
an "absurd" result.17 On other occasions, literal enforcement of a contract or
instrument may violate a well-defined public policy. 18
Even these fairly rare and restrained means of policing contracts are
subject to some controversy. For example, courts and commentators differ
over the degree to which a court may consult extra-textual sources of
information in determining what was meant by the language, whether an
outcome would be absurd, and what boundaries of public policy exist.19
More controversial is the propriety of courts policing a contract on the basis
13 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 688-94 (Cal.
2000) (holding that the arbitration provision requiring the employer but not the employee
to arbitrate was unconscionable due to lack of mutuality). See generally Michael H.
LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements:
Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 249 (2003) (observing court
decisions, particularly of appellate courts, reining in the breadth of the Supreme Court's
pro-arbitration doctrine through the use of countervailing contract law concepts).
14 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
151 borrow the term from E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 223 (3d ed. 1999)
(chapter entitled "Policing the Agreement"). Professor Farnsworth uses the term to
describe the activity of courts in reviewing contract agreements to prevent "unfairness by
placing limits on their enforceability." Id. at 223-24.
16 See id. § § 4.1-.29 (reviewing the variety of means by which courts supervise
contractual enforcement and indicating that the consensus of courts and commentators is
that such activity is necessary, although members of the legal profession may divide over
the amount of judicial policing required and the most apt means for effecting this public
policy).
17 Id.
18 See id. § 5.1; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES
§ 4.10[b] (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (describing the operation of this contract
construction norm for insurance policies).
19 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §§ 6.1-.12, 7.1-.17.
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of unconscionability. Although all jurisdictions appear to recognize the
concept, which is in theory universal, judges differ a great deal in their
willingness to invoke the unconscionability concept to modify, strike down,
or refuse enforcement of a contract term.20 Arbitration clauses, like other
contract terms, are subject to the divergent landscape of unconscionability,
perhaps more so in that arbitration agreements may be viewed as more
"procedural" than "substantive" and hence, less likely to be the source of the
type of social ill that justifies judicial interference with contract through the
unconscionability doctrine. In addition, the unconscionability concept has
been in some disrepute and retreat during the same time that arbitration has
been in ascendancy. Beginning with Arthur Leff's critique-cum-diatribe
against the unconscionability provision of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC),21  many scholars have suggested that
unconscionability is simply too plastic a concept that permits too much post-
hoc judicial meddling with contracts. 22 The legal and political revolt against
the "judicial activism" of the Warren Court on matters of constitutional and
criminal law23 also made it unfashionable for judges to do anything that
20 See id. § 4.28.
21 See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
22 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.28; Leff, supra note 21, at 515, stating
[I]f one decides to police contracts on a clause-by-clause basis, he finds that he has
merely substituted the highly abstract word "unconscionable" for the possibility of
more concrete and particularized thinking about particular problems of social policy.
Should warranty disclaimers be permitted? If so, should they be with respect to
consumer goods?
Id. See generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1970) (arguing that the
unconscionability concept should not be an ad hoc judicial remedy but may be effective
as a regulatory concept imposed by legislature or administrative agencies). But see M.P.
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (defending
unconscionability); John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1969) (same). see also Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract
or Term, 31 U. PrIr. L. REv. 337, 337 (1970) (stating the opinion of the author and
Reporter of the ALI Restatement (Second) Contracts, who admits to seeing
unconscionability as an "unruly horse" of too much indeterminacy and discretion, but
moderates his criticism in finding that a workable concept of unconscionability may be
possible for courts to operationalize).
23 See infra note 164 and accompanying text. See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the
Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 189-204 (1998)
(suggesting that the general backlash against judicial activism was responsible in part for
the surge and decline of reasonable expectations analysis during 1970 to 1985 in cases
construing insurance policies). See generally JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN
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looked like case-specific legislating, even for the seemingly far more
mundane matters of contract law and arbitration. Law and economics
criticisms of the doctrine focused on the potential inefficiencies of ad hoc
judicial interference with contract terms, particularly the standardized form
terms found in most contracts. 24 Although the law-and-cognition movement
of the past fifteen years has provided support for some greater paternalism in
policing contracts, even this literature has been far more comfortable with
macrocosmic policing of contract by legislation or administrative agency rule
than with microcosmic supervision of contract terms by courts.2 5
These two strands of jurisprudential development-unconscionability's
fall from grace and arbitration's ascendance-combined to produce a law of
arbitrability that was both substantively supportive of arbitration and
reluctant to reign in arguable excesses of arbitration. As a result, much of
modern arbitration law has possessed a formalist, wooden, result-oriented
quality that has made it the subject of considerable criticism. Although lower
courts have always had-at least in theory-the power to police arbitration
agreements on the basis of ordinary contract law-this power was rarely used
until recently. Even the limited unconscionability-based regulation of
arbitration agreements seen during the past five years has arguably been
halting and truncated. Although courts appear to be more willing to supervise
arbitrability than they once were, courts continue to appear to be reluctant to
invoke the unconscionability concept or to apply it as a general norm.
Instead, courts have looked for particular attributes of an arbitration clause
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIvISM (1973);
ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF REFORM (1968); Louis LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 1-25 (1979); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley,
Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan & Bush, 57
ALB. L. REV. 1111 (1994) (examining Regan's and Bush's attempts to appoint Supreme
Court Justices who would reverse the liberal policy decisions of the Warren Court).
2 4 See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
25 See id. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market
Concept and Its Lessons for the Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 393, 417-23 (2003) (finding a role for unconscionability analysis in
policing standard form contract terms but advocating establishment of legal rules and
limits rather than ad hoc judicial supervision based upon unconscionability norm);
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality: Standard Form Contracts and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1290-95 (2003) (advocating judicial use of
unconscionability analysis to police contracts but only where term is "inefficient"); Carol
B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandry: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability
Doctrine, 31 N. MEX. L. REv. 359, 386-98 (2001) (arguing that standard form contracts
promote efficiency and that contract policing doctrines other than unconscionability, such
as fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and mistake, are more efficient avenues of redress).
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that are classified as unreasonable as a prerequisite to refusing enforcement.
If such attributes are not present, the judicial tendency continues to be one of
arbitration clause enforcement, with few courts appearing to take an overall
view of the fairness of the arbitration provision as a whole in light of the
context of the contract.26 Many courts continue to give unconscionability
concerns the judicial equivalent of the cold shoulder and are unmoved by
arguments that an arbitration clause lacks minimal fairness. 27
However incomplete, unaggressive, or sub-optimal, unconscionability
analysis of arbitration agreements has made something of a comeback in the
late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. Just as nature abhors a
vacuum, water seeks to be level, and ecosystems work to retain
environmental stability, the legal system has witnessed an incremental effort
by lower courts to soften the rough edges of the Supreme Court's pro-
arbitration jurisprudence through rediscovery of what might be called the
26 See infra Part llI.C.
27 See, e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 417-24 (7th Cir. 2002)
(determining that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable for barring punitive
damages and class wide treatment of disputes); Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 853
So.2d 194, 204-07. (Ala. 2002) (finding an arbitration term in an employment contract
enforceable; court finds nothing oppressive about a group meeting and pep talk for new
employees where a signature to the form was required); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis,
813 So. 2d 820, 824-25 (Ala. 2001) (finding arbitration clause enforceable where
borrower did not demonstrate inability to obtain financing from lender without arbitration
clause); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385-86 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Locke v. Raymer, No. 6029074, 2002 WL 31025863, at *3-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
11, 2002) (holding that a one-year time limit for bringing action in any dispute arising out
of the contract is not unconscionable); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that it is not procedurally unconscionable to impose an
arbitration term on a credit card user through mailing standard form language along with
monthly billing coupled with consumer's continued use of care); Joseph v. M.B.N.A.
America Bank, N.A., 775 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Pyburn v. Bill Heard
Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 362-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding arbitration term not
unconscionable for requiring buyer to share costs unless buyer could demonstrate that the
total cost exceeded the amount likely to be incurred in litigation).
Although Potts and Green Tree are both Alabama Supreme Court cases finding no
unconscionability problem with certain arbitration terms, Alabama has also rendered
several prominent decisions refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. The mixture of
Alabama cases appears in large part to be the result of change in the composition of the
Supreme Court more than change in, or erratic application of, judicial philosophy, with
the current Alabama Supreme Court arguably more receptive to arbitration than were
predecessor compositions of the Court. See Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story: The
State's Experience with Arbitration Shows the Connection of Law to Politics and Culture,
24 DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2001, at 24; Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and
Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
583,627-29 (2002).
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"unconscionability norm"-a collective judicial view as to what aspects of
an arbitration arrangement are too unfair to merit judicial enforcement. In
rediscovering and reinvigorating the unconscionability norm for arbitration
law, the lower courts have begun to achieve an equilibrium of arbitrability.
How completely this equilibrium develops and how firmly it becomes
established remain open questions that are subject to solidification or
retrenchment based on the Supreme Court's future arbitration
pronouncements. 28 At this juncture, however, the seeming rediscovery of the
unconscionability norm, however incomplete, in modem arbitration law
reflects several significant points worth considering.
First, when the Supreme Court announces and imposes arguably
erroneous or unfair legal doctrine, lower courts29 appear to respond by
utilizing what other legal doctrines (unforeclosed by Supreme Court
precedent) may be available for correction or mitigation of perceived
excesses by the Court or private actors capitalizing on advantages conferred
by the High Court. Lower courts and other socio-legal forces work to
produce an equilibrium of moderation and compromise rather than enforcing
the Court's doctrinal pronouncements to their fullest extent. Regarding
enforcement of arbitration agreements, it is as if many lower courts have in
recent years been "tapping the brakes" on arbitration rather than allowing
contractual proponents of arbitration clauses to accelerate to the degree that
might have been initially suggested by the Court's cheerleading for
arbitration. This equilibrating tendency appears to be activated in part by the
excesses of opportunistic legal actors attempting to capitalize on problematic
legal doctrine. For example, the late 1980s and 1990s saw businesses
attempting to mandate arbitration before favorable tribunals in situations
where arbitration had not been used.30
28 See infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
291 use the term "lower courts" as a matter of convenient shorthand for describing
judicial tribunals other than the Supreme Court. I realize that purists may dislike the term
in that the United States judicial system is a federal one in which state court systems are
separate from the federal system and not "inferior" to it. Nonetheless, as a practical
matter, U.S. Supreme Court decisions ordinarily are final and dispositive, irrespective of
whether the High Court reviews a decision of a lower federal court or a state supreme
court.
30 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297, 334-40 (noting the differences between "old" ADR
traditionally used for commercial contracts and "new" ADR affecting consumer and
employment contracts). See, e.g., Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue: In
Significant Legal Shift, Doctors, Gyms, Cable Services Start to Require Arbitration,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003, at Dl.
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Second, the role played-and yet to be played-by the unconscionability
concept demonstrates the continued vitality and importance of the concept,
including judicial power to apply unconscionability doctrine where necessary
on an ex post and ad hoc, situation-specific basis despite concerns that this
may be inefficient judicial aggrandizement of power or may produce
inconsistencies in application.
Third, the judiciary's slow and continuingly reluctant application of what
I call the "unconscionability norm," even in cases where it would clearly be
helpful, suggests both that the judiciary has been unduly cowed by the critics
of unconscionability, and that the critics of unconscionability-even the
justly revered Professor Arthur Leff-have been too strident in criticizing the
concept. Developments in the arbitration field taking place in the years since
Leff wrote underscore the continued necessary role of unconscionability
analysis in the judicial policing and enforcement of arbitration clauses, and
perhaps all contract terms.
Part II of this Article reviews the development of the Supreme Court's
arbitration jurisprudence. Part HI examines the application of arbitration
clause enforcement in the lower courts and the emergent judicial use of
unconscionability and related analyses to police arbitration agreements. Part
IV reviews the unconscionability doctrine as well as criticism and defense of
the concept. Part V argues that unconscionability became unfashionable at
essentially the same time the Supreme Court became infatuated with
arbitration, resulting in judicial reluctance to restrain arbitration through
unconscionability analysis until lower courts were forced to resort to the
concept in view of the Court's foreclosure of other avenues for restraining
arbitration abuses. Part VI focuses on potential future development and
argues that a reasonably vigorous unconscionability doctrine remains an
appropriate and important means for courts to prevent arbitration abuses.
Although the unconscionability norm presents drawbacks, it remains an
essential tool for policing arbitration terms in contracts. Arbitration clauses,
more than most contract terms, are a type of contract provision meriting
substantial judicial scrutiny as to fairness because of the inability of most
laypersons to effectively assess ex ante the value they will ultimately place
on judicial access or at least leverage as to the shape of any alternative
forum.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT' S MODERN ERA OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
ENFORCEMENT
A. Historical Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Federal
Arbitration Act
Arbitration has a venerable history31 predating modem controversy over
arbitration. It has long been a dispute resolution forum of choice among
merchants in a particular industry. 32 Stock exchanges and mercantile markets
frequently require arbitration among members with particular rules. 33
Written, bilateral arbitration agreements existed at least as far back as
medieval Venice and the Italian city-states active in trade.34 However, courts
in the United States were historically reluctant to enforce pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. 35 The reluctance even rose to the level of recalcitrant
31 See Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment: Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REv. 417, 419-23 (2000) (describing Bet
Din, a form of ADR similar to arbitration and in use for centuries in Judaism); see also
DRAHOZAL, supra note 1, § 1.05; IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §
4 (1995); WESLEY STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS §
60 (1930). See generally Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law:
Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984) (describing
arbitration in colonial times);
32 See Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DIs. RESOL. 759, 760-67 (2001) (noting variety of arbitral mechanisms
historically and currently). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595,
597-98 (1928) (noting arbitration among Roman merchants).
33 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 1, at 158-65; Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION Ch. 11 D (4th ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003).
34 See Stempel, Public Policy, supra note 1, at 270 n.31 (noting records of
arbitration agreements in Renaissance Italy).
35 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d
Cir. 1959) (noting historical judicial resistance to any contract provision that would tend
to remove the court from its jurisdiction); D.G.R., Note, Effect of the United States
Arbitration Act, 25 GEO. L.J. 443, 445 (1937) (observing that the primary purpose of the
FAA was to legislatively overrule the anti-arbitration cases of the common law); see also
Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution of
Future Disputes: The Tradition of Revocability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2003) (noting resistance to arbitration agreements but viewing judicial attitude more
charitably as part of an overarching doctrine permitting revocability of contracts in
certain situations). See generally Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856); Kill v.
Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 332 (1746); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New
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prejudice among some courts, which declared such pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable because they effectively "ousted" the court from
what would otherwise be its clear jurisdiction. 36 Courts on occasion also
thwarted arbitration through an extremely narrow reading of the scope of an
arbitration clause. 37
In response to this judicial resistance to arbitration, the business
community and the commercial bar, particularly the New York bar,
successfully lobbied for passage of a national law making arbitration
agreements specifically enforceable. 38 The Federal Arbitration Act was
passed in 1925 and took effect on January 1, 1926.39 The Act provides for
enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate so long as the arbitration
clause is in writing and the contract in which the arbitration agreement is
contained evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce. 40 Of
course, in 1925, notions of interstate commerce were considerably less
expansive than they came to be and remain today.41
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926) (noting the historical attitude of
courts as a major impetus for passage of the FAA).
Recent scholarship has made a strong case that this conventional wisdom of judicial
hostility toward arbitration is overstated and even a "fallacy." See LeRoy & Feuille,
supra note 13, at 272-77 (contending that most courts were not directly hostile to
arbitration but that certain prominent cases in that vein have been overemphasized in the
traditional rendering of arbitration history). Even if the LeRoy and Feuille thesis is
correct, there is no question that the perception of the proponents of the Federal
Arbitration Act and, more importantly, the Congress that enacted it, was one of judicial
hostility toward specific enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses.
36 See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. PA. L. REV. 132, 139 (1934).
37 See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Atlanten, 232 F. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), affd, 250 F. 935 (2d Cir. 1918), affd 252
U.S. 313, 315 (1920) (taking an extreme, arguably absurdly narrow, reading of a broadly
worded arbitration clause and thus finding grounds to refuse to enforce an arbitration
provision against a party refusing to arbitrate).
38 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1-22 (1997); DRAHOZAL, supra note 1, § 4.01; STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 209-83
(4th ed. 2003).
39 See United States Arbitration Act, 68 Pub. L. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003)).
40 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
41 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 141-227 (13th ed. 1997); GEOFFREY STONE, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 258-313 (1986). Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 269-77 (1918) (finding that federal child labor law was an invalid exercise
of Congress's commerce power, as the manufacturing of goods is not "commerce" unless
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not paid much attention to this
development in making the sweeping pro-arbitration pronouncements
discussed in Part II.B, below, but that is the subject of another critique, one
that has left the Court largely unmoved.42 The Act also specifically states that
an arbitration clause in a "contract of employment" is not enforceable, a
seemingly clear limitation on the Act's endorsement of arbitration that has
also been effectively gutted by the Supreme Court despite the Court's
frequent rhetoric purporting to favor applying the plain meaning of statutory
text.43
it involves a direct link to transportation across state lines) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (determining that federal agricultural regulations were a valid
exercise of commerce power, because a significant amount of wheat that was the subject
of regulation would eventually cross state lines, either as raw goods or as ingredients in
other food products).
The 1990s saw something of a rebirth of a more limited notion of interstate
commerce in some Rehnquist Court decisions. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 73-78 (2000) (limiting application of the ADEA on sovereign immunity
grounds and limiting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (striking down the civil enforcement provision of
the federal Violence Against Women Act as exceeding the Commerce Clause power of
Congress); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-25 (1997) (striking down a portion
of the Brady Act on gun control, which required state cooperation with the federal law
enforcement scheme); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-73 (1996) (invalidating
a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and overruling Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991) (noting
concern for and giving deference to state prerogatives and federalism as a canon of
construction for statutes and the Constitution). But see Nevada v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972,
1976-77 (2003) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar application of the
Family and Medical Leave Act to states and that state employees are entitled to exercise
rights under the Act). On the whole, however, the New Deal Era's judicial expansion of
the reach of the Commerce Clause and the broad notion of what constitutes interstate
commerce remains intact enough to say with certainty that today's notions of interstate
commerce are broader than those prevailing at the time the FAA was passed.
42 See Stempel, supra note 3, at 266-80 (arguing that it is incorrect for the Supreme
Court to seize upon expanding the notion of interstate commerce to expand the reach of
the FAA generally without also applying this concept to give section 1 of the FAA, which
makes arbitration agreements inapplicable for employment contracts, similar expanded
construction; instead, courts continue to give workers section 1 protection from
arbitration clauses only if they are directly engaged in interstate movement of goods).
43 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
119 (2001) (holding that an arbitration clause contained in a worker's retail employment
contract is not exempt from the FAA); Gilmer v. Interstate/Jonson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 25 (1991) (holding that an arbitration agreement required of workers at a securities
firm was not an arbitration provision in a "contract of employment"); Stempel, supra note
3, at 266-80.
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Viewed as a whole and in light of its limited but clear legislative history
and political background, it is clear that the Act was designed largely to
ensure that written arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts
between merchants were enforced. The business community strongly desired
pro-arbitration federal legislation because of a view that arbitration provided
a lower cost alternative to traditional litigation that also had the benefits of
expert fact finders from business and industry rather than the use of judges or
juries less familiar with the subject matter at issue.44 Support for arbitration
also appears to have stemmed from the view that arbitrators would be
relatively free to decide matters according to the informal norms of an
industry or the more specialized contractual understandings of business, a
type of "Law Merchant" basis for decision.45  Comparatively few
businesspeople appear to have considered whether they would be better off
under a more formal legal regime should they become embroiled in a purely
legal contract dispute unmoored from any norms or fact questions specific to
the industry-or they considered it and concluded that the greater informality
and flexibility of the law in arbitration was likely to be better for them should
they be in breach or claiming damage from breach. The reduced prospect of
punitive damages awards or other damages in arbitration appears not to have
been a conscious consideration during the discussion of the Act.
Interestingly, the business community favored arbitration even before the
expansion of discovery in civil litigation occasioned by the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. As might be expected, the business
community has become more convinced of the relative cost savings of
arbitration as the perception has grown that modem civil litigation is
particularly expensive, intrusive, and cumbersome because of the availability
of broad (albeit narrowing in recent years) discovery. 46 Comparatively few
44 See IAN MACNEIL, ET AL., supra note 31, at ch.1; Cohen & Dayton, supra note 35,
at 269-74.
45 See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 35, at 270-75; Wolaver, supra note 36, at 135-
38.
46 See Carrington & Castle, supra note 35, 266-67 n.59. The FAA was focused on
business, not
consumers, tenants, patients, or employees. It did not occur to anyone in 1925 that
the Act would be used as an instrument of "tort reform," to disable consumers and
employees from enforcing their statutory rights. In part, this was because there was
so little law protecting such persons. Labor law was a creature of collective
bargaining, and there was little consumer protection law that was privately enforced.
Id.; see John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation: A Survey of Business Lawyers' &
Executives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 56-58 (1998); John Lande, Getting the
Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. J. NEGOT.
137, 184-86 (2000); Stempel, supra note 30, at 334-40 (noting that arbitration as
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businesspeople appear to have considered the possibility that they might be
involved in a dispute in which they would prefer the greater discovery
provided in the courts--or they considered it and implicitly decided that on
balance they were likely to be better off with less discovery, reduced
disputing costs, or both.
Passage of the Act of course did bring a change in the law of
arbitrability. No longer could a court simply refuse to enforce an arbitration
clause as a matter of turf protection. Notwithstanding the Act, however, there
remained areas of difficulty which resulted in non-enforcement of arbitration
clauses in some circumstances. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company,47 the
Supreme Court held that the Act applied only to cases in federal court and
did not constrain state courts from refusing to compel arbitration, even if the
refusal was based on state-specific grounds at odds with federal law or the
majority rule in the states. In Wilko v. Swan,48 the Court ruled that a claim
brought pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 was not subject to arbitration
on the ground that the statutory language and intent was inconsistent with
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Wilko was often interpreted to mean that
arbitration of statutory claims-or at least certain statutory claims-was
precluded.49 On this basis, some courts refused to require arbitration of
originally contemplated by Congress and the drafters of the FAA was confined to the
subset of industry, involved systemic relationships, addressed commercial matters and
actors, and focused on contract rather than tort or statute). See generally Carrington,
supra note 4. But see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2003) (arguing that by language and design, the FAA is not limited to
commercial matters or disputes between relatively sophisticated parties).
4 7 Bernhardt v. Poylgraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956).
48 Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427,437-38 (1953).
4 9 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding
that an arbitration clause was not enforceable with respect to civil rights claims made
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 745-46 (1981) (holding that Fair Labor Standards Act claims are not required to be
arbitrated pursuant to arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agreement);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (holding that Title VII claims
are not arbitrable); Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F. 2d 544, 547-48 (9th Cir.
1983) (refusing to compel arbitration of ADEA claims); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d
585, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that patent claims are not subject to arbitration);
Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(holding that patent claims are not arbitrable); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 277-78 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that ERISA claims not
arbitrable).
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antitrust claims.50 If the antitrust claim was "intertwined" with otherwise
arbitrable contract claims, some courts refused arbitration altogether.51
B. The 1960s and 1970s: Gradual Change
The legal landscape of arbitration in the 1926-1960 period was one of
only partial judicial support for arbitration. Significant pockets of exception
to arbitrability remained. The 1960s began a gradual move toward greater
solicitude for arbitration with the Steelworkers' Trilogy.52 In these three
cases, the Court expressed a preference for resolving any uncertainties of
language in an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration and extolled the
general social benefits of arbitration-at least in the context of labor
disputes. 53 In addition, the Court articulated an extremely deferential
standard of review for labor arbitration awards: courts should affirm so long
as the arbitrator's decision "draws its essence" from the agreement,
seemingly irrespective of whether the arbitrator's decision was in accord
with the legal regime.54
Although the Steelworkers' Trilogy, by definition, addressed labor
arbitration, which differs from commercial arbitration and consumer
arbitration, the holdings and rhetoric of the Trilogy were clearly a boost for
broad construction and enforcement of arbitration clauses. In Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company,55 the Court gave a similar boost
to commercial arbitration agreements by holding that a defense of fraud in
the inducement to the contract containing the arbitration clause was a defense
that related to the contract as a whole (and hence was arbitrable) rather than
50 See, e.g., Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117-
19 (7th Cir. 1978); Helfenbein v. Int'l Indus., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1971);
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
51 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
52 See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
53 Technically and (to a large extent) practically, labor arbitration and non-labor
arbitration are two separate worlds. The former is governed by the common law powers
of courts pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act while the latter
is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Thus, there are some differences in labor
arbitration law and non-labor arbitration law. To a large extent, however, the
jurisprudence of the two types of arbitration moves in tandem. Consequently, the
emerging pro-arbitration labor law decisions such as those of the Steelworkers' Trilogy
served to exert hydraulic pressure in favor of a more pro-arbitration jurisprudence in
matters of commercial law, and ultimately, noncommercial, non-labor arbitration as well.
54 See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
55 Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
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to the making of the arbitration agreement alone (which was and continues to
be a matter for judicial decision in first instance). Prima Paint had the effect
of moving more contract disputes into the arbitration forum at the outset and
making it less likely that a party resisting arbitration could engage in a war of
attrition through pre-award judicial challenges to arbitration. 56 There were a
few setbacks for arbitration during the 1960s. For example, in one case the
Court refused to enforce an arbitration clause that required one party to incur
significant inconvenience by disputing the matter in a distant forum.57
Occasionally lower courts applied similar reasoning to refuse enforcement of
arbitration clauses. 58 In addition, although a defense of fraud in the
inducement to a contract was first presented to the arbitrator, defenses based
on fraud in the factum, duress, and coercion were used by courts to negate
arbitration clauses. 59
In the 1970s, the Court continued to show incremental growth in its
support of arbitration agreements but also continued to show reluctance to
require arbitration of certain sorts of claims grounded in statutory law. The
56 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 1, at 55, noting that
Under the separability doctrine as adopted by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint, an
arbitration clause is separable from the main contract entered into by the parties. In
other words, the agreement to arbitrate is treated as a separate contract from the
underlying contract, so that the arbitration agreement is untainted by any fraudulent
inducement as to the underlying contract .... [Separability] allocates decision
making authority between courts and arbitrators". . in a manner effectively
shifting more power to arbitrators than would be the case without separability.
Id.; see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 86 (2002) (affirming
the continued viability of Prima Paint and the separability doctrine and requiring
arbitration of client service agreements); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to
Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts
with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 838-83 (2003) (criticizing breadth of
Prima Paint separability doctrine and arguing that the Court could have used the
Howsam case as a vehicle for reducing Prima Paint's delegation of power from courts to
arbitrators).
57 See Moseley v. Elecs. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 170-72 (1963).
5 8 See, e.g., AAACon Auto Transport, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 537
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding the arbitration clause in a car transit agreement not
enforceable against a consumer where it provides for an extremely inconvenient forum
for the consumer); Miller v. AAACon Auto Transport, Inc,, 434 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (S.D.
Fla. 1977), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1980).
59 See, e.g., Hellenic Lines v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 756-58 (2d Cir.
1967) (finding that proof of duress or coercion in connection with an arbitration clause
would make the clause unenforceable but finding insufficient proof of duress in the
instant case); Dougherty v. Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267, 273-76 (D. Del. 1987)
(finding that a claim of forged signatures to an arbitration clause alleges defense of fraud
in the factum and, if proven in court, negates the arbitration clause).
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Court ordered enforcement of an arbitration or forum selection provision in
two cases involving international transactions. 6° On the other hand, the Court
refused to order arbitration of job discrimination claims61 and certain labor
law claims.62
The 1970s also saw extra-judicial developments favoring greater court
receptiveness to arbitration. A burgeoning alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) movement was developing. Chief Justice Burger frequently extolled
the benefits of ADR generally and arbitration in particular.63 The 1976
Pound Conference, organized and supported by the Chief Justice, both
endorsed ADR and engaged in what many found to be litigation-bashing. 64
Several federal courts introduced court-annexed, non-binding arbitration of
relatively small contract and tort disputes and found the results positive. 65
60 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (holding
that an arbitration clause is enforceable in a claim related to an international securities
dispute); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1972) (enforcing a
forum selection clause in a high seas towing agreement despite great leverage enjoyed by
the towing company when the ship was disabled).
61 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-60 (1974) (holding that
Title VII claims not arbitrable).
62 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 734-46 (1981)
(holding that National Labor Relations Act claims are not arbitrable).
63 See generally Warren A. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274
(1982) (arguing for greater use of ADR to make for faster resolution of disputes and to
ease court dockets).
64 See Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor King, 10 O11O ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 99,
100-01 (1994) ("ADR was publically [sic] declared in 1976 at the Roscoe Pound
Conference [and represented] a turning point on a public debate that began ... in the
1960s when opposing groups of people voiced dissatisfaction with the American legal
system."); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 11 Ol-4o ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 216-18 (1995); Stempel, supra
note 30, at 310-12; Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It
Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155, 1156-58 (1993) ("[Tlhere was an unmistakable
tone at the Conference that the.., alleged litigation explosion would have to be
controlled").
The formal title of the Pound Conference was the "National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," popularly known
as the Pound Conference because of Harvard Law Dean Roscoe Pound's 1906 speech of
the same name, which was delivered in St. Paul, Minnesota, Chief Justice Burger's
hometown and the location for the 1976 Conference. The most frequently cited article
emerging from the papers presented at the 1976 Conference is Frank E.A. Sander's
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111-14 (1976), in which Professor Sander
introduced the concept of the "multi-door courthouse."
65 See generally Raymond J. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way,
69 A.B.A.J. 64 (1983) (commenting favorably on a court-annexed arbitration program in
his judicial district).
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C. The 1980s: Sea Change
Although some Supreme Court decisions of the early 1980s continued to
limit the reach and enforceability of arbitration agreements, 66 such rulings
were the exception in what by the mid-1980s became a series of cases that
both changed the "meaning" of the FAA and the ground rules for its
application and expressed the Court's substantive policy preference for
arbitration and other forms of ADR as part of an arguable judicial backlash
against the perceived excesses of civil litigation.
In 1983, the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Company,67 required arbitration of a construction dispute,
finding that defenses to arbitration such as laches and estoppel should be
interpreted narrowly. Of perhaps greater jurisprudential importance, the
Court in Moses H. Cone also found a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration over litigation when there were questions as to the scope of a
written arbitration agreement. 68
In 1984, the Court rendered perhaps its most significant arbitration
decision. In Southland Corporation v. Keating,69 the Court required
arbitration of a dispute between franchiser and franchisee notwithstanding a
state law invalidating such agreements. In doing so, the Southland Court
declared that the FAA was not merely a procedural statute governing the
treatment of arbitration clauses in federal courts. Rather, the FAA created a
substantive federal law regarding arbitration as part of a "national policy"
favoring arbitration.70 Southland effectively overruled the 1956 Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Company7' decision. Oddly, the Southland majority opinion did
not even cite Bernhardt, much less acknowledge its inconvenient existence.
Only Justice O'Connor's dissent noted Bernhardt, arguing that it was rightly
decided and entitled to more deference through stare decisis than it was
66 See supra note 49, discussing cases limiting arbitration of civil rights and other
statutory claims. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are not arbitrable); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1981) (holding that certain FLSA claims not
arbitrable).
67 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1983).
6 8 See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 ("Section 2 [of the Act] is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements .... "); see also
Stemlight, supra note 4, at 17-18 (viewing Moses H. Cone as perhaps the key case
launching the Court's era of modem arbitration law and criticizing the decision for
essentially inventing purported national policy favoring arbitration out of whole cloth).
69 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984).
70 See id. at 10-11.
71 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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accorded by the Southland majority in its fervor for the national policy
favoring arbitration. 72
In 1985, the Court effectively ended the "intertwinement" doctrine that
barred arbitrability when arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims were
enmeshed. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd,73 the Court compelled
arbitration of arbitrable issues, ruling that there was no reason to delay the
arbitration of these claims merely because related claims between the parties
were not within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The Court again
expressed support for arbitration as a policy concept and rendered a legal
holding requiring arbitrability, again in a franchiser-franchisee context but in
an international setting. The Court rejected contentions that either the
logistical inconvenience of the arbitral forum or the substantive identity of
the arbitrator constituted a basis for refusing to enforce the arbitration clause.
In particular, the Court interred the intertwinement exception to arbitrability
that refused to require arbitration where the dispute presented a mix of
contract and statutory claims. 74 In 1987, the Court reaffirmed its view (first
stated expressly in Southland) that the FAA created substantive federal
law-and that it pre-empted any state legislation that attempted to treat
arbitration clauses less favorably than other types of contractual
agreements. 75
Many viewed these decisions as signaling reduced support for the
Court's then 30-year-old Wilko v. Swan decision restricting arbitration of
securities disputes because of the language and purpose of the Securities Act
of 1933.76 Certainly, the securities industry saw an opportunity as it
increased the use of arbitration clauses in its brokerage agreements and
sought to enforce them in individual litigation and industry public relations
efforts. The court seemingly validated this assessment in the 1987
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon decision, 77 which required
enforcement of an arbitration clause in a brokerage agreement despite
customer claims of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Wilko
was formally overruled in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
72 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 23.
73 Dean Whitter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-27 (1985).
74 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628-40 (1985).
75 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-92 (1987) (finding that the FAA
preempts a California statute making wage disputes nonarbitrable).
7 6 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953).
77 Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 237-38 (1987).
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Express, Inc. ,78 which held that claims made pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933 were in fact arbitrable.
As during the earlier decades, proponents of arbitration in the 1980s
occasionally lost a round in the ongoing struggle between arbitration
enthusiasts and critics. For example, in a labor dispute, the same Court that
created a national arbitration policy in Southland and resolved doubts in
favor of arbitrability in Moses H. Cone found the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement in a subsequent case to be insufficiently
broad to encompass the dispute, and refused to compel arbitration. 79 For the
most part, however, any neutral observer would have to conclude that the
1980s was a breakthrough decade for arbitration. What had once been a
procedural statute controlling only the federal courts was now a body of
national substantive law. Where there had previously been a regime of
neutrality to contract provisions regarding arbitration, there was now a
"national policy" in favor of arbitration. Where in the past even broadly
worded arbitration clauses had been forced to yield to certain statutes, it now
appeared that both statutory and contract-based claims were subject to the
same new pro-arbitration regime.
What is to some degree extraordinary about the 1980s is that this
arbitration revolution took place with essentially no serious discussion by the
Court as to the contract doctrine and methodology that would govern
construction and enforcement of arbitration clauses. Instead, it was largely
assumed by the Court that the text of the arbitration was the only yardstick to
assess arbitrability. Essentially no attention was paid to questions of the
linguistic or hermeneutic certainty of the words on the face of the arbitration
clause, or to the surrounding circumstances of the contract, the specific intent
of the parties, or the overall purpose of the agreement. Nothing was said
about course of performance, course of dealing, usage in trade, or the
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties.
In short, the focus was on arbitrability in the abstract rather than on any
questions or how courts might apply the general contract law that they were
directed to utilize in making arbitrability decisions pursuant to Section 2 of
the FAA, which mandated that arbitration agreements be enforced on the
same basis as any other contract term. Although this is to some degree
understandable in that the Court's primary role is to provide constitutional,
statutory, and doctrinal guidance on matters of national import (rather than to
act as a nine-person version of Farnsworth on Contracts), the absence of
7 8 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86
(1989).
79 See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643, 650-52 (1986).
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serious contract construction discussion by the Court is both odd and
disappointing. As noted above, the Court in the 1980s effected a revolution
in arbitration law. One might have reasonably expected that it would at least
sketch for the lower courts the governing body of arbitrability law it
anticipated would replace the deposed older order. Instead, the Court made
reference only generally to broad contract principles without articulating and
examining them, giving little guidance to lower courts. When more guidance
came from the Court during the 1990s, it left many thinking that the Court
would have been better off remaining silent.
D. The Supreme Court in the 1990s and the Twenty-First Century:
Conviction of the Convert, an Embrace of Textual Formalism, and
Occasional Doubt
As noted above, the new arbitration jurisprudence of the 1980s said very
little about contract law methodology for construing arbitration clauses.
Implicitly, however, the Court appeared to be endorsing a textualist and
formalist preference regarding construction of arbitration agreements. By
textualist, I mean that the Court not only favored the normal contract canon
of applying the words of the contract as written, but also that the Court
appeared to believe that there was not much more to the inquiry regarding the
meaning of the arbitration clause than to examine the face of the document
containing the clause.80 There is little in the Court's arbitration opinions to
suggest that nontextual indicia of meaning were to be considered unless the
arbitration clause was ambiguous on its face. By formalist, I mean that the
Court suggested that if the words of the arbitration clause appeared to
encompass the dispute at issue, arbitration would be compelled without
much, if any, consideration of other factors courts may consider as part of the
process of contract construction, application, and enforcement. The less
80 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 817-48 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the
textualist school of thought in statutory interpretation); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15,
§§ 7.7-.13 (describing textualism and approaches to interpreting contract language). See
generally James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992) (describing the divide
over formal and functional approaches as one of "text of contract" versus "context of
contract environment" and also suggesting that in non-insurance contracts, textualism is
the rule). My own view is that Professor Fischer may be correct in arguing that
nontextual factors have greater influence for insurance disputes, but I believe he is
incorrect to the extent that he suggests that the formal "rules" of construction differ for
insurance and non-insurance contracts. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, §§ 4.04, 4.08, 4.09.
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formal approach to construing contracts is often described as "functional" or
"instrumental." 81
Certainly, the Court's other cases of the period concerning contract
interpretation, and its cousin, statutory interpretation, were viewed by many
as adopting a textualist and formalist approach.82 Thus, it was perhaps hardly
surprising that this proved to be the Court's approach to arbitration clauses as
well. For example, the Court did not give any particular consideration in
Southland to the possibility that the arbitration provision insisted on by a
franchiser might be procedurally or substantively unfair to a franchisee.
Neither did the Court worry much that the arbitration clauses in the
brokerage contracts at issue in McMahon or Rodriguez might be
substantively unfair, unfairly surprising, or simply not really agreed to by the
customers raising securities claims. The Court rejected the notion that the
mere status of the agreements as contracts of adhesion might invalidate them,
a position completely consistent with the textualist/formalist approach.
Once the Court addressed what might be regarded as "second-generation
post-Southland" arbitration, its preference for textualism and formalism
became clear. Perhaps the best example is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.83 In Gilmer, the Court faced the question, one raised late in the
litigation, of whether section 1 of the FAA applied to bar enforcement of the
arbitration clause at issue. Plaintiff Gilmer was in the securities industry, but
as a broker and employee rather than as a customer. When he was
discharged, he sued, alleging age discrimination by his employer, who sought
to compel arbitration pursuant to a securities industry-wide agreement
Gilmer had signed as a condition of beginning his employment. Section 1 of
the Arbitration Act states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
8 1 See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JUDICIAL PRIMER 145 (1994) (using the term "instrumentalism"
and also legal realism); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law:
Dusting Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1058-73 (1991) (using
the formalist-functionalist dichotomy to explain different results reached by different
courts construing the same standardized insurance policy language); see also Peter Nash
Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic
Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 634-36 (1996) (arguing that both textual
and nontextual considerations can be accommodated in construing contracts).
8 2 See Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 58-60 (1995);
Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the
Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 221-25 (1995); G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431, 434
(1993). The judicial trend toward textual focus and formalism was not confined to the
Supreme Court. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case
Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 425-27 (1986).
83 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 84
Incredibly, the Supreme Court avoided a direct confrontation with
section 1 by ruling that the arbitration agreement signed by Gilmer was
neither a "contract of employment" nor part of a contract of employment, 85
thereby making section 1 inapposite by judicial fiat (save for the dissenting
voice of sanity from Justice Stevens, who correctly characterized the
majority's maneuver as transparently evasive). 86
A decade later, the Court was forced to reach the section 1 issue of
arbitration clauses in employment agreements in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams.87 St. Clair Adams, a former sales associate (i.e., what most of us
would less euphemistically call an employee, a worker, or a salesperson) at a
branch store of the electronics retailing giant, alleged race discrimination in
connection with his discharge, invoking Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Circuit City moved to compel arbitration, winning in the trial court but losing
before the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court took the case and supported
Circuit City's position. Faced squarely with the section 1 issue that it avoided
in Gilmer, the Circuit City v. Adams Court held that despite the seemingly
clear "plain meaning" of section 1, this portion of the Act did not bar
enforcement of the arbitration clause. Drawing on lower court precedent and
what many regard as a strained view of the legislative history of the Act, the
Court found that section 1, although written in language at least as broad as
the typical arbitration clauses (usually enforced by the Court) worked only to
prevent forced arbitration based on clauses found in the employment
contracts of workers directly engaged in interstate commerce activity.
To state the obvious, I view Circuit City v. Adams (and the precedent on
which it drew) as wrongly decided.88 But whoever is correct about the "real"
meaning of section 1 of the Act, the Gilmer and Adams decisions both
qualify as very formalist decisions even if they are arguably anti-textual. In
other arbitration cases of the 1990s, the Court was more consistently both
84 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
85 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
86 See id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court majority "skirts the
antecedent question whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts").
87 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 116-24 (2001).
88 See Stempel, supra note 3, at 304-05. In addition, I was a signatory of an amicus
brief submitted on behalf of Adams arguing that arbitration clauses in such employment
contracts are specifically placed outside the FAA. See also Finkin, supra note 3, at 289-
97 (arguing in particular that courts have incorrectly understood congressional intent
underlying the employment contract exception); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 36
(criticizing the Court's view of the section 1 employment exception to arbitration).
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textual and formalist. Most of all, however, Circuit City v. Adams was pro-
arbitration and largely dismissive of any potential contract-based arguments
against arbitration enforceability as well as any state contract law that
appeared even modestly directed against arbitration agreements.
Other court decisions took a similar view favoring a broad reach of the
FAA as a matter of federal law. For example, in Perry v. Thomas,89 the Court
held that the FAA preempted state legislation making wage claims
nonarbitrable. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,9° the Court
reiterated the view that any state statute or judicial doctrine providing for
increased regulation of arbitration provisions, but not other contract terms,
was in violation of the FAA. However, the Casarotto Court, like the Perry
Court, kept the door open for more generic judicial policing of arbitration
agreements even as it was barring the door to state attempts to regulate
perceived abuses specific to arbitration, stating:
Repeating our observation in Perry, the text of § 2 [of the Act] declares that
state law may be applied "if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." Thus,
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2.
Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions. By enacting § 2, we have
several times said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be
placed "upon the same footing as other contracts." [The Montana law
regulating disclosure of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements that is
the subject of the Court's review] directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA
because the State's law conditions the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable
to contracts generally. The FAA thus displaces the Montana statute with
respect to arbitration agreements covered by the Act.9 1
In its other arbitration decisions of the 1990s, the Court continued its
generally supportive stance, finding little that might invalidate arbitration
provisions. The Court continued to take a broad view of what constitutes
interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA and to view the FAA as
substantive federal law.92 The Court also reaffirmed its view that
89 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-92 (1987).
90 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996).
91 Id. at 686-87 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
92 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-76 (1995).
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characterizing the FAA as federal substantive law required that any contrary
state law specific to arbitration be struck down,93 although selection of state
law in the same contract containing an arbitration clause required that any
applicable state law restrictions on arbitration be observed.94 Although
several Justices frequently praised federalism and state prerogatives, the
Court rendered its pro-arbitration holdings despite strong opposition from
many state attorneys general. 95 In EEOC v. Waffle House,96 however, the
Court ruled that the EEOC is not precluded from seeking judicial relief for a
worker, including back pay, reinstatement, and damages, due to the worker's
arbitration agreement with the employer. On a matter arguably related to
unconscionability concerns, the Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph,97 held that an arbitration agreement that was silent as to fees was
not rendered unenforceable.
Although rejecting the arbitral challenge before it in Green Tree, the
Court also gave some aid and comfort to the unconscionability norm,
suggesting that arbitration clause provisions or procedures that imposed
excessive burdens through fee shifting might be unenforceable:
It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum. But the record does not show that
Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration. Indeed, it contains
hardly any information on the matter.... The "risk" that Randolph will be
saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of
an arbitration agreement...
[W]e believe that where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring such costs. Randolph did not meet that burden. 98
93 See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687-88.
94 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63--64 (1995)
(holding that the selection of New York law in the choice of law provisions of a contract
containing an arbitration clause does not also incorporate New York law barring
arbitrators from ordering punitive damages); see also Volt Info. Scs., Inc. v. Bd of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 490-92 (1989) (holding that a contract with
an arbitration clause and a choice of law provision must honor both and apply the chosen
law to issues of contract formation and enforcement).
95 See Stemlight, supra note 4, at 20.
96 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295-96 (2002).
97 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).
98 Id. at 90-92. The Court continued:
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In a more recent arbitration decision, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,99 the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the 1967 Prima Paint decision
and its approach to the question of which tribunal is accorded initial and
primary jurisdiction over the issue of arbitrability, ruling that a dispute over
the applicability of the NASD six-year limit for bringing securities claims
was not a dispute as to arbitrability and therefore should first be presented to
the arbitrator. There is still arguable inconsistency and confusion in this area
as both Howsam and Prima Paint can be read as inconsistent with First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,'° ° which ruled that the Kaplan claim
regarding the scope of the arbitration clause should be heard initially by the
Court.
During 2003, the Court decided two arbitration cases on narrow grounds.
The thrust of both decisions suggests that the Court continues to adhere to its
pro-arbitration stance.
The Court in 2003 reviewed the Eleventh Circuit's decision In re
Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation,10 1 which held that an arbitration
agreement may not preclude arbitrators from considering a possible award of
treble damages in conjunction with a physicians' RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act) claim against an HMO, reasoning
that a provision barring punitive damages in the arbitration clauses at issue
intruded too greatly on the treble damages remedy provided by RICO. 10 2 The
Eleventh Circuit decision was obviously in tension with the Supreme Court's
modem arbitration law in that the appellate court appeared to have based its
decision on the distinctive statutory right to treble damages, which it viewed
as quite distinct from the contractual relations of the disputants. 10 3 In
How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking
arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not
discuss; for in this case neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on
the merits was there any timely showing at all on the point. The Court of Appeals
therefore erred in deciding that the arbitration agreement's silence with respect to
costs and fees rendered it unenforceable.
Id. at 92. The Court also declined to rule on Randolph's argument that the arbitration
clause impermissibly precluded her from bringing Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims as
a class action. Id. at 92, n.7.
99 Howsam v. Dean Ritter Reynolds, Inc., 573 U.S. 79, 85-86 (2002).
100 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-47 (1995).
101 In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cit. 2002), rev'd sub
nom., Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003).
102 See Humana, 285 F.3d at 973, 976; see also Paladino v. Avnet Computer
Techns., Inc., 134 F. 3d 1054, 1061-62 (11 th Cir. 1998).
103 See Humana, 285 F.3d at 976, stating
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contrast, the Supreme Court during the past twenty years has specifically
overruled or implicitly backed away from cases suggesting that statutory
rights are not arbitrable. 0 4
The physician claims against Humana/Pacificare are distinguishable,
however, in that the issue in the case was not the arbitrability of the RICO
claim or statutory claims generally, but whether the arbitration clause can
permissibly restrict remedies that would be available pursuant to statute.
However, there is a Catch-22 quality about the distinction the Eleventh
Circuit sought to draw between remedy and forum while at the same time
asserting an intertwinement of the punitive and treble damages. According to
the Eleventh Circuit, an arbitration agreement barring punitive damages is
generally permissible, but this remedy limitation becomes improper in a
statutory claim for treble damages because of the similarity between treble
damages and punitive damages. 105 Although treble damages share a purpose
of deterrence and punishment with punitive damages, the Eleventh Circuit
argument seemed strained from the outset. Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court reversed.10 6
In the past, the Supreme Court has evidenced general hostility toward
any state statute that restricts arbitrability or treats arbitration clauses
differently than other contracts. 10 7 The Humana/Pacificare case did not
require the Court to address the unconscionability analysis under the FAA,
but presented an opportunity. The lower court opinions in the cases appear to
accept that arbitration agreements may restrict punitive damages so long as
the punitive damages concept is not commingled with statutory remedies.
However, one can certainly argue that a restriction on punitive damages,
treble damages, or any other remedy, violates the unconscionability norm by
being unreasonably favorable to the drafter. The briefs of the parties and
Here, the doctors' suit does not rely upon or presume the existence of an underlying
contract; the RICO claims in this case are based on a statutory remedy Congress has
provided to any person injured as a result of the illegal racketeering activities. This
remedy stands apart from any available remedies for breach of contract, and clearly
is not "intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract
obligations."
Id.
104 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of
statutory exceptions to arbitrability).
105 See Humana, 285 F.3d at 973-74.
106 See Pacificare Health Sys, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003).
107 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's view that the
FAA creates substantive federal law that displaces any contrary state law).
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amici raised this issue, which also arose during oral argument, 10 8 but the
issue was not addressed by the Court.
It is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit, making its decision in relatively short time after the oral
argument. 1 9 Perhaps equally unsurprisingly, the Court did not use the
HumanalPacificare decision as an opportunity to make broad
pronouncements about federal arbitration law or to address the
unconscionability question. Instead, the Court decided the case on the
narrower ground that the Eleventh Circuit simply read too much into the
provision limiting arbitral remedies, and that when properly read, the
arbitration clause could not be interpreted as a matter of law as
impermissibly restricting statutory remedies of treble damages in a civil
RICO claim. 110 Consequently, it was premature for a court to interfere with
the arbitration. 111 The case was remanded for further proceedings. If the
Court had been inclined, it could have used Humana/Pacificare as the
vehicle for both deciding whether limitations on remedies makes an
arbitration term unconscionable, and outlining a general approach to
arbitrability under the FAA. Although the general law of contract used to
determine arbitrability has traditionally been state law, as suggested by the
language of section 2 and the legislative history of the FAA, this would not
preclude the Court from reading a general unconscionability norm into the
FAA, particularly since Southland made the FAA substantive federal law.
10 8 See Brief of Respondents at *9-11, Pacificare Health Sys. Inc. v. Book, 123
S.Ct. 1531 (2003) (No. 02-215) (arguing that waivers of statutory rights in arbitration
agreements are unenforceable); Brief of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, at *3-5, Pacificare (No. 02-215); Brief of National Association of
Consumer Advocates as Anicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at *4-6, Pacificare
(No. 02-215) (arguing that the bias of certain arbitration organizations makes arbitration
clauses selecting these organizations unconscionable); Reni Gertner, Is Arbitration
Agreement Barring Punitives Enforceable?, LAW. WEEKLY USA, Mar. 17, 2003, at 1
(reporting on an oral argument in the case). The Petitioners implicitly disputed the
doctors' unconscionability argument but the Petitioners' brief and reply brief are
explicitly directed toward the issue of arbitrability on the basis of contract and statutory
text. See generally Petitioners' Brief, Pacificare (No. 02-215); Petitioners Reply Brief,
Pacificare, (No. 02-215); see also Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at *8, Pacificare, (No. 02-215) (making argument that
contract containing damage or remedy limitations is not inherently unconscionable).
109See Pacificare, 123 S. Ct. 1531. The Pacificare oral argument was held on
February 24, 2003. The decision was issued April 7, 2003.
110 See id. at 1535-36.
111 See id.
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The Supreme Court also reviewed the South Carolina Supreme Court
decision in Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp.1 12 In Bazzle, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement employed by
Green Tree, a consumer lender, did not preclude class wide treatment of the
consumer claims against Green Tree.113 Specifically, the Bazzles and others
alleged that Green Tree had violated the South Carolina Consumer Protection
Code. 114 The South Carolina Supreme Court decided: (a) the Green Tree
arbitration clause was effectively silent as to class wide consideration of
claims and therefore should not be construed to prohibit such claims; and (b)
that section 4 of the FAA, the portion of the Act empowering courts to
compel arbitration, applied only to federal courts and did not govern state
court proceedings.11 5 The arbitration clause in question stated:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this
contract... shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator
selected by us with consent of you. This arbitration contract is made
pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1 ... THE PARTIES
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY
HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION BY US
(AS PROVIDED HEREIN) ... The parties agree and understand that the
arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract. These
1 12 Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), cert. granted, 123
S. Ct. 817 (2003), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
113 See Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360-61.
114 See id. at 351-52; see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-102, 37-10-105 (Supp.
1997). Specifically, the Bazzle claim was that Green Tree's solicitation and lending
documents in connection with home improvement financing failed to comply with the
attorney and insurance agent preference notice requirements of the statute.
115 See Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360-61. Section 4 of the Act (court power to compel
arbitration by a recalcitrant party) can be technically distinguished from section 2 of the
Act, which merely states that arbitration agreements are specifically enforceable and says
nothing about the procedure for enforcement. However, this appears to be the classic case
of a distinction without a difference. If section 2 of the Act makes arbitration agreements
specifically enforceable, this implies that a court with proper subject matter and personal
jurisdiction may act to enforce an arbitration agreement. Section 4 merely confirms this
truth about this judicial power and provides some guidance as to the procedure for
enforcing arbitration agreements. This appeared to be the view of the Supreme Court in
vacating and remanding Bazzle on the question of arbitrator authority to determine the
availability of class action treatment. The Court did not even address the South Carolina
Supreme Court's section 4 argument. See id.
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powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not
limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.1 16
Bazzle presented a more significant opportunity for the Court to modify
its arbitration jurisprudence than did the Humana/Pacificare case. For
example, at least one amicus brief argued that the case presented an
opportunity to overrule Southland, or at least restrict its reach
circumstantially. 117 The Court implicitly spumed this invitation to reconsider
Southland and did not address the issue, save for the lone dissent of Justice
Thomas, which reiterated his longstanding disagreement with
Southland. 118
Neither did the Court simply affirm the South Carolina Court's
seemingly correct contract interpretation decision finding that the language
of the Green Tree arbitration clause does not preclude class treatment of the
consumer protection claims in arbitration.' 19 The arbitration clause certainly
116 See id. at 2405.
117 See Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at *2-
*6, Bazzle (No. 02-634) ("This Court should overrule Southland and hold that the FAA
does not apply in state court or preempt state law."). In the interest of full disclosure, I
note that I was one of the law professors signing the brief, which was largely written by
University of Wisconsin Professor David Schwartz and University of Houston Law
Professor Richard Alderman, both prominent critics of the Court's modem arbitration
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts: A Callfor Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237 (2001); Schwartz, supra
note 10.
I am not as critical of Southland as are many in the academy. See, e.g., Carrington,
supra note 4, at 265. However, the Schwartz and Carrington criticisms have persuaded
me that Southland should be reversed in order to avoid problems in application and also
because of the problems noted in this Article; the Court consistently provides an
uncritical embrace of arbitration but is unwilling to engage in a serious, functional
contract analysis in order to police arbitration agreements so that arbitration clauses do
not become instruments of abuse. See supra text and accompanying notes 82-83
(discussing Court's textualist, formalist view of contract law). In theory, Southland's
holding of the FAA as substantive law can co-exist with a contract construction
methodology sufficiently protective of consumers. In the absence of this type of an
approach to contracts by the Court, it would be better if the reach of Southland and the
FAA were curtailed and state legislatures were permitted to specifically regulate
arbitrability.
118 SeeBazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2411.
119 Here, the South Carolina Supreme Court opinion appears indisputably correct as
a matter of contract interpretation. The arbitration clause at issue was silent on the matter
of class action treatment, despite Green Tree's strained argument that the clause, by
referring to "this agreement," meant to preclude class treatment. As the South Carolina
Court concluded, the language at issue is at least ambiguous and must therefore be
construed against Green Tree as the drafter and in favor of the consumer that accepted the
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does not contain any prohibition on class wide treatment of arbitral claims.
The most natural reading of the clause is that class action arbitrations are
permitted because "the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by
law." 120 Instead of merely affirming the South Carolina decision, the Court
engaged in a bit of deferral. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority (and
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Scalia) held that the type of
interpretative question at issue (the availability of class wide treatment of the
claim of lending disclosure violations) was one to be decided in the first
instance by the arbitrator rather than by a court. 121 Consequently, because the
record suggested that the trial court had ordered the arbitration to proceed on
a class basis (giving the arbitrator no say on that issue), the matter was
vacated and remanded for the purpose of having the arbitrator make a de
novo determination of the class treatment question. 122 Even though the
arbitrator had awarded more than $19 million to the plaintiffs, it was Justice
Breyer's view that it remained unclear as to whether the arbitrator would
have proceeded with class action arbitration in the absence of the orders of
the South Carolina Court.
Justice Stevens concurred and dissented, agreeing to join the Breyer
group in order to ensure that there would be a "controlling judgment of the
Court," but would have preferred to simply affirm the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
The parties agreed that South Carolina law would govern their arbitration
agreement. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held as a matter of
state law that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not prohibited by
the applicable arbitration agreement, and that the agreement between these
parties is silent on the issue. There is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act
that precludes either of these determinations by the Supreme Court of South
standard form provision (unless there was other persuasive extrinsic evidence of party
intent or contract meaning). See id. at 359-60. Notwithstanding what to me seems the
unassailable strength of this analysis of the arbitration clause as a matter of contract law,
case law exists treating the silence of arbitration terms as meaning that the arbitrator lacks
authority to consolidate claims made by different customers. See Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 67-71, 83 (2000) (noting cases and criticizing this analysis).
Perhaps more important, three members of the U.S. Supreme Court (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy) found the Green Tree clause so clear
as to preclude class wide arbitration as a matter of law a textual construction that seems
simply bizarre in light of the open language of the clause quoted above in text. See
Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. at 2408.
120 See id. at 2405.
121 See id. at 2407-08.
122 Id.
789
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Carolina. Arguably the interpretation of the parties' agreement should have
been made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court.
Because the decision to conduct a class-action arbitration was correct as a
matter of law, and because petitioner has merely challenged the merits of
that decision without claiming that it was made by the wrong
decisionmaker, there is no need to remand the case to correct the possible
error.123
Although the Bazzle decision implicitly achieves an acceptable result
(class treatment of claims is permitted if this is the arbitrator's determination
and such treatment is not clearly foreclosed by the text of the arbitration
clause), the decision is something of a dodge in that only Justice Stevens was
willing to simply affirm the South Carolina court and give precedential force
to what seems to be a clearly correct reading of an open-ended arbitration
clause (such open clauses do not implicitly forbid class wide arbitration).
Ominously, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy were so eager to
prevent arbitration claimants from enjoying the procedural benefits of class
action case processing that they adopted a very strained interpretation of
Green Tree's arbitration clause, declaring that the clause "clearly" barred
class wide arbitration because it used the word "you" to refer to the consumer
signing the arbitration agreement and speaks of disputes arising under "this"
contract. 124
Elements of the Court and perhaps the Court as a whole continue to
exhibit strong sentiments in favor of businesses drafting arbitration clauses of
adhesion, even to the point of issuing dissenting opinions with
embarrassingly bad contract analysis. 125 The inevitable conclusion seems to
123 Id. at 2408 (citations omitted).
124 See id. at 2409--10.
125 1 realize it is a bit undiplomatic to be so critical of the work product of three
Supreme Court Justices. But bad is bad. The Rehnquist dissent in Bazzle flunks Contracts
101 in its textual analysis. First, terms like "you" and "this contract" are the type of
generic boilerplate that should not be accorded more substantive meaning than it can
logically bear. Second, the clause clearly does not specifically address class actions by
name, much less specifically forbid them. Third, the clause does state that the arbitrator
"shall have all powers provided by law" when acting as a private judge. Bazzle, 123 S.
Ct. at 1205. A real judge of course clearly has power to order class wide treatment of
claims provided that the criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met. Thus, the
arbitrator presumably enjoys similar power under the plain language of the clause.
Fourth, to the extent that there is uncertainty of contract meaning that cannot be resolved
through compelling extrinsic evidence, the hombook rule of contract law is that
ambiguities are construed against the drafter. Green Tree authored the clause in question
and thus should lose on the interpretative point absent language much clearer than the
language actually before the Court. Fifth, public policy analysis is an appropriate part of
contract law. Public policy factors favor the availability of class wide treatment of small
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be that these three Justices are more interested in ensuring that arbitration
limits claimant rights and protects businesses than they are in fairly applying
conventional contract doctrine.
Notwithstanding that the Court in Bazzle spurned the invitation to
reconsider the Southland holding that the FAA created substantive federal
law, it is interesting to note that five members of the current Court have at
times expressed disagreement with Southland126 and the view that the FAA
creates substantive federal law. The potential for the Court as a whole to
revisit and alter the Southland holding seems ever-present, particularly in
light of the sustained academic criticism of Southland.127 But Southland
probably will survive through a combination of stare decisis (in that,
although problematic, it has been controlling law for nearly twenty years and
is supported by current preferences, at least among political elites, for ADR
and arbitration) and voting theory (in that the Justices with misgivings about
Southland tend to have different reasons for their disagreement and are
claims such as those in Bazzle. Without class treatment, the grievant has reduced
incentive to vindicate the law and the matter may be adjudicated inefficiently in
piecemeal fashion. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, regarding general rules of
contract construction.
126 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority decision in Southland is "unfaithful to congressional intent,
unnecessary, and inexplicable); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating "the Court has effectively rewritten the [Federal Arbitration Act] to
give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend"); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "I
will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it, since Southland will
not become more correct over time"); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating "In my
view, the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply in state courts"). Justice Thomas
continued to adhere to this view in Bazzle and thus dissented from the Court's majority
opinion remanding the matter to South Carolina for a decision of the arbitrator
interpreting whether the clause permitted class wide treatment. See Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at
2411.
127 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. But see Drahozal, supra note 5, 105-08
(arguing that Southland was correctly decided and that congressional intent underlying
the FAA was to create substantive as well as procedural law). Professor Drahozal's
defense of Southland is most well-timed and may influence the Court even if it is never
cited. He provides a reasonable argument in favor of the FAA as substantive law that will
be persuasive to many. At the very least, his thesis may give one or two of the Justices
who have previously disparaged Southland reason for determining that Southland is
sufficiently incorrect to merit overruling in light of the Court's general policy of stare
decisis.
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unlikely to coalesce around a single opinion to overrule or significantly alter
the Southland holding). 128
Thus, as Southland approaches its twentieth anniversary and Supreme
Court solicitude for arbitration moves toward a golden anniversary, it is
likely that the Court's support of a substantive pro-arbitration regime will
remain intact. Similarly, the current Court's textualist and formalist approach
to contract matters is unlikely to change in the near future. These traits of
arbitration law will continue to frame and govern the work of lower courts.
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that lower courts have to a
degree rediscovered unconscionability analysis as one of the relatively few
grounds remaining available for the policing of arbitration agreements.
IIM. LOWER COURT REACTION TO THE NEW ERA OF FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE HALTING REDISCOVERY OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. Past Unconscionability Precedents Regarding Arbitration Clauses
and Form Contracts
To borrow a phrase from Judge Posner, unconscionability is not some
"newfangled" doctrine of contract law.' 2 9 The concept has been around for
centuries 130 and is perfectly consistent with the governing norms of contract
and policy reasons underlying freedom of contract: consent, bargain, free
will, free exchange, and wealth maximization.13 ' Although an aggressive or
reckless use of the doctrine holds the potential to interfere with contract law
and policy, this has historically been considered a matter of the doctrine's
128 See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 80, at 80 (describing the possibility of voting
paradoxes in which the preference held by most members of a group does not become the
official position of the group due to a variety of presentations of a question and the order
in which the issue is presented to the deliberative body). In addition, in any collegial
body such as a court, the strength of preferences of the members may play a role. For
example, even if five Justices are weakly in favor of modifying Southland, one or more
of these Justices may prefer not to engage in protracted struggle with one or more
Justices strongly holding to the view that Southland was correctly decided.
129 See Mkt. St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
duty of good faith performance in contract law).
130 See, e.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750) (holding
that a contract provision is unenforceable if it embodies an arrangement "such as no man
in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other").
131 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §§ 4.27-.28 (3d ed. 1999); STEMPEL, supra
note 18, § 4.10[b].
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proper use rather than its legitimacy. All major contract treatises recognize
unconscionability as a legitimate element of contract law even if they vary in
their enthusiasm for the concept. 132 The UCC, adopted in every state,
contains a provision expressly adopting unconscionability as a means of
policing sales contracts, although it leaves the term undefined. 1
33
But what exactly is unconscionability? The most famous
unconscionability law does not define the term 134 and neither do judicial
132 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 56, 70 (1970)
(recognizing the doctrine); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.27-.28 (summarizing the
doctrine); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4.1-
.2 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS]; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § § 4-1, 4-2
(1972) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, FIRST EDITION]; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET
AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 329-44, 330 (2002)
(recognizing the doctrine and observing that "[s]cholars trace the concept of
unconscionability back to Roman law and find traces of an unconscionability doctrine in
basic equity maxims such as 'clean hands"').
133 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998); see also EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 132, at 330
(finding that "modem American law of unconscionability has its roots in section 2-302"
and in the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), an influential decision striking down certain debt acceleration and creditors'
remedies provisions of a form consumer contract for purchasing furniture).
134 Section 2-302 of the UCC, which has been adopted in every state but Louisiana
(which has codified the concept in slightly different language in the Louisiana Civil
Code) states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998).
Comment 1 to this section attempts to flesh out the black letter pronouncement, by
stating that a criterion for determining unconscionability is:
whether, in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs
of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract .... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.
U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. n.1 (1998).
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opinions, at least not with great precision. 135 Although courts have been
reluctant to articulate a specific definition of unconscionability, there is
considerable case law articulating a rough definition that is largely accepted
by courts and commentators (and probably by counsel advising clients
drafting agreements as well). 136 Historically, a contract term was viewed as
unconscionable if it was unreasonably favorable to one of the parties. 137
In his well-known article discussed in more detail in Part IV.A below,
Professor Leff articulated two different types of unconscionability-
procedural and substantive. 138 Procedural unconscionability or "bargaining
naughtiness" (Leff s term) involves unfair contracting practices. Substantive
unconscionability involved terms that-no matter how openly set forth or
voluntarily accepted-are simply too unfair to merit judicial
enforcement. 139 The common law unconscionability definition of an
"unreasonably favorable" term is in essence a definition of substantive
unconscionability despite its generic phrasing.
Although the emergence of a specific unconscionability provision in the
UCC has led many to view unconscionability as a doctrine that "took off'
during the 1960s, the development of unconscionability is more complicated.
As noted above, the notion of unconscionability has roots in ancient times. In
addition, Anglo-American courts acting well before the UCC have invoked
both types of unconscionability-procedural and substantive-in
invalidating or modifying contracts on occasion. 140 Put another way, Karl
Llewellyn and the other drafters of the UCC did not create the
135 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 132, at 213 ("It is not possible to define
unconscionability. It is not a concept, but a determination to be made in light of a variety
of factors not unifiable into a formula.") (citing Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d
1308, 1313 (Wash. 1979) (stating that an unconscionability determination made by
considering many factors with no one factor determinative)).
136 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(acknowledging unreasonable advantage for one party); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc.,
544 P.2d 20, 23-24 (Wash. 1975) (citing inconspicuous terms and language inconsistent
with party understanding or lack of negotiation); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp.,
543 P.2d 283, 287 (Or. 1975) (acknowledging oppressive terms and an unreasonable
advantage for one party in light of the risks assumed).
137 See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 4.10[b] at 4-162-163.
138 See Leff, supra note 21.
13 9 Id. at 509-40.
140 See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding a
restriction on the sale of a fungible commodity to others is unconscionable); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 85-86 (N.J. 1960) (finding that a disclaimer of
implied warranty of merchantability is unenforceable). The court suggests that the
provision is so uniformly used by automakers and so unreasonably unfavorable to buyer
as to be unconscionable. Id.
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unconscionability concept out of whole cloth; they imported it into the UCC
from the common law predating the UCC.
Clearly, the concept of unconscionability has been around for some time
and has been deployed with some frequency. What is less clear is the inter-
relation between procedural and substantive unconscionability. In particular,
there is the question of whether a term that is not procedurally
unconscionable may be invalidated or modified because of its arguably
substantive unconscionability. A related issue is whether the doctrine has
applicability outside the realm of contracts of adhesion.
Although considerable precedent suggests that procedural
unconscionability is a prerequisite to any unconscionability-based
interference with contract text,141 this does not follow inevitably from either
the nature or logic of the unconscionability concept. Many cases, however,
appear to require the presence of both forms of unconscionability in order to
invalidate or make unenforceable a given contract term. But many other
cases utilize the unconscionability concept in either procedural or substantive
form alone.142 More important, the concepts are analytically distinct and
should not be needlessly co-mingled.
For example, an arbitration provision may provide for a perfectly
reasonable and even-handed arbitration scheme in the event of disputes but
be the product of the type of bargaining naughtiness Leff noted. The clause
may be in typeface too small to be read without a microscope. It may be in
written in complex legalese or other jargon incomprehensible even to the lay
141 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1251-78 (concluding that most courts have
required both imperfections in the bargaining process, or "procedural unconscionability,"
and an unfairly one-sided term, "substantive unconscionability," to exist before refusing
to enforce an unambiguous contract term).
142 See, e.g. Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (discussing a "sliding scale" examination where sufficient presence of
factors related to either substantive unconscionability or procedural unconscionability
make an offending provision unenforceable); Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845,
849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing a sliding scale); W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING
PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 142 (1996)
(recognizing that most courts use a sliding scale approach); Swanson, supra note 25, at
367. But see Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
that Pennsylvania law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability to
abrogate or modify a contract term); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, Inc., 977 P.2d 989, 995
(Mont. 1999) (finding the same for Montana law); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17
(1993) (describing most courts and commentators as defining unconscionability to
require both procedural and substantive unconscionability).
For example, the cases discussed in Part V of this Article finding certain arbitration
provisions to be unconscionable often based the finding and the court's action on the
presence of procedural or substantive infirmities standing alone.
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reader armed with a microscope. It may be stapled to the contract as an
"endorsement" after execution and never seen by the party that signed the
overall contract. The execution of the "container contract" (the contract
containing the arbitration term) may have been attended by an environment
designed to distract the adhering party or to pressure him or her into
reviewing and signing quickly (e.g., "Ms. Unsophisticated, Deferential
Consumer, there are twenty-eight people in line behind you. Do you want the
Miracle Widget or don't you? If you do, please just sign the contract so that I
can wait on the other customers.").
In any of these scenarios, even if the substantive content of an arbitration
clause is beyond reproach, most courts would have difficulty enforcing the
provision in light of the procedural unconscionability described above. Even
if the arbitration clause provided for full discovery followed by hearing
before a panel consisting of Jimmy Carter, Albert Schweitzer, and Mother
Theresa, the fact remains that the arbitration clause was arguably forced upon
the misled consumer or, in the case of the post-signature endorsement, the
product of outright fraud. One at least hopes that most courts would not take
a "no harm, no foul" approach to such procedural abuses. After all, if the
consumer really thought there was no harm, the economics of disputing
would also work to discourage the metaphorical unsophisticated customer
from challenging the arbitration clause in the text of the container contract.
Logic would appear to support a role for procedural unconscionability
standing alone. As a practical matter, however, there may be few occasions
for its invocation unless the court is quite sensitive to arguable procedural
abuses. Few businesses would attempt to add a post-execution change in the
contract without notice to the consumer, both because the provision would
likely be unenforceable and because it would drive potential customers away
if discovered. Similarly, businesses will ordinarily refrain from an overtly
coercive contracting environment that may make not only the arbitration
clause but also other aspects of the contract subject to challenge (although
commercial actors may not be above providing a contracting context that
tends to put more subtle pressure on the consumer and to reduce haggling).
Rational businesses can be expected to at least make arbitration clauses clear
and conspicuous since that would make enforcement more likely and
imposes relatively little additional cost on the business.
But what about the converse situation? Can an arbitration provision that
has no procedural defects be so substantively unconscionable as to be
unenforceable? Again, the correct answer would appear to be affirmative.
Assume that an arbitration clause is clearly written and not capable of being
overlooked in connection with the container contract or other aspects of the
transaction. The clause is carefully explained to the signing party, who is
asked to sign the arbitration clauses separately in addition to the executing
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the full contract. The signer is also given several days to reflect on whether to
enter the agreement and is even encouraged to consult an attorney.
Can any arbitration clause resulting from such a process be substantively
unconscionable? My answer is "of course"; this is the nature of the
distinction between substantive and procedural unconscionability. Some
contract terms may simply be too one-sided to be enforceable, at least in
some circumstances. For example, an arbitration clause providing that
disputes would be resolved by the drafting party with no right of judicial
review would probably not survive in many courts, even where the adhering
party is reasonably sophisticated and entered the agreement without
significant economic or other duress (although some courts might find such a
provision acceptable as applied to a sophisticated and well-heeled but foolish
or foolishly desperate commercial entity).
For business-consumer or employer-employee arbitration, the case for
substantive unconscionability, and the likelihood that courts will find it, is
stronger. If a job applicant is seeking work during a recession, he or she is
likely to agree to fairly oppressive arbitration clauses in the interests of
procuring employment. If a loan applicant is seeking financing for a home,
he or she may similarly accept some rather severe arbitration mechanisms no
matter how fulsomely these are disclosed and explained during the
contracting process.
Determining whether substantive unconscionability alone will avoid a
contract term can be difficult as well because the doctrine may be conflated
or co-mingled with notions of public policy. What if, for example, the
procedurally circumspect contract drafting party provides for an arbitration
mechanism in which disputes are resolved by the arbitrator torturing both
disputants, with the disputant who endures longest obtaining an arbitration
award in his favor (sort of a Marquis de Sade-style arbitration)? Although
such a provision is probably outright illegal in most jurisdictions and
certainly at odds with most people's concept of public policy, it is not at all
clear that the provision is unreasonably favorable to the drafting party
(although one would expect the rational drafting party to have a pretty high
pain threshold before coming up with this sort of dispute resolution
mechanism).
Throwing aside hypothetical detours, it appears that, at least in theory,
there can be substantive unconscionability without procedural
unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability results in practice, not
because contract drafters set out to design obscenely bizarre contract terms or
arbitration clauses, but because adhering parties are not fully rational-only
boundedly rational. Because most adhering parties-at least most consumers
and small businesses-are not realistically able to investigate the arbitration
provisions that are produced by even the most procedurally fair contracting,
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the realistic possibility remains that a nontrivial number of arbitration clauses
might be substantively unconscionable. 143 This phenomenon suggests a
legitimate, continued role for judicial policing of arbitration agreements on
the basis of substantive unconscionability as well as procedural
unconscionability. Although the UCC commentary about unconscionability
suggests that deals should not be modified simply because they result from
disparate bargaining power, this admonition for a code among merchants
should not prevent courts from appreciating the degree to which asymmetric
bargaining power-and sophistication, understanding, and impaired
rationality-might result in entry into unconscionable arbitration
arrangements by employees, consumers, tenants, medical patients, and
others.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's modem pro-arbitration
jurisprudence, however, lower courts generally did not attempt to invoke
either procedural or substantive unconscionability analysis to police
arbitration agreements. 144 For the most part, courts simply enforced the
arbitration agreements without much assessment of anything other than the
text of the clause and the basic formalities of contract formation. To the
extent that there were disputes over the making of the contract itself, these
were to be first sent to the arbitrator under Prima Paint (a procedure that
continues under Howsam and Bazzle).l45 Where the objecting party's
challenge was to the making of the arbitration agreement or its scope, this
was a decision for the court, but one made by most courts in the formalist
manner found in Supreme Court opinions without particular concern for
nontextual factors relevant to interpretation of the arbitration agreement,
including unconscionability analysis. 146
143 See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1234.
[A] non-salient term will not automatically become salient just because its content is
communicated to the buyer. A form term calling for arbitration of disputes in an
inconvenient state, for example, is likely to be non-salient to the vast majority of
buyers unless the type of contract in question commonly results in
disputes .... Notice" is a prerequisite of salience, but notice is not a sufficient
condition of salience.
Id.
144 See Drahozal, supra note 5, at 107-14.
145 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
146See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(suggesting no unfairness problem with the requirement that a Montana franchisee
arbitrate a dispute in Connecticut, the franchiser's home state), remanded Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596, 598 (Mont. 1995) (modifying arbitration clause due to
unconscionability); Wood v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427-29 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a panel of two Saturn dealers and two Saturn employees was not
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In response to Southland and its progeny, some states adopted laws
requiring greater indicia of disclosure or consent for the enforcement of a
predispute arbitration agreement. Courts have consistently refused to apply
these provisions, finding them pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act on
the ground that they were state laws discriminating against arbitration in
particular (rather than general state contract laws designed to further the
provision of information or to ensure the reliability of form contracts). 147
The emerging post-Southland jurisprudence of arbitrability in the lower
courts became one in which any specific restrictions on arbitration contract
formation or enforcement were likely to be struck down. The door remained
open for using general unconscionability doctrine as a policing mechanism
for arbitration agreements. For the most part, however, Courts during the
1980s and most of the 1990s appeared to be reluctant to invoke this
mechanism for adjudicating arbitrability disputes.
B. An Upsurge in the Unconscionability Approach in Reaction to
Oppressive Arbitration Agreements
Beginning in the late 1990s, courts appeared to become more receptive to
the application of general contract law of unconscionability as a means of
determining the force of arbitration clauses. Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 148 is perhaps the best known of this new
unconscionable or insufficiently neutral to arbitrate dealer's dispute with Saturn);
Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 2002) (enforcing a
boilerplate arbitration clause in a mobile home sales form against an owner's claims of
toxic tort damages); Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 853-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in a medical service agreement); Burton v. Mt. Helix
Gen'l Hosp., Civ. No. 14210, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1280, *17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(enforcing a form arbitration clause in a hospital's intake forms filled out by a patient as
part of the routine checking in for surgery); KFC Nat'l Mgm't Co. v. Beauregard, 739
So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (enforcing retroactively an arbitration clause
added after a food service worker began the job); Carol A. Crocca, Annotation,
Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1994) (noting similar cases
enforcing such clauses in medical service forms).
147 See, e.g., KKW Enters, Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising
Group, 184 F.3d 42, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the FAA preempts Rhode Island
statutes invalidating clauses in franchise agreements if a forum outside the state is
selected); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the FAA preempts a similar New Jersey statute); Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc. v.
Whaler Graphics, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that the FAA
preempts a similar Michigan statute); Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719,
722 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the FAA preempts Virginia law prohibiting
"nonnegotiable arbitration provisions").
148 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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generation of cases refusing to enforce arbitration terms on grounds of
unconscionability. The Armendariz Court ruled that an arbitration provision
that required employees-but not the employer-to arbitrate was
unconscionable. 149
Although lack of mutuality was the crux of the Armendariz holding, the
California Supreme Court articulated a number of other factors for judicial
scrutiny of arbitration terms based on the unconscionability norm: limitation
of remedies; inadequate discovery; imposition of unreasonable fees and
costs; and degree of mutuality as to each party's choice of arbitration or
litigation. 150
Armendariz applied a sliding scale test for determining
unconscionability, examining the challenged arbitration provision for both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. 151 However, under California
law as set forth by Armendariz, the challenged term must be contained in a
contract of adhesion to trigger further unconscionability analysis.152
Because Armendariz was a decision of the highest court of the largest
state, it has attracted considerable attention 153 and something of a following
in that it appears to have ushered in a series of cases refusing to enforce
arbitration clauses where the drafter and the non-drafter did not have mutual
options in the event of a dispute. 154 This view has met significant opposition,
however, from other courts 155 and commentators. 156
The unconscionability norm was stirred from slumber by Armendariz,
perhaps because it was one of the few remaining avenues for judicial
149 Id. at 689-99.
150 Id. at 691-98.
151 Id. at 689-90.
152 Id. at 689.
153 As of August 6, 2003, Armendariz has been cited in approximately 150 judicial
decisions and 70 law reviews or other legal periodicals such as A.L.R. annotations, rather
extraordinary figures for a case only three years old. See also Leroy & Feuille, supra note
13, at 287 (describing Armendariz as a "key decision" in a lower court "revolt" against
the excesses of Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence).
1 e infra text and notes 157-66, discussing decisions invalidating non-arbitration
provisions.
155 See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir.
1999) (deciding that an arbitration clause giving a consumer lender the unilateral option
to litigate or arbitrate is not unconscionable).
156 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 537, 541 (2002) (arguing that a mutuality requirement in arbitration clauses
"may result in arbitration proceedings that are less fair, rather than more fair, to
consumers" and that a mutuality requirement is inconsistent with general contract law).
Professor Drahozal also concludes that the Armendariz approach, despite its growth,
remains the minority view. Id. at 540.
800
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policing of arbitration agreements. However, there were unconscionability-
based decisions refusing to enforce arbitration agreements prior to
Armendariz. For example, in Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix,
Ltd.,157 the Arizona Supreme Court refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement entered into by a medical service provider on grounds of
unconscionability coupled with the arguably coercive setting in which the
agreement was obtained. 158 The court stated, "Contracts of adhesion will not
be enforced unless they are conscionable and within the reasonable
expectations of the parties. This is a well-established principle of contract
law; today we merely apply it to the undisputed facts of the case before
use."
159
During the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, courts have tended
to develop a typology of unenforceable arbitration agreements, although
these decisions vary in the degree to which they specifically invoke the
unconscionability norm. 160 In addition, many courts continue to reject
unconscionability-based defenses to arbitration clauses. 16'As discussed
above, the Supreme Court's arbitration law of the Southland era produced a
major shift in doctrine and power in favor of entities desiring to impose
arbitration and against those who seek to avoid compelled arbitration.
157 Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, LTD, 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (en
banc).
158 Broemmer was 21 years old, poor, and 16 weeks pregnant. Id. at 1014. She
sought an abortion under pressure from the father of the fetus, completing several forms
as part of patient intake, including a form containing a broad arbitration clause. Id. at
1014-15. During the course of the abortion procedure, she "suffered a punctured uterus
that required medical treatment," leading to a subsequent malpractice claim against
Abortion Services. Id. at 1050. Under the circumstances, the Arizona court concluded
that a valid agreement had not been formed. Id. at 1017. Although the Court's discussion
stresses the plaintiffs relative lack of information and choice, the opinion is founded on
notions of procedural unconscionability as well. Id. Accord Obstetrics & Gynecologists v.
Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam) (refusing to enforce an arbitration
agreement in similar circumstances, holding that the lack of sufficient consent precluded
formation of agreement).
159 See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1018. In dissent, Justice Martone argued that the
language of the arbitration clause was sufficiently clear as to make for constructive
consent by the patient. See id. at 1018-21 (Martone, J., dissenting). The Arizona Supreme
Court in Broemmer thus encapsulates the basic divide in the courts between formalist and
functionalist, textual and contextual approaches to arbitration clauses and contracts
generally.
160 See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (reviewing cases refusing
arbitration).
161 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text; infra notes 160-71 (reviewing
cases rejecting unconscionability defenses to arbitration).
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The judicial treatment of arbitration clauses reflected in the
unconscionability-based arbitration decisions of the past decade represents a
re-calibration of arbitration law toward a better balanced legal regime.162
Whether consciously or not, these cases suggest that many lower courts-
forced into the slanted pro-arbitration doctrinal straightjacket fashioned by
the Supreme Court-have begun to find a means of at least loosening the
straps even though early efforts in this regard were unsuccessful and
seemingly foreclosed. Because specific regulation of arbitration alone has
been struck down, lower courts appear to be increasingly willing to turn
toward general contract law and its attendant unconscionability norm in order
to regulate arbitrability to the degree seen necessary by these courts. 1 6 3 The
162 A similar phenomenon appears to have taken place regarding judicial
construction and application of the 1983 Amendment to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 11.
When Rule 11 was initially strengthened in 1983, courts for several years thereafter
applied it in a manner many found to be overly wooden and undermining of creative legal
representation, especially for civil rights plaintiffs. Decisions of the late 1980s and early
1990s adopted a more restrained and nuanced view of Rule 11. See generally Carl
Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105 (1992)
(comparing the current version to the 1983 version of the Rule and noting that sanctions
are discretionary rather than mandatory and attorneys and parties have a "safe harbor" of
time to withdraw contentions before a motion for sanctions may be filed with the court;
additional provisions also make Rule 11 less intimidating for those asserting claims for
relief). Despite this recalibration, criticisms of Rule 11 prompted further revision of the
text of the Rule in 1993. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
163 There still remain some battles on this front. In addition to reviving
unconscionability analysis, the California Supreme Court has held, despite the U.S.
Supreme Court precedents described above, that claims seeking injunctive relief sought
pursuant to certain state statutes are not arbitrable. See, e.g., Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67, 79 (Cal. 1999) (holding that claims for injunctive
relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act that are designed to protect the
public from deceptive business practices are not subject to arbitration). The California
high court, in a Spring 2003 decision, reaffirmed its commitment to Broughton's
approach and rejected a claim that the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Green Tree and
Circuit City required abandonment of this "public interest equitable action" exception to
FAA-driven enforcement of arbitration clauses. See Cruz v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc.,
66 P.3d 1157, 1164-68 (Cal. 2003) (holding that claims to enjoin misleading advertising
and unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 and 17500 are inarbitrable
but that claims for restitution and disgorgement of profits, being similar to actions for
money damages, may be arbitrated pursuant to contract term). Two justices dissented. Id.
at 1168 (arguing that Broughton and Cruz were inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court
holdings, including Southland, which began as this type of public interest statutory
enforcement action). Plaintiff Cruz also argued that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable, an argument the court declined to address in view of its holding
abrogating the provision on the basis of statutory interpretation and public policy. Id. at
1168.
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trend to increased policing of arbitration terms is sufficiently robust that
according to the authors of one study:
Critics of mandatory arbitration will also be unsettled... [by many of the
actual case outcomes]. Relying on textual passages from leading Supreme
Court cases, they worry that federal courts are in lock-step agreement with
the pro-arbitration Justices who authored these decisions. Some believe that
a legislative remedy is needed to undo damage from the Supreme Court.
The reality is, however, that lower courts sidestep these precedents more
often than is realized .... [T]he judiciary is currently developing a set of
due process guidelines consistent with common law traditions dating to the
early nineteenth century.... [C]ourts behave more consistently over
extended periods than either arbitration advocates or critics realize. 164
C. Continued Judicial Wariness Regarding Broad-Based Policing of
Arbitration Agreements Through Unconscionability Analysis
The recent "unconscionability evolution" concerning arbitration has been
something less than total and something less than coherent and fully
developed. First, as noted above, the revolution, or perhaps evolution, is
hardly complete. Lower courts remain divided as to what constitutes
unconscionability and under what circumstances the presence of
unconscionability invalidates an arbitration term. Nonetheless, there seems to
be a clear emergence of increased judicial use of unconscionability analysis
for arbitrability disputes. Although these cases are clearly doing so in part on
the basis of what might be termed the "unconscionability norm," they often
stop short of a full-fledged embrace of unconscionability as a general tool for
regulating contracts and usually do not attempt to articulate a general theory
of unconscionability.
Instead, these courts have focused on particular provisions in contracts
that are viewed as unduly problematic or unfair. Where such a provision is
found, as outlined in the rough typology of the preceding subsection, the
court labels this a fatal flaw and strikes down the arbitration provision (or,
more specifically, refuses to give it judicial enforcement). As a consequence
of this resurgence in policing arbitration agreements, drafters of arbitration
clauses and those who must (or are willing to) adhere to them have an
informal check to consult for attempting to predict the efficacy of such
arbitration arrangements. The case law policing arbitration agreements under
an unconscionability norm has established a number of specific traits that
may brand an arbitration clause as unconscionable:
164 See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 13, at 256.
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* Lack of mutuality regarding remedial options.165
* Lack of mutuality of obligation. 166
" Limitations on damages or other elements of remedy.167
165 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-
99 (Cal. 2000) (holding that it is unconscionable to permit an employer to select either
litigation or arbitration in the event of a dispute while an employee's only option was
arbitration); Pindeo v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 439-40
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Samek v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 793 N.E. 2d 62, 64-66 (111. Ct.
App. 2003) (determining that a one-way arbitration clause permitting an insurer to seek
trial de novo, given an award in excess of $20,000, violates public policy and effectively
becomes substantively unconscionable); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, Inc., 977 P.2d 989,
996 (Mont. 1999); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 859-62 (W.
Va. 1998); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894-96 (9th Cir.
2002) (applying California law and following Armendariz and also holding that an
arbitration clause was unconscionable because it limited the remedies available to the
employee); Drahozal, supra note 156, at 551, n.104 (citing seven unpublished California
Court of Appeals opinions following Armendiraz). But see Harris v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding an arbitration clause not
unconscionable for giving a drafting lender unilateral control of whether a dispute is
arbitrated or litigated). For a recent summary of California law regarding arbitration and
unconscionability, see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1173, 1180 (9th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting an arbitration term similar to the clause at issue in Circuit City on
the grounds of unconscionability).
166See, e.g., E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001);
Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 365-67 (Ark. 2000);
Labor Ready Cent. III, L.P. v. Gonzalez, 64 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App. 2001). Although
cases such as Armendariz appear to be on the rise, "[pirior to 1990, a number of courts
(although certainly not all) refused to enforce nonmutual arbitration clauses, relying on
the doctrine of mutuality of obligation-that both parties to an agreement must be bound
or neither is bound." Drahozal, supra note 156, at 542-43 (footnotes omitted) (citing
cases). See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985). See also
MACNEIL, ET AL., supra note 31, § 17.4.2 (viewing Hull v. Norcom as wrongly decided
because it rested on the New York law view that arbitration clauses need their own
consideration and are not supported by a contract's overall consideration, a result
inconsistent with the Southland admonition that the FAA preempts inconsistent state
law); Jarmillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 534-35 (Cal Ct. App.
2003) (suggesting substantive unconscionability due to de facto nonmutuality of
obligation and noting that a requirement in a lease of arbitrating all personal injury claims
would, as practical matter, only affect tenants, who are far more likely to be hurt on
premises than landlord). The case could be characterized as one turning on nonmutuality
of remedy and classified with Armendariz.
167 See, e.g., Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d
314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that a restriction on punitive damages in a RICO action
is unenforceable); Larry's United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a punitive damages exclusion is unenforceable); Paladino v. Avnet
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* Imposition of excessive fees or fee-shifting.168
* Selection of a seriously inconvenient forum.169
* Unduly tight deadlines forfiling claims. 170
Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (examining a
limitation on remedies); Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1994 (reviewing a restriction on exemplary damages and recovery of fees otherwise
available to prevailing plaintiff in statutory cause of action); Mandel v. Household Bank
(Nev.) Nat'l Ass'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385-86 (Cal. 2003), rev. granted, 65 P.3d
1284, 1284 (Cal. 2003) (finding an arbitration clause prohibiting class actions is
substantively unconscionable); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 150-52
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding an arbitration clause unconscionable for limiting a worker
to only "actual damages for breach of contract" in event of wrongful discharge); Kyocera
Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1003 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding
that parties are not free to contract for a customized standard of judicial review of an
arbitration award and that default rules set forth in the FAA are binding on federal courts
and may not be altered by private parties). But see Farrell v. Convergent
Communications, Inc., No. C98-2613 MJJ, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17314, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 29, 1998) (holding that "limitations on the amount of damages alone does not
render an agreement to arbitrate per se unconscionable, as parties are generally free to
contract as they see fit").
168 See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that an arbitration clause's imposition of the English Rule, which required the
loser to pay the opponent's counsel fees, is substantively unconscionable); Bradford v.
Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 559 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
high expense of arbitration imposed on the adhering party made the clause
unenforceable); Shanide v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the shifting of arbitration fees and costs to the losing party
made the agreement unenforceable); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569,
574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (refusing to enforce an International Chamber of Commerce
arbitration provision due to the high financial burden it would impose on the nondrafting
party). But see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that an arbitration term in a franchise agreement was not unconscionable on the
basis of costs likely to be incurred in arbitration); see also LeRoy & Feuille, supra note
13, at 316-18 (describing the division of the courts on this point).
169 See, e.g., Patterson v. ITTI Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-68
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the requirement that California consumers arbitrate in
Minnesota made the arbitration clause unconscionable); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700
N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ohio 1998) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement in connection
with a consumer loan due to its inconvenient forum and other unconscionable
provisions). But see Doctor's Assocs., 85 F.3d at 980 (rejecting the argument that
requiring arbitration outside of the state where the franchise is located made the
arbitration clause unconscionable).
170 See, e.g., Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266-67 (holding that the imposition of a 30-day
time limit for bringing an arbitration claim made the clause substantively
unconscionable); Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2000)
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* Pressure tactics to induce obtain signatures. 171
" Insufficient neutrality in the arbitration mechanism. 172
* Fraudulent aspects of the arbitration term or its implementation.173
" Inadequate assent to the arbitration term.174
(holding that a 60-day deadline for challenging a health plan coverage determination
through arbitration was too short).
171 See, e.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (discussing an employer that gave workers a maximum of 15 minutes to review
and sign a 16-page document); Sun Trust Bank v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 184 F. Supp. 2d
1246, 1256, 1261-62 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that an arbitration agreement presented to
a guest at a Bahamas resort upon arrival from the continental United States was
unenforceable because it offered the guest no realistic opportunity to reject the clause; the
only alternative to adhering to terms was abrupt and inconvenient change of travel and
lodging plans); Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (holding that arbitration agreements were procedurally unconscionable because
Spanish-speaking workers were forced to sign contracts with arbitration terms that were
written in English).
172 See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 337 F.3d 697, 704-06 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an arbitration clause that gave employers excessive control over the process
and selection of arbitrators was unconscionable); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that an arbitration term was unconscionable
because it provided an unfair advantage to the employer in selecting arbitrators); Penn v.
Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944-49 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (voiding
an arbitration term that resulted in a three-person panel with two arbitrators having ties to
the provider organization and the employer); Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of
State ex rel., 49 P.3d 647, 650-51 (Nev. 2002) (holding that an arbitration term in a home
sale agreement that gave the builder's warranty insurer an "unilateral and exclusive right
to decide the rules that govern the arbitration and to select the arbitrators" was
"oppressive" and substantively unconscionable); see also Floss v. Ryan's Family
Steakhouses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging concerns over
competence and possible bias of arbitral arrangement but refusing to enforce agreement
on other grounds).
173 See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 916-22 (1997)
(finding an arbitration term misleading as to speed and other aspects).
174 See, e.g., Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266 (holding that an arbitration term imposed in
an employment contract as a condition of employment when new employees arrived for
an orientation meeting constituted procedural unconscionability); Jaramillo v. JH Real
Estate Partners, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a clause
in a lease that required arbitration of personal injury claims was unenforceable because
the tenant had no realistic opportunity to consider and decline the provision); Badie v.
Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the
placement of a preprinted insert into a credit card bill was insufficient to appraise the
cardholder of an arbitration provision and its implications); DirectTV, Inc. v. Mattingly,
829 A.2d 626, 633-39 (Md. 2003) (holding that an arbitration provision that was
[Vol. 19:3 2004]
ARBITRATION UNCONSCIONABILITY
* Retaliating against workers who refuse to sign arbitration
clauses. 17
5
* Any combination of these deficiencies.176
embedded in a customer agreement, which was sent with the billings, provided
inadequate notice and was unenforceable); Burch v. District Court, 49 P.3d 642, at 650
(Nov. 2002) (holding that an arbitration term buried in a lengthy and complex home
warranty agreement gave insufficient notice and was procedurally unconscionable). But
see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the placement of a preprinted insert with an arbitration clause inside the computer
packaging created an enforceable arbitration agreement when the customer opened the
box and removed the product for use).
175 See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 (1lth Cir. 2002)
(reversing the District Court on this point).
176 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172-73 (9th Cir.
2003):
Several substantive terms of Circuit City's arbitration agreement are one-sided. The
provisions concerning coverage of claims, the statute of limitations, the prohibition
of class actions, the filing fee, cost-splitting, remedies, and Circuit City's unilateral
power to modify or terminate the arbitration agreement all operate to benefit the
employer inordinately at the employee's expense. Because these one-sided
provisions grossly favor Circuit City, we conclude that, under California law, these
terms are substantively unconscionable ....
Id.
The Ingle Court also found the agreement procedurally unconscionable in that the
worker had no meaningful choice as to the term and further found that the
unconscionable aspects of the provision so infused the arbitration clause that they could
not be severed. See id. at 1172, 1179-80.
In addition, courts may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements on the basis of other
statutory directives deemed to override the FAA. See, e.g., Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d
375, 384 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the regulation of arbitration provisions in health
insurance plans overrode the FAA pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which makes
the business of insurance subject to state regulation). This sort of restriction on
arbitration, however, is not grounded on the unconscionability norm.
Cases that restrict enforcement of an arbitration term against one who did not sign
the contract in question are closer to the unconscionability norm, but are more properly
classed as based on agency principles. See, e.g., Allen, 71 P.3d at 378-81 (Colo. 2003)
(holding that a wife was not bound by the deceased husband's signature to a HMO health
services contract containing an arbitration term); Shea v. Global Travel Mktg, Inc., No.
4002-910, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 5755, at *13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003)
(holding that an arbitration clause that was signed by a mother was not binding on the
father who sued for the wrongful death of an 11-year-old child killed by hyenas while on
an African safari with the child's mother); see also Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1255-78
(providing similar categorization of the types of unconscionable conduct or provisions of
arbitration terms).
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D. Evaluating the "New Unconscionability" ofArbitration
Agreements
The advent of renewed unconscionability-based scrutiny of arbitration
clauses is on the whole a positive trend. It interjects considerations of
fairness and contracting context that have been largely absent in the Supreme
Court's arbitration jurisprudence 177 and thus serves the equilibrating function
posited for lower courts in this Article. In the absence of sufficient judicial
use of the unconscionability norm, arbitration case law may be more
indeterminate and inconsistent than when unconscionability analysis is
performed by courts policing contracts. As one commentator summarized
after reviewing decisions seeming to alternate between enforcement and
nonenforcement of arbitration decisions:
How and why are the courts arriving at such drastically different
conclusions? While slight differences in facts may explain some
discrepancies, a bigger factor seems to be judicial attitude. Some of these
courts are untroubled by the claims that the arbitration clauses were surprise
packages in contracts of adhesion, while some courts were very troubled
indeed. The differences appear on the surface to be inconsistent applications
of state and federal law. Perhaps courts simply fail to understand the
difficult doctrines of unconscionability, contracts of adhesion, and the reach
of the commerce clause.
There is a different way to explain the messiness of the case law.
Courts with reservations about arbitration of personal injury claims are not
allowed a direct attack. Precluded by the FAA from basing decisions on
concerns about consumer arbitration generally, those courts use the tools
available. They rule on issues that are supposed to be heard by the
arbitrator. They ignore the FAA, or hold the contracts to be intrastate and
apply more protective state law. They construe the clauses narrowly. They
use state law contract defenses broadly to find clauses to be unconscionable,
or grasp at the plaintiff's illiteracy to find lack of consent. Failing that, they
protect spouses and children who have not actually signed the contract
containing the arbitration clause. In doing so, they often render opinions
that are technically incorrect. Small wonder that this area is full of
177See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting With Tortfeasors: Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2003):
The Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence, with its emphasis on formal
agreement to contract terms, underplays the fairness of contract law. When the
parties to a contract have disparate bargaining power, disparate knowledge, and
disparate interest, both the moral and economic bases of contracting demand more
than the mere outward trappings of contract.
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inconsistent cases. The law applied in these cases often serves as a proxy
for the courts' more basic concerns. 178
On the whole, I agree with Professor Thornburg's comment. Many of the
arbitrability decisions of the post-Southland era, particularly where a court is
refusing enforcement and failing to follow the Supreme Court's formalist
template, give the impression the courts are attempting to shoehorn the
situation into a category that will prevent enforcement. However, I would
disagree with Professor Thornburg to the extent that she sees the
unconscionability norm as part of the problem. I see it as part of the solution,
provided the unconscionability norm is applied candidly, straightforwardly,
and with relative consistency as well as some caution and reluctance to
render decisions adverse to contract text or any demonstrable efficiencies
delivered by the arbitration system of which the challenged clause is a part.
Unconscionability can be more effectively deployed, however, if deployed
generally, with the court freed from the need to find a particular type of
offense in order to trigger the unconscionability analysis. Put another way,
the unconscionability norm should not reflect the type of indirection or
obfuscation found in other, covertly anti-arbitration precedents.
The new, situation-specific unconscionability of arbitration thus seems a
mixed blessing. On the positive side, as noted above, it at least gets courts
back into the business of policing arbitration clauses, something the Supreme
Court has largely been unwilling to do except in rare instances. If anything,
the Court has been more interested in policing any effort to restrict the reach
of an arbitration clause. Certainly, the Court has not been interested in
providing a clear template for the use of lower courts in policing arbitration
agreements. 179 In addition, the mild invocation of unconscionability seen
178 See Thornburg, supra note 177 (footnotes omitted).
179 Of course, the Justices might respond to such a criticism by asserting that it is not
their job to provide a road map of contractual unconscionability and that this is a task for
the tribunals applying respective state contract law. At this juncture, it appears that the
contract law of arbitration agreements (as opposed to the specific performance questions
addressed in the text of the FAA) is governed by general state contract law, which will
not be disturbed unless the state law specifically targets arbitration terms for disparate
treatment. However, if the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the Southland view that
the FAA creates substantive federal law of arbitrability, it would not be inconsistent to
treat all general contract issues surrounding an arbitration agreement as a matter of
federal common law in order achieve consistency in arbitrability decisions irrespective of
different general state contract law. Although since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78-79 (1938) it is accepted that there is no "general federal common law," federal
common law is applied in order to vindicate important federal interests. See e.g., City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (describing the rationale for, and instances of,
federal common law). This doctrine has been used to justify use of federal common law
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
thus far poses little risk of "runaway judicial activism" or similar judicial
meddling that might interfere with markets. Because the cases to date
restricting arbitration tend to fall relatively neatly into the categories set forth
above in Part Ill.C., this emerging body of unconscionable arbitration
provisions gives drafters of arbitration clauses quite a bit of specific
guidance. If a business wishes to draft an arbitration clause that will be
enforced, the case law to date provides a rather readable road map. By
contrast, a body of more open-ended unconscionability law could be so
indefinite that commercial actors (and consumer advocates, for that matter)
would have essentially no guidance in determining what to draft, what to
insist upon, and what to dispute. But, there is a negative side to the emerging
specificity of unconscionability. It may tend to pigeonhole unconscionability
into particular categories in derogation of the bigger picture and an
appropriate resolution of each given case before the Court.
As a result, courts policing arbitration agreements according to the
delineated criteria set forth in the "new unconscionability" cases to date may
be hunting for proverbial trees while missing the metaphorical forest
(perhaps becoming bogged down with cichds as well). For example, a court
may review an arbitration agreement and find none of the things (lack of
mutuality; high fees; inconvenient venue; non-neutral decision maker, etc.)
listed above that have barred arbitrability in the past. However, a court that
then so abruptly ends its "shift" as a contract policeman may permit some
extremely unfair or oppressive arbitration provisions to control the dispute.
Although it may be unfashionable to urge greater investment of judicial
resources in case-specific contract policing according to a general
unconscionability norm rather than a short list of unconscionability
indicators, this may be necessary to effectively regulate the imposition of
arbitration clauses in form contracts. In addition, application of the
unconscionability norm through a "paint by numbers" method that consults a
checklist of disfavored practices may be under-inclusive or over-inclusive.
To state the more intuitive problem first: If judicial contract policing is based
too rigidly on scrutiny of a few disfavored practices, courts may simply miss
a substantial number of unconscionable contract provisions because the
unfair term is not on the court's "watch list" of disfavored practices. The
problem really is not all that different than that faced by law enforcement and
security agencies when attempting to apprehend criminals or terrorists (or at
least prevent their presence in certain locations such as airplanes or the White
House). If the security agent examines only prospective entrants in
of contract. See Young v. Washington Gas Light Co., 206 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
2000); STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 20.03 (noting that insurance coverage disputes
involving benefit plans subject to ERISA are governed by federal common law).
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juxtaposition with the watch list, the agent is likely to prevent anyone on the
list from getting through (at least getting through unscathed). But if this is all
the security agent seeks, he could be completely oblivious to very suspicious
characters who simply have the good fortune not to be on the list. In similar
fashion, courts that limit their contract policing activity to a few traits of
arbitration arrangements such as mutuality of remedy or physical
inconvenience of the arbitral location, may be missing both the much bigger
picture and much more unfair aspects of an arbitration clause.
The over-inclusiveness problem is perhaps counter-intuitive but
nonetheless a real danger as well. Under what appears to be the emerging
norm of arbitration clause scrutiny, if an arbitration term violates a value on
the court's metaphorical checklist the arbitration clause is deemed
unenforceable-period-without much further consideration of whether the
arbitration clause as a whole or in context represents a basically fair (and
therefore not unconscionable) means of dispute resolution. For example, a
"good" or "decent" arbitration clause might very well provide some
advantages to the drafter while providing a different set of advantages to the
adhering party. The drafter may very much want (and therefore insist upon)
an asymmetric set of disputing options and may even be willing to give the
signer a dramatic reduction in price or other incentives for agreeing to the
asymmetry. The signer may be perfectly content, for example, with this
"ban" on punitive damages if in return it is permitted broad discovery or
greater latitude in selecting the arbitrator. Such an arrangement would appear
not to violate the common law concept of unconscionability-but it might
well be struck down by one of the "new" unconscionability precedents such
as Armendariz. 180
Furthermore, as compared to a generalized unconscionability norm,
identifying specific types of arbitration clause infirmities that invalidate the
clause has a false air of objectivity and precision about it. But to have an air
of objectivity is not the same as to actually be objective and predictable.
When the unconscionability norm is expressed not as a concept but as a list
of disfavored traits, it is true that affected parties no longer need to speculate
very much about what traits in an arbitration term may invalidate the
provision. Instead, they must ask questions that are equivalently
indeterminate despite their veneer of certainty and specificity: "What is
sufficient mutuality? Of obligation? Of remedy? Must there be complete
symmetry or equality of options for the parties? What is a sufficiently
180See Drahozal, supra note 156, at 541, 555-65 (making a similar but more
sophisticated argument suggesting that rational businesses, subject to Armendariz, may
well tend to react by offering mutual, but less fair, arbitration provisions in consumer
contracts).
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inconvenient forum or venue to vitiate an arbitration agreement? Just how
much access to information must be provided through the arbitration to keep
it from being deemed defective and quasi-unconscionable?" When it comes
time to actually decide cases and determine whether to enforce an arbitration
clause, the specific components of unconscionability, or what might be
termed "proxies" for, or indicators of, unconscionability may not be any
more definite or measurable than the unconscionability norm itself or the
notions of fairness on which it is based.
Although the newer genre of "unconscionability-lite" decisions has
restored some equilibrium to arbitration law, lower courts might be able to
accomplish more arbitral justice by utilizing the more general and less trait-
specific notion of unconscionability that long predates the Supreme Court's
modem and post-Southland eras of arbitration law. Why have these courts,
which so clearly seem to be seeking and achieving a recalibrating
equilibrium, shirked from fully embracing the unconscionability norm? The
answer lies mingled in political and intellectual trends of the last third of the
twentieth century.
IV. EXPLAINING THE HISTORICAL AND CONTINUING HESITANCE ABOUT
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Reviewing the history of arbitrability and unconscionability in the courts,
one cannot help but ask how it came that courts appear willing to police
arbitration clauses only through a truncated unconscionability approach
rather than a wide-ranging unconscionability-based review. The cases
discussed in Part lII.B that refuse enforcement of problematic arbitration
provisions certainly draw upon concepts of unconscionability. These courts
however, have neither enunciated a broad-based notion of unconscionability
nor posited that courts are vested with such wide-ranging powers to police
problematic contract terms. In other words, courts remain relatively slow to
apply the unconscionability norm to arbitration clauses and restrained in their
use of the concept. My question is: "Why?"
This is a different question than asking why the courts seem to have
rediscovered the applicability of the unconscionability norm during the
1990s. The answer is simply that lower courts were forced into it by Supreme
Court decisions that foreclosed other alternatives. In the early aftermath of
Southland and the new reign of the substantive, pre-emptive FAA, lower
courts and state legislatures-at least the lower courts and legislatures that
were less uncritically enamored of arbitration than the Supreme Court-tried
to police arbitration by other means. For essentially the first decade of the
Court's modem arbitration law however, the Court rebuffed these efforts,
finally setting forth a pattern of precedent that showed these lower courts that
[Vol. 19:3 2004]
ARBITRATION UNCONSCIONABILITY
unconscionability would be one of the few available means of regulating
arguably oppressive arbitration clauses. By the 1990s, the Court's "lesson"
had been "learned" by the lower courts. If they were to supervise arbitration
clauses in any significant manner, it would be through the use of
unconscionability concepts.
Answering this question-why did courts come to this new brand of
unconscionability analysis-illustrates to some degree the type of
equilibrating tendencies I posit. In a system (judicial, legal, social) populated
by people of different opinions, there will be a tendency for some actors in
the system to counter the initiatives of other actors in the system if those
actions appear excessive or extreme. The new trend in arbitral
unconscionability reflects this counterbalancing tendency of the legal system
as applied to arbitration and also reflects a counterbalance to much of the late
twentieth century conventional wisdom that unconscionability was not a
helpful judicial tool.
The later recalibration has been something less than a total revolution in
favor of unconscionability analysis. This part of the Article asks why, as a
jurisprudential matter, has there not been a swifter, stronger embrace of
unconscionability doctrine. As noted in the introduction to this Article, my
contention is that the current situation-specific "unconscionability lite"
(rather than judicial embrace of a robust general doctrine of
unconscionability) results from an unfortunate combination of intellectual
and political trends.
Five intellectual and social developments worked to place the
unconscionability norm out of judicial favor. First is the academic assault on
unconscionability led by Professor Arthur Leff. Second is the reascendancy
of a textualist, formalist version of classical contract interpretation. Third is
the rise of the law and economics movement. Fourth is the upsurge in
political and social opposition to any perceived increase in judicial power
and discretion. Fifth is a general turn against legal regulation and perceived
excessive litigation in favor of a more laissez-faire approach to commercial
activity. These developments combined to diminish the standing of the
unconscionability norm in the courts as well as provide additional energy to
the embrace of ADR that helped fuel modem pro-arbitration jurisprudence.
Although there were countervailing intellectual trends, these were either
substantially less powerful or too late in their development to impact the key
Supreme Court shift toward arbitration in the 1983-89 time period.
A. The Academic Assault on Unconscionability
Professor Arthur Leff launched a frontal assault on the unconscionability
norm in his oft-cited, well-known, and influential law review article. In The
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Emperor's New Clause,18 1 Leff argued that UCC section 2-302 was open-
ended, amorphous, and unwisely permitted courts to interfere with contract
terms without benefit of sufficient formal structure. 182 Although Leff did not
quite parody Justice Potter Stewart's famous bon mot (or faux paus)
regarding pornography, 183 Leff was essentially arguing that the
unconscionability norm, at least as contained in the UCC's undefined
unconscionability term, was something of an "I know it when I see it"
standard that was too indeterminate to be consistently and fairly used either
for resolving litigation or permitting judicial interference with the markets.
Leff's article, published in 1967, triggered something of an academic
cottage industry debating unconscionability. Some scholars took
considerable umbrage with Leff's criticism and defended both section 2-302
and the unconscionability norm. 184 Others were more sympathetic to Leffts
view. 185 But, without doubt, unconscionability received renewed scholarly
attention. Over time, it appears that the Leff critique gained sway, although
the intellectual victory was not complete. I reach this conclusion even though
much of the most noted scholarly commentary of the era defended the
unconscionability norm and sought to rebut the Leff criticism.186
181 See generally Leff, supra note 21.
182 See id. at 485.
183 Justice Stewart attracted some criticism when he observed that it was difficult to
articulate a definition of pornography but that the case before the Court could be
adjudicated because "I know it when I see it." See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
184 See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 22, at 12; Murray, supra note 22, at 50.
185 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 293, 294-95 (1975) (addressing the unconscionability concept in terms arguably
harsher than Leffts); Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible
Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485-90 (1974) (adopting the view that judicial intervention
in contract disputes via the unconscionability norm is misguided but suggesting
legislative or administrative intervention through statutes or rule-making); Arnold L.
Rotkin, Standard Forms: Legal Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law,
1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 599, 613-15 (1977). It is perhaps reflective of Leffts long-term
influence that the more recent articles on the topic appreciate or embrace his view of
unconscionability, perhaps more than did articles immediately following The Emperor's
New Clause-a time when much scholarship in the field was intended as a rejoinder to
Leff or partial defense of the unconscionability norm. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, Law,
Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 16-17 (1998)
(referring to unconscionability as "[plerhaps the most notorious paternalistic device" and
citing Leff to explain unconscionability).
186 See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 22, at 12; Murray, supra note 22, at 50; see also
Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 338
(1970) (expressing modest support for the unconscionability norm while praising Leff's
analytical framework); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems,
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Prior to the publication of Leff's article, the unconscionability norm and
the judiciary's power to invoke this principle were relatively unquestioned.
The roots of the unconscionability norm arguably extended for at least
decades, if not centuries. 187 The doctrine itself, enunciated as a requirement
that contract provisions not be excessively unfair, was supported by English
case law at least as far back as the eighteenth century 188 and American law
from at least the nineteenth century forward. 189 The UCC was the product of
a "brain trust" of drafters from the American legal establishment.190 The
principal drafter of Article 2 was Columbia Professor Karl Llewellyn, an
icon of the law (albeit perhaps a controversial one). 191 The United States
117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 968-69 (1969); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent
and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 359, 374-75 (1970) (supporting
unconscionability and removing the element of assent). In addition to having support
from others, see supra note 185, Leff was also perhaps his own best defender. See, e.g.,
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 155-56 (1970) (suggesting
that form contracts have attributes of products as much as they are written expressions of
bargains and should therefore be regulated in the manner that governments regulate
goods or services, giving deference to permit markets to regulate with minimal
government involvement); Leff, supra note 22, at 352-54 (recognizing the need to police
unfairness in consumer contracts but advocating that this be done through specific laws
rather than ad hoc judicial supervision).
187 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 330.
188 See, e.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750) (refusing
to enforce a penalty provision on the basis of what we now call substantive
unconscionability); Emanuel College v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494, 495 (1625) (refusing
enforcement of a mortgage agreement on the grounds of what we now label procedural
unconscionability).
189 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870); Woolums v.
Horseley, 0 S.W. 781, 781 (Ken 1892). At least one commentator sees Scott as a break
from a prior regime of strict enforcement of contract terms on the basis of the popularity
of a laissez-faire approach to contract law. See Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine
of Unconscionability Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV.
625, 628-29 (2002) (finding also that "the doctrine of unconscionability appeared to have
little effect on the day-to-day operations of the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company").
"Soon after its adoption, it was eclipsed by more specific consumer legislation that
garnered more attention from businesses selling to the poor." Id. at 660. The author also
suggests that there is relatively little help for poor customers through the
unconscionability norm because comparatively few of them avail themselves of legal
remedies in disputes with merchants. Id.
190 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 132, § 1, at 3; Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act:
A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-1949, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 276-77
(1998).
191 See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 154-56 (1994) (noting Llewellyn's
key role in the Legal Realism movement and legal academia generally); WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 132, § 1, at 4 (noting Llewellyn's key role in the UCC); Mitchell
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had embraced the
unconscionability norm in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture C0.,192a
decision authored by Judge J. Skelly Wright, another icon of American
law. 193 In short, as 1967 began, unconscionability was on something of a roll,
if that can ever be said about something as non-kinetic as legal concepts.
Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 330, 330 (1951) (referring to the UCC as "lex Llewellyn"); Leff, supra note 21, at
488 n.ll ("From time to time [in the article] I shall use the singular form 'draftsman' to
refer to the late Karl Llewellyn who, at least at the earliest drafting stages, did the major
share of the actual drafting, especially of the Sales article."); Eugene F. Mooney, Old
Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New
Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 223 (1966) (describing Llewellyn's influence on
the drafting of the UCC). But see Leff, supra note 21, at 488 n. 11:
It became an article of faith for the defenders of the Code to assert that no single
man or group had a monopoly of the drafting of the Code, especially (during the
height of the adoption push) not law professors. There are a goodly number of
articles on who really drafted the Code, taking somewhat divergent views.
Id.; Karl Llewellyn, Why A Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953)
(lamenting that "there [were] so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in... but I was voted
down").
192 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Judge Wright was joined in the panel's majority opinion by Chief Justice David
Bazelon, another noted jurist but also one, like Wright, who became a target of criticism
over his perceived liberalism or judicial activism. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra
note 23, at 14, 23-25 (noting Bazelon's role as a "feeder" judge of law clerks to Supreme
Court Justice William Brennan and legal staff to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-
Massachussetts), and the resentment of future Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren
Burger toward this liberal trio). As discussed below, the late twentieth century
unfashionability of both unconscionability and liberal jurists is related to some degree.
Justice Burger, author of Southland, was also a strong proponent of arbitration. But on
that issue, Burger and Brennan were close in position. Justice Brennan authored Moses H.
Cone, which announced the Supreme Court's new "national policy" favoring arbitration
and is viewed by some as the more pivotal case ushering in the modem era of arbitration
law. These two threads of legal and social attitude reflect the alignment of factors
favoring a move toward a more aggressive body of law concerning arbitrability.
1 9 3 See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN
JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN
DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY 112-35 (1981) (noting Wright's role in
important desegregation decisions while serving as a federal district judge in Louisiana
prior to his appointment to the D.C. Circuit); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 336-37
(quoting Justice Brennan's comments describing Wright as "one of the outstanding jurists
of the nation's history"); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wright, 102
HARV. L. REV. 361 (1988); see also Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. La.
1950) (demonstrating that Wright, serving as district judge, enjoined the registrar of the
Louisiana university system to cease racial discrimination in elector registration).
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Then came Leff's article. A portion of The Emperor's New Clause was
devoted to a frontal attack on the Walker-Thomas decision, including use of
what became something of a Leff trademark-the theatrical pseudo-
conversation or narrative parable.194 Like most of Leff's writing, it was
interesting and amusing and carried considerable bite. Although I have never
found his attack on Walker-Thomas particularly persuasive (despite being a
self-confessed fan of Leff's who benefited as a student in three of his
courses), the criticism no doubt had significant impact. If nothing else, it
provided strong academic support to attorneys defending contract drafters
who wished to discourage courts from overturning or modifying the drafter-
favorable terms they had fought so hard to achieve.
Just as important was the impact of The Emperor's New Clause on the
momentum previously garnered by the unconscionability norm. Before
Leff s article, vesting courts with a license to apply unconscionability
seemed unquestioned. After Leff's article however, the concept of
unconscionability itself, the standards (or purported lack of standards)
governing its use, as well as the role of the courts in utilizing the doctrine
became more controversial. 195
194 See Leff, supra note 21, at 544-45 (featuring the hypothetically ironic and
humorous pseudo-testimony of merchant "Max Greed" and defense counsel resisting
payment on Greed's contract and a similar spoof of hypothetical testimony in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)). Leff frequently used the pseudo-
conversation or ironic essay format to enliven his articles and drive home a point,
sometimes pointedly and on the edge of ridicule. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 451-52 (1974)
[hereinafter Leff, Realism About Nominalism] (comparing the first edition of Richard
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law to Cervantes's Don Quixote because of the manner in
which "Economic Analysis" is presented by Posner as a protagonist seeking to explain
law and rid it of inefficiency); Arthur Allen Leff, Law And, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 989-90
(1978) [hereinafter Leff, Law And] (creating mythical "Maize Jondo" and "Fish Jondo"
tribes to provide illustrative foil for his assessment of Law and Economics and other
interdisciplinary legal movements); Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229 [hereinafter Leff, Unspeakable Ethics] (placing the
narrator in the position of making a plaintive cry to the heavens in response to a revealed
conundrum).
195See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 132, § 4-3, at 155; Bruce W. Frier,
Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2207 (1991) ("The influence of academic
writings is, of course, difficult to assess exactly, apart from obvious examples such as
Arthur Leff's largely successful effort to limit the sweep of unconscionability in UCC
section 2-302."); Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative
Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power," 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 775, 804 n. 164 (1995) (referring to
Emperor's New Clause as the "leading article" about unconscionability); Mark Klock,
Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 337 (2002)
(referring to Leffts article as "classic" and stating that it labels the UCC provision about
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In short, after Leff's article, unconscionability lost much of its once
largely unchallenged strength as a legal concept. Although Leff did not
eradicate the unconscionability norm, he clearly cut it down to size, both in
the academy and, I posit, the courts (although this is admittedly a difficult
phenomenon to gauge). After the article, counsel for companies wishing to
defend against charges of unconscionability now had a weapon and courts
wanting to rein in unconscionability had a tool. Even if The Emperor's New
Clause was not formally cited in briefs or opinions, its reasoning likely
informed legal argument and judicial decisions. 196 If nothing else, an ensuing
generation of lawyers and judicial law clerks were introduced to the Leff
critique of unconscionability during law school, where The Emperor's New
Clause received considerable attention.197 To be sure, the article was often
juxtaposed with Walker-Thomas, which gave readers a choice of positions on
unconscionability to be "so vague as to be totally unhelpful"); Harry G. Prince,
Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
459, 463 (1995) (referring to Leff as "the first principal critic" of UCC section 2-302);
see, e.g., Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713, 717 (Ala. 1989)
("Rescission of a contract for unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy usually
reserved for the protection of the unsophisticated and the uneducated.").
Professor Frier appeared to accept the success of the Leff attack with a mixture of
admiration and disgruntlement. See Frier, supra, at 2207 n.44 ("Contrast with Leff the far
more thoughtful article of Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969), which has had little influence.").
196 Regardless of whether one agreed or disagreed with the Leff attack on section 2-
302, everyone started to use Leff s vocabulary after publication of The Emperor's New
Clause. The concepts of "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability framed by
Leff with terms coined by Leff has become standard fare for academic or judicial
discussions of the subject. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 132, §§ 4-3, 4-4 (titling
the sections of the treatise according to Leff dichotomy); Ware, supra note 2, at 1016
n. 103 (crediting Leff with distinguishing two types of unconscionability); Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456 (2002) (noting the general use of the dichotomy and crediting it
to Leff); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in
Legal Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and Arbitration), 33
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 106 (1997) (noting the influence of Leffts view that a contract
term should be unenforceable only if a court finds both procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
197 See, e.g., A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 495-509 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995)
(reprinting or discussing prominently The Emperor's New Clause); STEvEN J. BURTON,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 2001) (same); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES
AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2000) (same); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15,
§ 4.28 (same); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 78 (7th
ed. 2001); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 572 (4th ed. 2001).
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the issue of unconscionability. 198 After publication of the article, however,
there could never be a one-sided debate or an uncritical embrace of either the
Walker-Thomas decision or the unconscionability doctrine.
Nearly 250 law review articles have cited The Emperor's New
Clause. 199 Perhaps more importantly, it has been cited in nearly fifty judicial
decisions.2°° My reading of these cases appears to confirm the influence of
the article, or at least its close match with judicial attitudes. Of the forty-eight
cases examined, thirty-one reached what I categorize as results consistent
with the Leff view and found nothing sufficiently unconscionable about the
contract or term at issue; the remaining cases found unconscionability despite
citing The Emperor's New Clause. Breaking down the group of cases further
showed that fourteen cases reflected an express or strongly implied approval
of Leff's position, with only one opinion appearing critical of the Leff
analysis. Another eighteen cases cited The Emperor's New Clause and noted
its influence or importance. Fourteen decisions cited the article simply as a
neutral background secondary source. These numbers suggest that the Leff
commentary has impacted the courts as well as the academy. Thus, Leff's
work in the area casts a long shadow, even where The Emperor's New
Clause is not cited. For example, as previously noted, Leff popularized and
coined the distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability.
Hundreds of cases now routinely use this terminology without citing to Leff
198 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.28, at 311-12; FULLER & EISENBERG,
supra note 197, at 62; SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 197, at 572. By stressing the
influence of the Leff critique and the prominence of The Emperor's New Clause, I am not
attempting to slight the impact of Walker-Thomas. As of August 6, 2003, the case had
been cited in nearly 350 judicial decisions and nearly 350 law review articles. But,
quantity of citation of course does not directly correspond to influence. As noted above,
the California Supreme Court's Armendariz decision backing unconscionability review of
arbitration clauses is well on its way to perhaps passing Walker-Thomas. See supra notes
148-64 and accompanying text. But it appears that the Leff perspective has dominated in
both the academy and the courts. Whether it will continue to hold sway in coming years
depends, of course, on the degree to which decisions like Armendariz and commentary
favoring judicial contract policing via the unconscionability norm is viewed as more
persuasive than the anti-unconscionability views of Leff and others.
199 As of my Lexis database search of July 7, 2003, the "exact" count was 237.
200 More "precisely," there were forty-eight as of July 7, 2003. I place the "scare
quotes" around exact and precisely because database searches can always miss a few
citations or have false positives depending on how well the search strategy captures the
"real" world of court opinions or law review articles. As of this writing, I have not
examined all 237 articles citing The Emperor's New Clause, although I have reviewed the
bulk of them. However, there always remains the chance that I have missed a case or two.
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or The Emperor's New Clause, suggesting that his analysis of
unconscionability rests near the core of judicial thinking on the topic.201
During what might be termed the late high season of debate over Leff's
view of unconscionability and contract law generally, another soon-to-be
famous contract article was published. W. David Slawson's Standard Form
Contracts and the Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power began with the
unsubstantiated, but normally accepted, empirical claim that more than
ninety-nine percent of all contracts were standard form contracts. 202 The vast
presence of so many standard form contracts provided both social benefit and
social detriment.
On the benefit side of the ledger, such contracts were useful in lowering
transaction costs by reducing the need for case-specific negotiation and
drafting. They also allowed for ready comparability of contractual options.
For example, if all commercial liability insurance policies are essentially the
same, the prospective policyholder can shop according to price alone rather
than attempting to compare differences in contract text. Excess insurers and
reinsurers can instantly know what they are committing to when issuing their
policies based upon the standard primary policies in the field. 20 3
On the detriment side, standardization led to more contracts of adhesion
being offered on a "take it or leave it" basis, with little or no room for
modifying the contract for a specific context or for permitting any softening
of the rough edges of the standard form. In addition, standardization led to
more dense, complex preprinted form contracts, with the preprinted form
often presenting a struggle to read and understand its contents in even the
best of circumstances. Standard printing also led commercial actors to
attempt to turn otherwise innocuous documents into contracts. This begat the
"contracts" one finds on the back of a purchase receipt, a transportation
voucher, or a ticket stub. 204 This also led drafters of these pseudo-contracts to
engage in overreaching, attempting to add unreasonably favorable "contract"
language to these documents in the hope that courts would give the verbiage
201 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.37, at 381
(5th ed. 2003) ("Professor Leff labeled the two kinds of unconscionability as
'substantive' and 'procedural,' distinguishing the content of the contract (substantive
oppression) and the process by which the allegedly offensive terms found their way into
the agreement (procedural surprise). Many authorities have adopted this terminology.");
see also supra note 196.
202 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 529 (1971).
203 See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 4.06[c] (reviewing the benefits and detriments of
contract standardization).
204 See id.
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legal impact, or that the strong pro-drafter language would at least give the
drafter psychological leverage should a dispute arise. 20 5
Although more receptive to judicial intervention than Leff, Slawson
shared Leff s aversion to unguided judicial interference with contract text.
Both Leff and Slawson supported legislative regulation of contracts to
prevent imposition of harsh terms, but neither was very comfortable with
courts generating the operational unconscionability norms except in
particularly egregious circumstances. 206 This view persists today among
mainstream contracts scholars. While concerned with contract fairness, they
are equally or more concerned about activist judicial interjection of
unconscionability concerns in contract disputes. 207
In the more than thirty years since Leff and Slawson addressed these
issues, the unconscionability norm has been in retreat. Because the
unconscionability approach was bloodied to a degree during the very period
when arbitration was on the ascendancy, the unconscionability norm
provided only a modest bulwark for resisting the excesses of arbitration
imposed by standard form contracts. As a result, it tended to be overlooked
by the judiciary, particularly when Supreme Court discussion of arbitration
appeared to be unconcerned with unconscionability principles.
B. The Re-Emergence of Textualism, Formalism, and Classical
Contract Theory
During the same final third of the twentieth century, there was a
resurgence of classical contract law, textualism, and formalism-all
doctrines inhospitable to unconscionability. The timing of this trend,
appearing in tandem with the attack on unconscionability, is seemingly
coordinated in almost an eerie way. While Leff was attacking the
unconscionability principle, the American Law Institute was working apace
on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts [hereinafter "Restatement
(Second)"], first with Robert Braucher of Harvard and then Allan Farnsworth
of Columbia serving as its Reporters. The Restatement (Second) was widely
available in tentative draft form during the 1970's and was officially
205 See Bailey H. Kuklin, On The Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and
Lease Tenns, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 845, 899 (1988).
206 See Slawson, supra note 202, at 550.
207 See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 338 (stating that the success of
unconscionability doctrine in courts is mixed and highly fact-specific); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 15, § 4.28 (introducing the unconscionability concept, but noting restrained
use by courts).
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published in 1981.208 It embraced a functional approach to contract law more
closely linked to the Corbin tradition 20 9 than the formalism of
Williston.210 But, because of other trends favoring formalism and textualism,
the Restatement (Second) has been undermined to a degree. This was even
true as of the date of its publication. In the reported cases, textualism and
formalism appear to be on the rise.211 In its statutory interpretation and
contract construction jurisprudence, the Supreme Court expressed greater
solicitude for these concepts and greater suspicion of functionalist
approaches out of an express or implicit fear that this would lead to judges
substituting their own preferences for the written agreement of the parties.
The confirmation of Antonin Scalia-an unapologetic, even extreme
textualist, formalist, and traditionalist212-as a Justice of the Supreme Court
in 1986 (with nary a dissenting vote) illustrates that this Willistonian re-
emergence had arrived in force. Conveniently, this accompanied the Supreme
Court's new era of arbitration jurisprudence.
C. The Rise of Law and Economics Analysis
Within this same time frame came the rise of "Law and Economics"
(L&E) scholarship. 213 In addition to generally helping to create a more
business-friendly climate, L&E writings and theory were hostile toward the
unconscionability norm on the theory that market interaction would produce
2 0 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
209 See MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.4 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1998) (expressing a preference for functional and contextual contract
analysis over formal and textualist contract interpretation).
2 10 See WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 618 (3d ed. 1961)
(expressing preference for textualism and formalism over functionalism and
contextualism).
211 See Braucher, supra note 82, at 53-56 (describing the ascendancy of textualism
and formalism in contract law during the 1980s and 1990s); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 660 (1990) (describing the rise in textualist
thinking regarding statutory interpretation).
2 12 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ci-i. L. REv. 1175,
1177 (1989) (describing his own embrace of formalism as the correct view of law).
2 13 See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 35 (describing the rise of the L&E
movement during the latter third of the twentieth century, pegging the beginning of the
movement with the publication of Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) and Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961)). The L&E movement was clearly a force of note from
the time of Richard Posner's treatise was initially published in 1972. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). The Posner treatise has enjoyed a "good
run" in academia and is now in its fifth edition.
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optimally efficient contract terms.214 In a nutshell, the standard L&E analysis
of form contract terms posits that market forces will produce efficient form
contract terms that on the whole benefit not only contract drafters (i.e.,
sellers) but also adhering parties (i.e., buyers or consumers). The impact of
the L&E assessment has been significant. This construct for evaluating
contract terms is a trump card of sorts against those protesting the imposition
of standard form contract terms. If persuaded by the L&E analysis, courts no
longer need to worry about things like bargaining power, consent,
understanding, or fairness in the individual contract disputes. The forces of
the market economy will produce standard form contract terms that are
generally efficient. Therefore, strict enforcement of these terms became the
"right" thing for courts to do, irrespective of any analysis of the particular
context of the dispute before the court or potential consequences to the
disputants. 215
I realize that I am taking some liberty in advancing my five-prong thesis
as to the factors deflating the strength of the unconscionability norm during
the 1967-97 period. Many will undoubtedly disagree with my thesis in whole
or at least as to discrete parts. On the whole, however, I am probably more
confident as to the influence of L&E on the atrophy of unconscionability
than perhaps any other prong. The clear thrust of basic L&E texts such as the
Posner,216 Polinsky,217 or Cooter & Ulen 218 treatises is to embrace the market
as a default rule that for the most part creates optimally efficient contract
terms. As an inevitable corollary, most regulation of any sort is viewed with
214 See, e.g., George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L.J. 1297, 1347 (1981); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA.
L. REv. 1387, 1398-99 (1983).
215 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1989) (stating that "[t]he law-
and-economics movement has fought long and hard to convince courts to restrict the use
of immutable rules" that would trump contract language); Edward L. Rubin, The
Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 107, 113
(1995) (stating that "the entire field [of contract law], under [L&E] influence, took a
massive wrong turn," which led scholars and courts to focus too greatly on the economic
efficiency of contract rather than other concerns attending contract disputes).
2 16 POSNER, supra note 213, at 41-64.
2 17 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICs 7-14,
105-13 (2d ed. 1989).
2 18 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-39 (4th ed.
2004). As one commentator has noted, the sound bite or slogan for the L&E movement
might be that the "law is efficient." See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 27-46; see
also Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599,
605-09 (1989).
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suspicion because it alters the normally sanguine market outcomes. Although
some L&E scholars such as Judge Posner seem to express a de facto
preference that regulation come via common law adjudication, 219 any
tendencies toward L&E empowerment of judicial regulation as less sweeping
and politicized than legislative decisionmaking appears to be swamped by
the more dominant notion held by the public and many political theorists:
that regulation should generally be done by legislatures or agencies because
of their greater expertise, responsiveness, and purported democratic
legitimacy. 220 In addition, many moderates addressing contract policing from
a moderate economic perspective do in fact appear to embrace the view that
specific legislative prescriptions are better than ad hoc judicial development
of the unconscionability norm. 221
Because L&E was the dominant intellectual and jurisprudential
subdiscipline of law from at least the late 1970s into the 1990s (and arguably
continues to enjoy this stature today), L&E thinking and belief systems
probably contributed a good deal toward judicial reluctance to invoke
unconscionability. L&E, more than other legal subgroups, appeared to have
2 19 See POSNER, supra note 213, at 7-8. Coincidently, this is also the reading given
to Posner's treatise by Leff, whose review is arguably the most entertaining book review
ever published in a legal periodical. See Leff, Realism About Nominalism, supra note
194, at 451-52 (concluding as have others that Posner's view is that the hydraulic
pressure of common law judicial decisions is toward efficient legal rules and outcomes,
but providing entertainment as well by analogizing Economic Analysis of Law to Don
Quixote, in which the "hero," "Economic Analysis," conquers all by relentless imposition
of its own vision on the world).
220 But see GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164-65
(1982) (contending that courts possess advantages of institutional competence in this
regard as compared to legislatures or executive branch agencies).
221 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1285-95; Braucher, supra note 25, at 421-
22. On this point, Professor Korobkin and I are perhaps fated never to agree. In providing
gracious and helpful commentary on a draft of this Article, he very properly took issue
with the causality arguments I am making in my five-prong thesis on the relative
desuetude of unconscionability during the 1967-97 period. Pointedly, he asks "did L&E
scholarship really cause courts to be hesitant to use unconscionability?" and states that he
is "not sure there is much proof of this ... even circumstantial proof." See E-mail from
Russell Korobkin to the author (Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with author). For the reasons set
forth in the text above, I see at least correlation and circumstantial proof.
Professor Korobkin and I also remain in some disagreement as to the appropriate
bounds of judicial enforcement of the unconscionability norm. We do both agree,
however, that courts have a role to play in policing contracts. Professor Korobkin favors
more emphasis on tangible rules while I am advocating more free-form standards. Indeed,
one of the most pointed criticisms Professor Korobkin levels at my view is that it is so
dependent on unarticulated discretion as to be near-standardless. See E-mail from
Korobkin, supra. I address this point later in this Article.
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considerable practical influence outside the academy and in the judiciary.
Judges expressly embracing L&E analysis (e.g., Richard Posner, Frank
Easterbrook, and Alex Kozinski) were appointed to the federal bench. Many
judicial law clerks were exposed to the L&E approach during law school and
a significant number expressly embraced the L&E subdiscipline.
D. Political and Social Misgivings About Judicial Power
In addition, political trends of the final third of the twentieth century
worked against widespread judicial use of any doctrine or principle that
appeared to be permitting courts to "rewrite" contracts, just as courts were
not to "rewrite" statutes or the Constitution. Earl Warren, who presided as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1954-69, and the Warren Court
became a lightening rod for criticism as that Court was frequently accused of
ignoring textual directives of positive law (i.e., the written words of the
Constitution or a statute) in order to render what the Court viewed as a best
result in a case or to update the constitutional provision in question.222
Notable examples included the Warren Court's "reading into" the
Constitution:
* A Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. 223
* An expansion of the Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination that required police to advise arrested criminals of their
rights, including a right to counsel and that what they said could and
would be held against them.224
222 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 45-100 (1978); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 69-100 (1990); NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 267-99 (1995); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-75 (1980); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 37-92 (1996); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His
SUPREME COURT (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 169-72,
351-55 (1982); Laura Kalman, The Wonder of the Warren Court, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780
(1995) (addressing the issue of why there are so few good biographies of Warren Court
Justices).
223 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
224 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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" An incorporation of certain provisions in the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment, making them applicable to the states. 225
" A requirement under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that each voter's ballot have rough equality, a decision
that essentially outlawed the historical practice of dividing election
districts according to geography more than demographics. 226
Even the Warren Court decision that everyone agrees with (at least
ostensibly and in public), Brown v. Board of Education,227 has been the
subject of continued hand-wringing over its alleged activism and criticism of
its methodology. 228
The backlash against the Warren Court probably reached its zenith when
it became an issue in the 1968 presidential campaign. Republican candidate
Richard Nixon made criticism of the Court a significant part of his campaign,
including the promise to appoint only strict constructionists to the Court
rather than judicial activists.229 The seriousness of Nixon's commitment was
sufficiently palpable that Warren Burger, who ultimately did succeed Earl
2 25 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment was applicable to the states through incorporation via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2 26 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-31 (1962).
227 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2 28 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-23 (using Brown v. Board as the
centerpiece of the book and presenting the reconciliation of Brown's purported activism
and traditional constitutional structure and restraint as the central dilemma in modem
constitutional law); Barry Friedman, The Birth of An Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 191 (2002) (suggesting
that legal scholars have been unduly worried about the legitimacy of the judge-generated
Brown opinion).
2 2 9 See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 1-28 (2001) (describing the
politics of Supreme Court selections during this era); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 112 (1998) (noting the backlash against the Warren
Court); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 592
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) (same); JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE
JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 289 (1979) (noting that Warren Court decisions
engendered large-scale "fulminations" against Warren and the Court); WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 5-25 (discussing how Republican candidate Richard
Nixon used the Warren Court as a political issue during the 1968 presidential campaign
and sought to reverse Warren Court decisions with his nominations to Court); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C. District Court's Criminal
Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 693-94 (2002) (noting that during his 1968 presidential
campaign, Nixon argued that the Warren Court had rendered decisions that "weaken[ed]
the peace forces" of society in favor of the "criminal forces of this country").
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Warren as Chief Justice, was seen as "running" for the post through his
public speeches, agreeing with the implicit criticism of the Warren Court and
suggesting that Burger, as a strict constructionist, would be the perfect person
for the Court.230
E. The "Turn Against Law"
Beyond the political attack on the perceived excesses of the Warren
Court and activist judging generally, this era was also marked by a general
"turn against law," which was both a political and intellectual
movement.231 Although this trend was not as noticeable until the 1970s, it
took solid root and remains the dominant perspective, at least in politics and
public opinion, with intellectual opinion more divided. I used the term "turn
against law" in the same sense as Marc Galanter, who coined the term, as
well as other commentators making similar points. In reaction to a perceived
excessive increase in the growth of litigation and liability, interest groups,
certain political and intellectual elites, and much of the public at large came
to view excessive litigation as a social cost, expending resources too freely
rather than a benefit achieving recompense, resolution, or social justice and
harmony.232 Perhaps not coincidentally, the 1976 Pound Conference
championed by Chief Justice Burger is often seen as part of this trend.233
Other examples of this shift in social attitude include:
230 See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW & PoLmcs 245-49 (1983) (noting that
the public outcry against Miranda and other Warren Court decisions, which were viewed
as excessively favorable for criminal defendants, fueled appointments designed to change
the approach of the Court); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 11-25; Peter
G. Fish, Spite Nominations to the United States Supreme Court: Herbert C. Hoover,
Owen J. Roberts, and the Politics of Presidential Vengeance in Retrospect, 77 KY. L.J.
545, 545-46 (1989) (discussing how the selection of Burger, an outspoken opponent of
Warren Court decisions, was a direct signal that Nixon sought change in the Court's
direction).
231 See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 285 (2002).
232 See id. at 291; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline,
53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494, 494-95 (1986) (describing phenomenon on smaller scale of
emerging dissatisfaction with civil litigation procedure); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New
Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure
and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659 (1993).
233 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the 1976 Pound
Conference and Chief Justice Burger's activism in favor of contracting litigation and
private ADR).
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* The medical malpractice tort reforms of the mid-1970s (often
referred to as the "first" tort reform or med mal "crisis"); 234
* The product and public liability tort reforms of the mid-1980s (the
second tort reform crisis);235
* Incremental amendments to federal and state rules of civil procedure
that generally reduced the availability of discovery and made
prosecution of damage claims or institutional reform litigation more
difficult;236
* Case law restricting discovery and litigation claims, especially law
reform litigation; 237
* The rise of the ADR movement, including greater solicitude for
arbitration;238 and
234 See generally Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's:
A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5 (describing the
perceived medical malpractice crisis of 1970s and tort reform initiatives directed at the
problem).
23 5 See e.g., Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-
Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 397 (1988) (discussing the effect of tort reform on the insurance
industry). The problem of the mid-1980s was centered on product liability and other
relatively new risks such as municipal liability and child care liability. Like the 1970s
medical malpractice problem, it was also very much insurance-driven, as many
policyholders found themselves facing large premium increases or even cancellation. See
George J. Church, America: Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16.
23 6 See e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747,
753-84 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse:
The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REv. 683, 684-86 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the
Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," 64 LAW. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, 197, 207-11.
237 See e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth
or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 968-95 (1998) (concluding that access
to courts became more difficult in 1970-95 time period, with negative results); Stempel,
supra note 232, at 688-90 (observing the trend toward discouraging full discovery and
litigation of disputes).
238 See Stempel, supra note 8, at 1380-82 (reviewing the history of arbitration,
including the modem pro-arbitration movement); Stempel, Public Policy, supra note 1, at
269-83 (same); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR
from Ideology, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 247, 271-85 (reviewing the history and rise of
mediation).
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* Efforts to make both lawyers and lawsuits targets of political
rhetoric. 239
Although describing the "turn against law" phenomenon briefly
enough for this Article risks reducing it to a cartoon, there appears to
be no question that there was a sea change of sorts in attitudes toward
law and litigation during the past quarter or third of the twentieth
century. The new, anti-litigation (or, more charitably, "law in its
proper place and scope") movement was clearly dominant by the
1980s. Not coincidentally, this is when the Supreme Court rendered its
most significant, sweeping, and arguably overly enthusiastic,
pronouncements about arbitration and arbitration law.
Applied to arbitration, the "turn against law" logically favored less
litigation and more ADR, including arbitration, because ADR mechanisms
were both less legalistic and thought to be less prone to the perceived
pathologies of litigation, such as excessive jury awards, undue delay,
increased expense, and substantial pretrial efforts and expenditures. Court
dockets were thought to be too crowded and growing too fast, a perception
naturally hospitable to developing a refined body of arbitration law more
likely to move more disputes from the courts to arbitration.
Like almost any other social or intellectual movement, however, the
"turn against law" has another side that can be mustered in support of a less
expansive, textual, and formal approach to arbitrability. One premise of the
move away from litigation is that ADR works better because it is voluntary,
less formal, and less technical than litigation. Arbitration outcomes are
thought to be based more on rough justice or equity and less on the letter of
the law. A judicial sentiment to move more disputes into arbitration is of
course perfectly consistent with litigation's fall from grace during the same
time that the Court was remaking American arbitration law. Ironically,
however, the Court changed arbitration law and practice by utilizing the
traditional "legalistic" tools that had also fallen into disfavor: literalist
reading of contracts, disregard for the practicalities and equities of the
context giving rise to the arbitration clause, formalism in arbitration
enforcement, and a limited role for common sense review or policing of the
arbitral process and the privatization of dispute resolution.
239 See Stempel, supra note 232, at 687 (describing attacks on lawyers by various
interest groups and attacks even from the President and Vice-President of the United
States).
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F. The Privatization Movement
In addition to these trends, but perfectly consistent with them, arose a
privatization movement during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The
privatization norm argued that many functions previously performed by
governments should be reallocated to the private sector in order to achieve
greater efficiencies. Privatization, downsizing of government, and re-
inventing became the conventional wisdom of the day. 240 Every President
during the this time period, Republican or Democrat, appears to have
embraced the concept.241 In addition, these and other government actors took
concrete action designed to "down-size" government functions and have
more historically governmental functions performed by the private sector.
Examples include privately managed prisons, schools, and social welfare
systems.242 The American resistance to government-provided health care
presents another example of the relative triumph of privatization. 243 Even
240 See, e.g., AL GORE, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETrER AND COSTS
LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, 62-64 (1993) (advocating for
the privatization of many government functions and the use of market-based incentives
for government programs). See generally, DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992) (same).
2 4 1 See, e.g., MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
29-33 (Brookings Institution, 1985) (illustrating Ronald Reagan's advocacy of
deregulation); Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to
Fight a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524-27 (1990) (discussing Jimmy Carter and
zero-based budgeting). Bill Clinton, particularly in his first presidential campaign, ran on
a prominent reinventing government program, which was credited with making Clinton
more popular and electable than many potential Democratic candidates. See generally
DONALD F. KETTL, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION: A REPORT ON THE
TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE (2000); Nand C. Bardouille, The Transformation of
Governance Paradigms and Modalities: Insights into the Marketization of the Public
Service in Response to Globalization, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 155 (2001) (discussing
deregulation as a response to globalization); The Ghost of Bill Clinton, ECONOMIST, Aug.
2, 2003, at 34 (arguing that the anti-government or limited government ethos is so strong
in current U.S. politics and thought as to require that even the more liberal major political
party fun limited government candidate if it is to win the presidency).
242 See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 531, 536 (1989) (noting that governments frequently hire private contractors to run
prisons); Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schooling a Private Business, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 695, 701 (1999) (highlighting the Edison Project, in which a private company
was selected to run certain troubled public schools).
243 See W. John Thomas, The Clinton Health Care Reform Plan: A Failed Dramatic
Presentation, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 83, 83-84 (1996) (describing the unpopularity of
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when the body politic has strong incentives to seek a governmental initiative,
there has, in the recent modern era, been strong resistance to anything viewed
as additional government activity as well as a zeal for turning government
functions over to private entities. One need only recall the debate concerning
a Transportation Safety Agency with federal employees to screen air travel
passengers in the wake of the September 11 tragedy. Although this piece of
legislation was ultimately enacted, there was considerable resistance and it
almost failed despite the macabre energy it possessed because of the
September 11 airplane hijackings. 244
The privatization movement joined well with the above-mentioned trends
to encourage enforcement of arbitration clauses with relatively little
examination of the particular arbitration provision or reflection about the
type of arbitration being compelled. Judges, like society as a whole, appear to
have accepted as a general norm the idea that the government should
delegate more social functions to the private sector. Enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration clauses as written was quite consistent with this notion.
G. A Confluence of Factors Favoring Arbitration and Disfavoring
Unconscionability Intervention
As is probably true with all social trends, the ones discussed in this
section did not proceed in isolation from one another. For example, the L&E
writings that defended form contract terms also criticized both the tort system
and excessively broad discovery rules while championing more use of
determinable "rules" (logically to be set forth in the text of statutes or
contracts) in lieu of the more relaxed "standards" that might permit judges to
intrude too greatly into the contractual "bargains" made by the parties. Even
legislation was reconceptualized, not as some public deliberation of great
social problems, but as "deals" worked out by interest groups and their allied
representatives. 245 Corporations were described, not as a separate entity, but
the 1993 Clinton Administration health care initiative, which sought considerably less
government control of health care than the single payer system long in use in Canadian
provinces).
244 See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Stalemate in Congress Irks Security Experts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2001, at 7 (reporting that Congress was quite divided as to whether
additional federal workers should be hired for airport safety screening as opposed to
continued use of private contractors).
245 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 192-91
(1986).
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as a "nexus of contracts." 246 These views dovetailed significantly with those
in the legal elite who advocated formalism and textualism. 247
H. The Ineffectiveness of Countervailing Intellectual Trends
United States society, however sheep-like it may appear on occasion, is
still relatively pluralist, of course. The trends described above were not
unopposed or unanswered. Intellectually, the L&E and legal formalism
movements were answered by the Critical Legal Studies (hereinafter "CLS")
movement that clearly has roots in the Legal Realist movement as well as a
revival of functionalist legal process thinking clearly descended from the
Hart and Sacks Harvard Legal Process school. Cognitive theory and
behavioral science learning entered the legal arena as a "law and" subject. In
addition, many judges defended functionalism and even judicial activism as a
necessary part of the judicial role. Contract theorists and consumer advocates
challenged the efficiency and operation of standard form terms. ADR
writings, once largely promotional efforts for ADR devices, have become
more searching, more serious, and more critical.
On the whole, however, the activities described in the preceding
paragraph have not enjoyed the same success-at least in the political and
judicial arena-as have the more pro-arbitration, anti-unconscionability
movements described in this Article. Clearly, ADR remains in ascendancy
and litigation in disrepute. Tort reform remains the order of the day in many
state legislatures, particularly in light of recent upheavals over medical
malpractice insurance premiums and the increasing militancy of physicians
demanding some revision of the tort system. Criticism of excessive litigation
and excessive legalism is popular both in society generally and among the
elite. The success of Philip Howard's books and their provocative titles (The
Death of Common Sense248 and The Collapse of the Common Good)249
provide a particularly good example of this social trend.
246 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407-11 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99, 100-03 (1989).
247 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 774 (2002); see, e.g., Scalia, supra note 212.
248 See generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (arguing that excessively formal legalism and
bureaucracy has resulted in waste, mismanagement, and the thwarting of useful activity,
giving many anecdotes from news stories: for example, New York City's failure to
provide regulatory clearance for a much-needed low-income housing project).
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1. Critical Legal Studies
The counter-revolution of sorts described above can be described as too
little, too late. Too little-and paradoxically too much-describes the CLS
counter-attack. CLS can be described as a school of jurisprudential thought,
rising during the 1970s, positing that much of the perceived coherence,
consistency, and rigor of the American legal system was a facade that could
not hold up under closer examination. As one scholar put it, if the slogan of
the L&E movement was "law is efficiency," the CLS slogan was "law is
politics." 250 The CLS critique suggested the following more specific
shortcomings of the existing legal system:
[I]ndeterminacy of legal doctrine; undue mystification of the law to exclude
outsiders and enhance the power of lawyers; doctrine and procedure
structured to obscure the political aspects of law; protection of the interests
of the dominant under the guise of neutrality.... Unlike the Realists,
however, CLS adherents often not only recognize the inevitably political
aspects of law but also argue for a more self-consciously political approach
to law, one which assesses legal outcomes not by application of formal rules
or processes so much as by the distributional consequences of legal
activity. 251
Although the overall thrust of the CLS movement was not as radical as
contended by its critics, CLS arguments did, on occasion, go to extremes that
250 See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
599, 621 (1989).
251 See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 175.
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made them easy targets of criticism.2 52 The movement, whatever its
successes, 253 rubbed many in the legal profession the wrong way.254
252 For example, some CLS scholars took the "law is politics" aspect of CLS so
seriously as to suggest that legal outcomes were always driven by social, economic, and
political power rather than substantive rationality or fidelity to first principles, a position
seen by most as too extreme. Some CLS writings argued that legal rules are limitlessly
malleable and therefore have no constraining effect on decisionmakers-legal realism on
steroids if you will. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:
A Critical Phenomenology of Judging, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 519-26 (1986). As a
result, CLS writings sometimes argued what many regarded as extreme views, such as
the proposition that there is no intellectual content to the distinction between public and
private. Although most reflective persons would readily admit that the dividing line
between the two spheres is murky and even meandering, most in the legal mainstream
would never agree that the concept had no heuristic or practical value. See Symposium,
The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REv. 1423 (1982)
(criticizing the historical, formal rigidity of the public-private concept as unrealistic but
most contributors refusing to find the distinction devoid of intellectual support).
253 CLS scholars would, to a significant degree, state that CLS has been given
something of a "bum rap" by mainstream law and legal education in that CLS is not a
doctrine of anarchy and destruction, but more a school of post-modem social construction
that looks behind the formalism of law to suggest reform of the socially constructed
hierarchies pervading society. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of
Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 1, 1-10 (1985); Minda, supra note
250, at 614-22. Certainly, concepts and analyses consistent with the CLS view, and
arguably influenced by it, can be found in the writings of mainstream legal scholars. See,
e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 56-122 (1992) (utilizing rules-standards
distinction for assessing Supreme Court opinions). The rules-standards distinction,
although arguably implicitly existing since the dawn of society, is frequently associated
with an important CLS article considered to be one of the foundations of the CLS
movement. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976).
In this Article, my objective is not to determine the relative strength of the pro and
anti-CLS positions. Rather, my contention, as set forth in more detail in the text, is that
the CLS movement was never openly accepted by the legal establishment and arguably
spurred a significant backlash against liberal or functional analyses due to a retrenchment
of formal, conventional legal thought in the face of what many saw as an onslaught by a
hoard of intellectual barbarians at the gates of the law. See generally BRYAN BURROUGHS
& JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990) (using
the Visigoths and Roman Empire analogy to describe the reaction of many established
economic interests to the less gentile operating style of the establishment).
254 See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L. REv. 221, 223-57
(1990); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1-2, 14-15
(1986).
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Ironically, one of the harshest critics of the CLS movement was Paul
Carrington,255 who later became one of the harshest critics of the Supreme
Court's modem arbitration jurisprudence. 256 Carrington's standing astride
these two worlds summarizes my point about the relative inefficacy of CLS
in holding back the formalist, textualist, efficiency-enamored tide in favor of
aggressive compulsion of arbitration. Even those with grave misgivings
about the new world of arbitration law did not deploy CLS concepts against
it.
Other potentially powerful jurisprudential movements against the rise of
the Court's modem arbitration law tended to be too late on the scene. By the
time they arrived, the Court had already set out on the path of arbitration as
national policy, enforced by textualist, formalist application of arbitration
clauses. Cases such as Moses H. Cone, Southland, McMahon, and
Rodriguez257 were precedent and would receive judicial deference even if
their approach was undermined by subsequent scholarly writings.
2. The New Legal Process
One example of these jurisprudential movements is evidenced in the
renewed interest in legal process analysis. During the 1950s, Harvard Law
professors Albert Sacks and Henry Hart developed what came to be known
as the Harvard Legal Process school of jurisprudential thought. It was
characterized by a functional analysis of legal problems emphasizing
institutional competence, decisionmaking authority, and the nature and
context of legal problems. Documentary text was respected by Hart and
Sacks but not sanctified. Further, they were not textualists in the manner of
Justice Scalia or other devotees of a "plain meaning" approach to
interpretative problems.
255 See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 222-26
(1984) (arguing that CLS scholars were nihilists who should not be part of law school
faculties). At the time of the Of Law and the River article, Carrington was Dean at Duke
Law School, a position that added to the attention his assessment received and helped to
underscore the degree to which CLS was something of an "outsider" movement.
Carrington was not arguing that CLS adherents had no rights of expression or no place in
academia, but instead was arguing that the status of law as both an academic discipline
and a means of social governance made CLS thinking inappropriate for law.
256 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 4, at 260; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 331, 333-36.
257 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text (describing these cases and
evolution of Supreme Court's view of arbitration law during 1980-90 period).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Unfortunately, the manifesto of the Legal Process School was an
unpublished draft of the Hart and Sacks teaching materials. 258 To be sure, it
was influential and has been referred to (probably correctly) as the most
famous unpublished work in law.259 But it remained unpublished during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. More important, and not unrelated, the Hart and
Sacks approach had faded from the frontal lobes of lawyers, scholars, and
judges. Not only was the movement's sacred text unpublished, but the law
reviews of the day were far more likely to be filled with L&E, CLS, or
straight doctrinal scholarship. Of course, there was advocacy and policy
scholarship on the pages of law reviews during this era. But much of it was
scholarship attacking litigation and promoting ADR generally and arbitration
in particular. Against this backdrop, the teachings of Hart and Sacks-which
in my view cautioned against the uncritical embrace of arbitration, rigid
textualism, or formalist enforcement of arbitration clauses-were not
consulted. During this time period, the Supreme Court began its infatuation
with arbitration and its embrace of the new, aggressively enforced approach
to enforcing arbitration clauses.
The Hart and Sacks manuscript was eventually published in book form,
with an updated introduction by its editors, prominent legal scholars William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey-but not until 1994.260 By then, the modem era
of arbitrability was sufficiently entrenched as to be relatively immune from
this sort of intellectual influence. Although to some extent the influence of
Hart and Sacks "never left" the law, and there were elements of revival
through the "new" Legal Process school associated with Eskridge,
Frickey,261 and others, 262 their revival of legal process thinking simply was
25 8 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law (1958) (tentative draft), in HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 165-67 (1994) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.).
259 See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 159.
260HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also id. at ii (discussing of the role of the text at the Harvard
Law School).
261 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691 (1987).
262 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1989) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 80); Robert
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983) (reviewing CALABRESI, supra note 220).
I suppose that I am implicitly not giving Robert Weisberg's contribution its due by
suggesting that the "new" Legal Process did not take root until the later 1980s and that
there was not really a full-fledged rediscovery of the Hart and Sacks approach until
[Vol. 19:3 20041
ARBITRATION UNCONSCIONABILITY
not strong or timely enough to have a large impact on judicial construction of
arbitration agreements, particularly during the key years 1976-87, when
litigation was subject to criticism and ADR and arbitration were in
ascendancy.
In addition, much of the new legal process project was directed toward
statutory interpretation. Although the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions,
particularly Southland, were statutory interpretation decisions, they received
comparatively little attention from this group of scholars. For example,
formal publication of their manuscript. Of course, I do not mean any of this all that
literally. Attempting to site intellectual trends on the historical landscape always involves
approximation. For example, I am focusing on the date of formal publication of The
Legal Process (1994) as a matter of convenience and ready reference, what one might
call a "Casey Stengel" approach to establishing the historical timeline (so named because
of the famous baseball manager's frequent defense of even his most outrageous
statements with "you can look it up," something fairly readily done with a book
catalogued by the Library of Congress). In fact, the intellectual currents that spurred
formal publication were stirring for some time prior to the Eskridge and Frickey project
in order to create the sentiment for the project and the publisher's receptiveness. A good
deal of it also was personal serendipity. See HART & SACKS, supra note 260, at xxv-xcvi
(describing the personal contacts and relationships leading to formal publication).
In fact, Eskridge & Frickey's own introduction suggests that the legal process
revival was a 1980s phenomenon rather than a late-1980s and early 1990s phenomenon
as I am positing. See HART & SACKS, supra note 260, at cxxv. Perhaps they are correct, at
least in regard to legal scholarship. But even conceding this, I would still argue that my
assessment is correct regarding the visibility of legal process thinking for the United
States Supreme Court that launched the modem arbitration era. In addition, even if legal
process was "back" by the 1980s, it nonetheless continued to be snowed under by L&E,
formalism, textualism, and even CLS.
More to the point regarding my arguable failure to give Weisberg his due is this-
Weisberg is critical of Calabresi's book as constituting too much of a brief for legal
activism. See generally Weisberg, supra. The "new" Legal Process as conceptualized by
Weisberg is more receptive to Calabresi's approach (that courts treat legislation only as
the equivalent of precedent rather than as binding positive law that cannot be changed by
courts) than the old legal process would have been. Id. at 237-49. But it is still critical
and suggests that Calabresi was promoting something of a CLS-like radical methodology
when one might have just as easily regarded the Calabresi approach as an accepted
member in the new legal process club. Id. What Calabresi suggested is not much different
than the approach to statutes championed by "new" Legal Process school founder
William N. Eskridge. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). In my view, the Weisberg treatment of Calabresi's book
suggests that new legal process thinking in the early 1980s had not become the more
functionalist new legal process thinking of later in the decade. And, of course, Weisberg
was among Calabresi's friendlier critics. Others accused him of disrespect for the legal
order. See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in
the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1752 (1982).
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Professor Eskridge spent only a few lines of hundreds of pages of his
statutory scholarship of the time in addressing the Court's arbitration
decisions. When he did, he was critical, but offhandedly critical without
sustained examination of the matter.263 His critique, like that of most who
weighed in against the new law of arbitration, was focused on statutory
analysis and jurisprudential concerns other than contract doctrine.
3. Cognitive Theory and Behavioral Science
The insights of cognitive theory/behavioral science also came a bit too
late in the play to have a significant effect on the plot or outcome of the
arbitration drama, even though the application of cognitive theory to law has
become one of the most dominant "law ands" of the past decade. By
cognitive theory and behavioral science, I mean the body of learning that
addresses the manner in which people make decisions--often noting the
irrationality or imperfections of the judgment process owing to the heuristic
errors and biases held by humans. Work in this area is founded upon the
pioneering psychological experiments and writings of Amos Tversky, Daniel
Kahneman, and fellow travelers in this field.264 Its first significant
appearance in legal scholarship appeared during the late 1980s and early
1990s, increasing significantly in the mid-1990s. 265 Today, cognitive theory
analysis is no longer a "hot, new area" so much as it is a well-established
area in which a substantial amount of serious and prominent scholarship
continues to be done.26 6
263 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1083-86, 1099-1100 (1989).
2 64 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, et al. eds. 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1124.
265 See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (1998);
see, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1418 n.35 (1985); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 525
(1985); John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 237, 261 (1987). The LexisNexis database of American and Canadian law reviews
reflects no law review articles prior to 1980 that cite to leading behavioral science
scholars Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. My research revealed fewer than 20 such
articles published prior to 1990. Thus, I am fairly confident that the Supreme Court did
not consider this literature during its important arbitration decisions of the mid-1980s.
266 See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed. 2000);
Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1202-08 (employing cognitive theory to assess the problems
posed by form contract terms and the most efficient means for controlling potential
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Scholarly work in this area has been impressive and promising.267 To a
large degree, cognitive analysis is an antidote to the errors and excesses
sometimes found in the L&E analyses. L&E thinking posits perfectly rational
actors. Cognitive theory demonstrates that most humans are at best vested
with only "bounded rationality" that limits the thoroughness and
effectiveness of their investigation and analysis of legal arrangements. 268
Consequently, the preferences of people will not always serve their best
interests, an insight that has obvious implications for government and legal
decisions as to when market deference or market regulation should be the
order of the day. Some conclusions of cognitive theorists fit comfortably
with L&E assessments, 269 but many findings of cognitive theory also support
the previously instinctive resistance to some L&E assertions. Importantly, the
scientific base of cognitive analysis makes it a counterweight to L&E that
has significantly more academic credibility than many of the traditional
objections to L&E, which are based on seemingly more subjective or
indeterminate concepts such as justice or fairness.
Without a doubt, bringing cognitive theory into the analysis makes it
more difficult for courts to take a strictly textualist or formalist approach to
arbitration enforceability. As to timing, however, it is quite clear that
cognitive theory insights simply did not arrive on the legal intellectual scene
soon enough to have a significant influence on the development of modem
arbitration law. It was largely absent from the legal literature during the
1980s when the bulk of the arbitration revolution took place. Like renewed
abuses); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 743 (2000). But see
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2002);
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law & Economics Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73 (2002).
267 See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 266; Chris Guthrie et
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 782 (2001); Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1479 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEo. L.J. 1789, 1811-28
(2000); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, & Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 84-86 (1997); Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1051-60 (2000).
268 "Bounded rationality" is limited rationality rather than fully rational analysis. See
Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1222. People exhibit bounded rationality in many of their
decisionmaking behaviors because they lack the cognitive ability, as well as the time,
resources, or expertise to engage in the sort of investigation, analysis, and understanding
required for full rationality. See id. at 1224-28.
269 See, e.g., id. at 1224-3 1.
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legal process thought, it was established during the 1990s when the Supreme
Court was continuing to sort out arbitration law. Thus it had not been
practically available as a basis for resistance when the Court transformed the
FAA from a procedural rule of the federal courts into a national policy of
substantive federal law backed by a textualist, formalist view of contract.
Although the emergence of cognitive theory in the law may well support or
even eventually propel changes in arbitration jurisprudence, eventually it
could not, and did not, hinder the emergence of current arbitration law that
rode the other intellectual, social, and political waves described in this
Article.
V. THE FUTURE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARBITRATION:
PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING EQUILIBRIUM AND IMPROVED CONTRACT
SUPERVISION THROUGH UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS
The unconscionability norm has unfortunately become a disfavored
stepchild of contract law. Although it remains acknowledged by courts and
commentators, none embrace it too closely or urge its growth and greater
use.270 Much of the most recent scholarship of contract theorists that
addresses unconscionability fits comfortably within the dominant post-Leff
construct in which judicial creation and application of the unconscionability
norm is disfavored. 271 Instead, the prevailing norm even for those favoring
some role for the concept is that unconscionability standards, since they
interfere with contract terms produced by the market, are better set by
legislatures or executive agencies and not developed by courts. 272 In
270 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L.
& EcON. 293, 302 (1975); Robert Flannigan, Commercial Fiduciary Obligations, 36
ALBERTA L. REV. 905, 920-21 (1998); Allan Schwartz, A Re-assessment of Non-
Substantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1054-55 (1977).
271 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.28; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI &
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, §§ 9.37-.41 (5th ed. 2000); Braucher, supra note 25, at 421-23.
272 See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint
and Consistency, 46 HASTING L.J. 459, 466, 553-54 (1995); Symposium,
Unconscionability Around the World: Seven Perspectives on the Contractual Doctrine,
14 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 435 (1992); William C. Whitford, Structuring
Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 1018,
1020-21 ( noting that consumers and others with relatively small stakes at issue in
particular cases are unlikely to invest in developing contextual facts to show
unconscionability); Robert Wisner, 51 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 396, 409 (1993)
(arguing for Kantian constraints on the unconscionability doctrine); see also Russell
Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 62 (1999)
(making an argument for legislative and administrative standard-setting regarding the
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addition, judicially-generated unconscionability standards can be criticized as
being too slow in development. 273 In general, the prevailing norm posits that
the judicial role in policing contracts should be circumscribed, and that only
in the most extreme cases of procedural or substantive unconscionability,
courts should generate and apply common law unconscionability
norms. 274 Many, and perhaps most courts, require that the unconscionability
must be both procedural and substantive in order to merit judicial
intervention. 275
In contravention of the post-Leff conventional wisdom, I am arguing for
a significant, continued role for unconscionability analysis in the policing
contracts by the courts-as a matter of judicially-created common law-and
that the unconscionability norm be applied flexibly and as something of a
gestalt, without highly confined reference to any specific traits that are on the
"list" of unconscionable provisions. The judicial approach I am advocating
has, as discussed above, taken root to a large extent as the courts have begun
to increasingly apply the unconscionability norm to arbitration clauses.
However, I remain concerned that courts using an unconscionability analysis
may become too focused on particular traits while failing to evaluate whether
the arbitration provisions of a contract are, as a whole, unfairly obtained or
fairness of health insurance contract provisions). But see Korobkin, supra note 25, at
1277-84 (appearing to accept the utility of a greater judicial role in policing contracts
under an unconscionability analysis).
Professor Leff, of course, remains the strongest proponent of the view that
legislatures or agencies (rather than courts) should define unconscionability and should
define it with specificity rather than depending on general notions of fairness. See Leff,
supra note 21, at 488-89; Leff, supra note 186, at 149 (1970); Leff, supra note 22, at
357-58.
27 3 See Braucher, supra note 25, at 421:
[S]low accretion of cases does not work to make particular harsh terms
unenforceable when procedural unconscionability must be shown, because each
factual variation in formation potentially makes any given case distinguishable. Pure
substantive unconscionability has better potential to "accumulate," as Llewellyn put
it, into a body of prohibited terms - but this is an expensive, long-term project.
Unconscionability is fire as a residual type of policing for overreaching that has not
yet appeared, but where particular substantive abuses are already identified, they can
and should be specifically targeted in a statute or regulation.
Id.
274 See supra note 272; Braucher, supra note 25, at 421-23. Professor Korobkin
appears to support a greater judicial role but one more constrained than advocated in this
article. See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1274-84.
275 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text; see also PERILLO, supra note
197, § 9.37, at 381 (distinguishing Leffts characterization of oppression and surprise in
terms of both substantive content of contracts and procedural processes by which
offensive terms find their way into contracts).
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unreasonably favorable in its substance. In particular, I am advocating that
either procedural or substantive unconscionability, standing alone, should be
sufficient to permit judicial intervention or judicial refusal to enforce
arbitration clauses. 276
Although legislative or administrative guidance is of course helpful and
welcome, courts should not be restrained in their contract policing powers
merely because of the absence of statute, agency rule, or executive order.
Rather, courts should rediscover and continue to exercise their historical
power of policing contract formation, construction of contract language, and
enforcement of contract terms in order to prevent unfairness in arbitration
and to promote full disclosure, better understanding, and more meaningful
consent in this aspect of contracting.
As discussed in Part IV of this Article, lower courts have to a large
degree attempted to achieve this result in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's arbitral infatuation of the modem era.277 Through what I have
characterized as a cautious embrace of the unconscionability principle, lower
courts have refused to enforce problematic arbitration clauses. 278 However,
these courts have not only been relatively unaggressive in their use of
unconscionability analysis but have also tended to take a trait-specific
approach to unconscionability. Rather than starting from the premise that a
court may act upon a finding of any type of unconscionability in an
arbitration term, courts have looked for a particular type of problem in the
arbitration arrangement as a prerequisite for refusing to enforce the text of
the written clause. 279 As a result, these cases have spoken of an arbitration
clause being infirm because of lack of mutuality, excessive fees, or a distant
forum rather than finding the arbitration clause defective because it is
unconscionable in a general sense.
This greater judicial vigilance in reviewing arbitration agreements is on
the whole a welcome development. It represents a helpful reining in of the
arguably rampaging pro-arbitration body of Supreme Court law of
arbitration. As discussed in Part IV, the lower courts, whether consciously or
not, have worked toward an equilibrium of more consumer-protective
arbitration law by rediscovering unconscionability and related doctrines as a
276 See also PERILLO, supra note 271, § 9.37, at 381 (stating that "there is no basis"
in the UCC unconscionability provision for requiring showing of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability to render a contract provision unconscionable as a matter
of law). In my view, the argument for requiring both procedural and substantive
unconscionability as matter of common law is even weaker since the common law notion
of unconscionability is at least as broad as that set forth in UCC section 2-302.277 See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
278 See id.
279 Id.
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means of doing what they can to police arbitration contracts within the area
of discretion permitted them by the Court's arbitration precedents.
Although the new unconscionability and new equilibrium in arbitration is
a welcome development, it remains an incomplete and excessively mild
counter-revolution. Arbitration clauses that are unfair may yet escape judicial
scrutiny because they do not fall directly into one of the categories (such as
mutuality) that trigger judicial disapproval. The limited, situation-specific
policing of arbitration by lower courts to date also holds substantial
unintended consequences. For example, faced with a ban on mutuality,
arbitration clause draftspersons may instead impose a mutual, but unfair or
oppressive arbitration provision in a contract. 280 Rather than continue this
pattern of seeking an equilibrium through proxies for policing by
unconscionability, courts should instead expressly regulate arbitration terms
by self-conscious reference to the unconscionability norm.
Although the notion of judicial policing of contracts with something as
malleable as unconscionability has been viewed as too standardless, 281 the
common law history of unconscionability suggests that it is not a rogue
doctrine, but instead a relatively constrained judicial tool for policing
contracts that can be consistently and fairly applied in a manner that does not
unduly disturb the expectations or reliance interests of contracting
parties. 28 2 As noted above, in many cases, courts will not invalidate an
agreement or restrain the reach of its text unless there is both procedural and
substantive unconscionability. 283 Even in such instances, a court may not
decide to invalidate the entire contract but may merely sever the
unconscionable provision from the contract as a whole. 284 Whether a court is
280 See Drahozal, supra note 156, at 561-65.
281 See supra notes 181-212 and accompanying text (noting both the academic and
judicial criticism of the unconscionability concept).
282 See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 22, at 759-60 (noting that the use of
unconscionability by the courts has not been wild or standardless); Murray, supra note
22, at 3-4 (same); Joel A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 931, 936-52 (1969) (discussing the concepts and definitions behind the
unconscionability doctrine).
283 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
284 See, e.g., Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682 (8th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to invalidate entire an arbitration agreement due to a defective term that can be
severed); Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (S.D.
Miss. 2000), afd, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Jones v. Fujitsu Network
Communications, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (same); see also Quiller
v. Barclays An./Credit, Inc., 764 F.2d 1400, 1402 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 976
U.S. 1124 (1986) (finding severability the general rule so long as severance does not
make a contract meaningless); Vineberg v. Brunswick Corp., 391 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.
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required to sever an unconscionable portion of an arbitration term where
possible in order to save arbitrability has not been fully articulated by the
courts. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address this issue in the
Humana/Pacificare case, where the parties and amici briefed the issue,285
but the Court nevertheless declined. To the extent that the Court-or a
critical mass of lower courts-support severability, the use of the
unconscionability norm can add flexibility to the judicial policing of
arbitration clauses. Instead of striking down such clauses on an all-or-nothing
basis, courts may trim away unconscionable or problematic attributes of the
clause without preventing an arbitration that was in the main agreed upon by
the contracting parties.
Judicial use of the unconscionability norm is thus subject to substantial
legal and practical constraint. A party who wishes to successfully challenge
clear contractual text on the basis of the unconscionability norm must be able
to articulate and support an argument that either the contracting process was
procedurally unconscionable or that the contract term is substantively
unconscionable, or perhaps both. The trial judge must accept the argument,
or at least be willing to submit it to a jury that accepts the argument. Then,
the appellate court must affirm the trial court's ruling. In other words, three
out of four judges reviewing the matter must find an arbitration term to
violate the unconscionability norm before the judicial system will interfere
with the contract. As a practical matter, this is unlikely to lead to wholesale
judicial rewriting of contractual text.
Judicial use of a general unconscionability norm in policing arbitration
terms, and all contract terms for that matter, also has the advantage of
permitting the evolution of judicial thought that is arguably the essence of
common law. 286 Operating pursuant to a general unconscionability norm, a
given jurisdiction can organically develop a body of unconscionability law
that evolves over time and in response to the economic and social situations
1968) (same); Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1288-89 (discussing the severability of
unconscionable arbitration terms).
285 Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003). See Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 108, at *8-10 (arguing that severability is permitted and even required
by the national policy in favor of arbitration embodied in the FAA); Respondent's Brief,
supra note 108, at *15-17 (arguing that severability impermissibly rewrites the
arbitration provision to impose a contract that was never agreed to by either party); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce, supra note 108, at *3 at *3 (arguing for
severability); Brief of Amicus National Association of Consumer Advocates, supra note
108, at *3 (arguing against severability).
286 See generally Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J.
862, 867 (1983) (discussing the concept of common law adjudication and its Anglo-
American history).
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that confront contracting parties and the courts. Under a general common law
unconscionability norm, courts can both treat like cases alike and make
prudent distinctions. For example, an arbitration agreement providing for a
foreign location may be unconscionable in a low-stakes dispute involving a
consumer but be perfectly reasonable as between two medium size
businesses. Similarly, such a clause may be more or less reasonable
depending on whether the record reflects that the designation of a particular
forum or location resulted in a lower price, a better warranty, or some other
trade-off for the party agreeing to the provision. By contrast, a more specific
checklist of what makes for unconscionability may not only limit courts from
the outset, but also retard the evolution of the law of arbitration clause
unconscionability.
In short, my own view is that much of the criticism of unconscionability,
particularly its relatively frequent use to police arbitration clauses, is not
persuasive. Although I prefer a more generalized unconscionability norm to
item-specific unconscionability review by courts, the issues are largely the
same for both varieties of unconscionability as are the relative pros and cons
of judicial use of unconscionability in overseeing arbitration clauses.
Critics of unconscionability will undoubtedly respond that judicial
interjection of this concept makes for interference with efficient terms. How
do we know that a seemingly oppressive arbitration clause is efficient?
According to the standard L&E analysis, the answer is that the "market says
so."287 In this Article, I am not attempting to address in detail the economic
arguments surrounding unconscionability. However, the economic argument
against judicial enforcement of the unconscionability norm appears
problematic in at least two ways.
First, the consumers interacting with vendors in the market for arbitration
clauses are not fully rational, but only "boundedly" rational while the
vendors are much closer to being fully rational, or at least in a more
advantageous position to correct their mistakes in evaluating consumer
preferences. Vendors can read market signals and respond.288 They also have
the financial incentive to devote more time to changing contract terms even
where this results in minor benefits per contract or interaction. By contrast,
consumers are closer to being "one-shot players" for many transactions,
while vendors are the classic repeat players. When using arbitration clauses,
vendors generally will have determined what arbitration clauses are in their
best interests and will seek to impose them through standard form contracts.
287 See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text (discussing the economic theory
supporting enforcement of standard form contracts).288 See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1220-46 (describing the contracting behavior of
vendors and buyers).
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They may know full well that a given arbitration organization is virtually
guaranteed to bring them victory should a dispute arise with the
consumer.289 By contrast, the consumer is effectively precluded from
engaging in the type of cost-benefit analysis necessary to determine whether
to accept or reject the arbitration term or the contract containing the
arbitration term. As a result, the market will not always produce efficient
contract terms, particularly regarding arbitration, which governs the meta-
issue of how contract rights are to be vindicated in the event of a dispute,
rather than any specific aspect of the substance of the exchange provided for
in the contract.
Second (and clearly beyond a full discussion in this Article), the
economist's usual measure of efficiency-the Kaldor-Hicks criteria of
wealth maximization-may be inapt for assessing the social utility of
arbitration clauses. Most economists tend to measure efficiency and social
value according to a Kaldor-Hicks or utilitarian criteria: if the use of the
standard form term creates more savings or benefits for society as a whole
than it causes detriment to an aggrieved person or pool of aggrieved persons,
then the term is "efficient" within the meaning of this economic
analysis.29° Although this "greatest good for the greatest number," utilitarian-
289 For example, the California Research Bureau of the California State Library has
conducted a study suggesting that HMOs are likely to avoid consent to an arbitrator that
rules against them and highly likely to seek to re-use those that find for them. See
MARCUS NIETO & MARGARET HOSEL, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU No. 00-09,
ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA MANAGED HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 18-23 (Dec. 2000),
available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/09/0O-009.pdf (body of report); id.,
available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/09/Appendix_09.pdf (appendix to report).
Perhaps more troubling is the contention made by the National Association of Consumer
Advocates' brief in Humana/Pacificare, which referred to a report on discovery produced
in Bownes v. First USA Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 99-2479-PR (Cir. Ct. Montgomery
Cty., Ala.), stating:
In an interrogatory response in that case, First USA stated that it had prevailed in
19,618 cases before [private arbitration services provider] the National Arbitration
Forum [the arbitration provider designated in the bank's arbitration clause in its
credit card agreements] while its card members had prevailed in only 87 cases....
First USA's success rate of 99.6% is astounding and strongly suggests that the
National Arbitration Forum is unable to provide a fair and unbiased mechanism for
resolution of disputes involving First USA.
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Consumer Advocates, supra note 108, at
*6 (citing Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely? Arbitration Forum's Rulings
Called One-Sided, WASH. POST, March 1, 2000, at El).
290 See POSNER, supra note 213, at 4.
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style29' argument may be apt for much social decisionmaking, it is arguably
inapt when addressing the means by which disputes are resolved.
The very nature of adjudication is an inquiry into the relative factual and
legal strengths of the positions of the disputants. Permitting adjudication
rather than having all differences subject to a default rule minimizing fact-
finding suggests that the social system has already moved away from a
purely utilitarian approach and is more concerned with individual justice.
Otherwise, disputes could be resolved by routinely splitting the difference or
use of somewhat more tailored, situation-specific rules rigidly applied. These
approaches might be far more efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense than either
arbitration or litigation so long as the behavior of one of the disputants is not
unduly bizarre. Under such non-adjudicative regimes, parties to a contract
would still have an incentive to perform. Even if the judicial mechanism for
dispute resolution was the flip of a coin, rational contracting parties will not
want to risk the fifty percent chance of loss. In the case of the mandatory
compromise, they will use this default rule to shape their behavior toward
efficiency.
Of course, I am not proposing that judicial review of arbitration terms on
grounds of unconscionability be so free-form as to be standardless. Rather, I
am arguing that reviewing courts should not be tightly bound by the
emerging "checklist" of unconscionable traits of arbitration clauses, even
though that list has become quite extensive. Courts should remain free to find
unconscionability irrespective of the form of that unconscionability in cases
where the court is left with the overall impression that an arbitration term
was unfairly achieved (procedural unconscionability) or is unfair in
substance (substantive unconscionability). If the former occurs, the
arbitration clause is inconsistently volitional and should not be enforced
291 Although wealth maximization and utility maximization are not technically the
same thing, the concepts are similar in that both involve treating an aggregate gain as
"good" even if in the course of achieving this aggregate gain, some individuals suffer
losses or "bad" results. Similarly, a utilitarian philosophical approach, often called a
teleological approach, is one in which the a policy, program, or social arrangement is
considered "good" to the extent it produces greater aggregate happiness whatever the
distribution of the happiness or even if some persons are miserable while the majority is
happy. This is in contrast to the deontological approach associated with philosophers like
Immanuel Kant, which argues that there are certain absolutes and that violation of these
absolutes cannot be "good" even if more benefit from the violation than lose from the
violation. See KUKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 6 ("Teleological ethics declares that
goodness dominates justice, that the just act is that which is required to increase the
Good. Deontological ethics declares that justice dominates goodness, that the just act,
one's duty, is to be done even if it decreases the Good."). Since either ethical school in
pure form can lead to extreme or bizarre results, most societies practice a hybrid form of
ethics that attempts to accommodate the greater good with adequate individual justice.
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because of the consent norm in contract law. If the latter type of
unconscionability exists, the manner in which the arbitration term was
imposed is immaterial: unfairness is unfairness, however achieved.
As to the standards for applying the proposed standard-based,
comprehensive concept of unconscionability, the accumulation of case
precedent should provide substantial "notice" to contracting parties to guide
their behavior in drafting, adhering to, performing, and disputing arbitration
provisions. There is no need to move to a system of more formal checklists
of "acceptable" traits and unconscionable traits as an official constraint on
adjudication of arbitration terms. Case synthesis has already generated such a
list as a guidepost and will continue to do so as courts apply the
unconscionability norms in the future, thereby providing sufficient prediction
of the law to guide actors in the marketplace.
Although many will undoubtedly view my proposal as insufficiently
detailed, I offer as a workable standard for unconscionability the following: a
term or condition is unconscionable, as a matter of either procedure or
substance, when the party achieving arbitration in this manner would be
unwilling to accept the arbitration provision if the roles were reversed. In
other words, to be enforceable, an arbitration term should be one that was
achieved in a manner the vendor would agree was procedurally fair if it were
a consumer or employee. In addition, the substantive provisions of an
arbitration term (e.g., cost-shifting, forum traits, control over forum,
available remedies) should be the sort that the vendor would accept if it were
substituted for the consumer or employee in the transaction. Where this test
of symmetry cannot be met, the arbitration term is unconscionable and
should not be enforced. Alternatively, where the vendor can demonstrate that
the consumer/employee received some significant benefit in return for
agreeing to the arbitration provision, courts need not insist on precise
symmetry. For example, an arbitration provision that seems too advantageous
to the vendor when standing alone may not be unconscionable as a whole if
the consumer received a significant price reduction or the employee received
a higher wage in return for agreeing to the arbitration clause.
To the extent additional specific guidance is required, contract law
authorities Joseph Perillo and John D. Calamari have suggested that courts,
and consequently contracting parties seeking to avoid having contract terms
declared unconscionable, could look not only to the traits already viewed as
suspect by some courts, but in addition may consider the "six illustrative
circumstances which a court should consider in an unconscionability
determination" set forth in the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, which
was released in 1970 (but not widely adopted by the states).292 Under this
292 See PERILLO, supra note 271, § 9.40, at 391.
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Act, problematic contract provisions raising unconscionability concerns arise
when the supplier has reason to know:
(1) that he took advantage of the inability of the consumer to reasonably to
protect his interests because of his physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy,
inability to understand the language of an agreement, or similar factors;
(3) that when the consumer transaction was entered into the consumer was
unable to receive a substantial benefit from the subject of the transaction;
(5) that the transaction he induced the consumer to enter was excessively
one-sided in favor of the supplier; or
(6) that he made a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer
was likely to rely to his detriment. 293
Other traits for courts to use as guideposts for assessing
unconscionability could include the illustrations of procedural
unconscionability I have previously suggested for use:
* "Blameless Ignorance" as to the existence or effect of arbitration
provisions, 294 a consideration likely to apply in many cases since
arbitration terms are not salient to most consumers; 295
" Inability to escape from adhesive terms because of their widespread,
close-to-uniform use by vendors; 296
" "Defective Agency," in which an arbitration provision is negotiated
by or adhered to without authorization. 297
293 Id. (quoting UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4). Omitted are criteria
numbers (2) and (4), which involved aspects of a transaction designed to apply to terms
other than arbitration clauses.
294 Stempel, supra note 8, at 1435-37.
295 See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 31.
296 See Stempel, supra note 8, at 1438-42 (labeling this as an arbitrability defense of
"inescapable adhesion").
2 97 Id. at 1443-44. The defective agency concept may have little actual application
outside the context of labor organizations agreeing to arbitrate under a collective
bargaining agreement where individual members wish to bring civil rights claims.
Because the collective bargaining agreement generally relates only to terms and
conditions of the union's employment contract, my view is that these arbitration clauses
should not foreclose civil rights litigation for members. Id. at 1443-47. In addition, the
Better Approach article advocates strong contract policing if there is "dirty dealing"
(procedural unconscionability) or substantive unconscionability in the form of highly
one-sided arbitration provisions. Id. at 1437-38, 1442-43.
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Other yardsticks for measuring any alleged unconscionable component
of an arbitration term could also include:
* "[T]he degree to which terms of the transaction require
consumers to waive legal rights"; 298
* The competence of the adhering party and the presence of
legal advice;299
" The value of consideration received in return for adhering to
the contract term at issue.3°°
The social and legal system has always made situation-specific, dispute
resolution on the merits available to disputants. This is the default rule
society has implicitly embraced over the centuries. Even if parties "contract
out of' this default rule in a manner that satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks test of
efficiency, this may not be to the ultimate good of the socio-legal system,
which is attempting to provide forms of dispute resolution that achieve
rational, fair, merit-based results that are at least procedurally satisfactory to
all disputants. Apart from whatever good derives from correct results for
individual cases, the socio-legal system derives the aggregate benefits of
social stability and public satisfaction.
The use of standard form contracts to escape this default norm of
adjudication may be unacceptable even if it increases net social wealth. Such
a situation would accomplish its efficiency by allowing a relatively small
concentration of vendors to capture the net gain in wealth while many of the
consumers would be relatively impoverished. Calling this a good result
simply because the overall net wealth is greater seems inappropriate when
the purported gains are so skewed in their distribution.
Examined another way, one can argue that the imposition of standard
form arbitration with no judicial policing for unconscionability fails the
standard Kaldor-Hicks criteria for efficiency. In counting costs and benefits,
those defending the efficiency of form terms set by the market tend to look
only at the effect on the vendors and consumers engaged in contracting.
There is no real effort to value the gain or loss to the socio-legal system as a
whole. But if my hypothesis is correct-that a significant perception of
unfairness or inadequacy of dispute resolution is a substantial cost to
298 N.Y. CITy ADMIN. CODE § 2203d-2.0(b) (McKinney's 2001); PERILLO, supra
note 271, at 391 n.22 (citing § 2203d-2.0(b) with approval).
299 See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.107(4), 7 U.L.A. 112 (2002); PERILLO,
supra note 271, at 391 n.23 (citing § 1.107(4) with approval).
300 See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.111(3); PERILLO, supra note 271, at 391
n.24 (citing § 6.111(3) with approval).
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society-this cost should be counted in calculating the overall efficiency of
contract terms. In other words, one cannot bless an arbitration clause as
efficient unless one knows whether the total net gain to vendors, or the gain
to vendors combined with savings to consumers, exceeds the social costs
when inflexibly-imposed arbitration creates the impression of judicial
coercion applied in the service of unfair forums and where many disputants
are dissatisfied not only with the outcome of the dispute, but the procedure
by which the dispute was processed.
There is also the problem of the absence of any serious empirical support
for the economic rationale for judicial non-interference with form arbitration
terms. One might accept that the market, in theory, will produce optimally
efficient terms. For example, the average consumer may prefer a lower
product price and an arbitration clause (even one providing for arbitration in
a biased forum) in lieu of a higher product price and no arbitration
clause.30 1 But there is nothing to suggest that vendors imposing arbitration
clauses actually lower their prices in conjunction with using arbitration
clauses in their contracts. Similarly, there is no solid support for the
theoretical idea that by using arbitration clauses, vendors are able to refrain
from price increases that would otherwise occur.30 2 The imposition of
arbitration without judicial policing may merely result in a windfall to
vendors rather than a benefit shared among vendors and consumers. The
situation may still be one that is efficient in the broadest Kaldor-Hicks sense
of the word, but it is not the efficiency that has historically been used to
"sell" arbitration as a benefit to consumers as well as vendors.
Of course, litigation imposes social costs as well as generates the positive
externalities I posit. In addition, it can be argued that where markets are
competitive and barriers to entry are low, it will be difficult for vendors
imposing arbitration clauses to retain all economic surplus from any actual
savings of disputing costs. The idea is that at least some vendors will attempt
to compete for business by passing on some of the disputing efficiencies
obtained through imposing arbitration rather than litigating disputes with
customers or employees. Although this argument is theoretically attractive, I
remain skeptical largely because it is so hard to find any real evidence of: (1)
such savings from substituting arbitration as the default for litigation; and (2)
vendors sharing with consumers the purported savings from widely-imposed
arbitration clauses. If such information were available, one would certainly
301 See Priest, supra note 214, at 1307-13.
302 At least it has no empirical support of which I am aware. The scholarly writings
positing the efficiency of standard form contract terms set by the market all make their
case on the basis of assumption and theory rather than through empirical study. See supra
notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
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expect the proponents of mandatory arbitration, who have litigated the issue
for more than twenty years, to produce such empirical support. They have
not, but instead continue to argue their case for social gains solely on the
basis of theory. Concern for contract fairness and consent should prompt
courts to require more evidence before determining that arbitration
agreements satisfy the unconscionability norm.
In addition, those favoring increased limitations on judicial intervention
to enforce the unconscionability norm can also argue that courts have a
serious institutional competence problem in that the court's knowledge is
generally confined to the litigants, rather than to the overall markets,
businesses, or behaviors implicated by the case. Although this is a valuable
point to consider, I see it as a relatively weak argument against policing
contracts according to unconscionability. First, courts can acquire a good
deal of broad knowledge in an area implicated by a case. The parties and the
fact witnesses implicitly do this in most cases. Second, judges and juries use
their collective experience to fill in some of the blanks regarding behavior
and conduct, making justifiable inferences as necessary. Third, expert
witnesses can be brought to bear by either the litigants or the court so that the
tribunal is better informed about information that transcends the parties for
purposes of evaluating the fairness of arbitration clauses. Although this
would be overkill if used in every case, it can be justified in select cases.
After that, the common law development of unconscionability precedent
serves to place this accumulated knowledge in the public and legal domain
for future use by courts assessing unconscionability and arbitration.
Perhaps most important, a contract term affecting the means of dispute
resolution in the event of contract discord is quite different than a contract
term that merely affects a discrete part of the contract. A contract clause
establishing arbitration or another means of dispute resolution is a "meta-
term" that can affect the operationalization of all other aspects of the
contract. It substitutes the designated arbitration forum for the default rule of
the courts. This is quite different from a contract term that requires
complaints to be filed within a reasonable time, or even one that limits
consequential damages to a liquidated amount. With respect to contract terms
other than arbitration, consumers and vendors may alternately "win some and
lose some." But with arbitration clauses, a vendor's "win" on this point may
effectively skew the parties' respective rights across the contract for a variety
of disputes. In this sense, an arbitration clause is quite different than other
contract terms and quite different from the example of consumer warranties
or payment clauses that were the focus of not only the Leff critique, but also
more recent commentary expressing wariness about undue interference with
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form contract terms via the unconscionability norm.303 Bounded rationality
analysis strongly supports this view, concluding that for most contracting
parties, an arbitration clause may not be a salient term even though it can
have significant impact (and significantly disadvantage the adhering party) in
the event of a dispute. 304
In light of these shortcomings in the economic analysis as well as the
emerging insights of cognitive theory, recent commentary has suggested that
there is at least some role to be played by courts in policing arbitration
agreements. 30 5 However, many courts and commentators, following the Leff
tradition, want unconscionability to be circumscribed and specific rather than
general. They would also prefer that the specific standards for
unconscionability be determined by legislatures or administrative agencies
rather than courts. Unfortunately, this view fails to fully appreciate the
problems of depending on a legislative or administrative solution to the
problem of policing unconscionable contract terms.
In this vein, it is important to remember that Leff largely wrote his
analysis of contract and unconscionability before intervening developments
regarding the analysis of administrative and legislative institutions. The
Emperor's New Clause was published in 1967 at a time when confidence in
political institutions remained high. It was the time of the New Frontier and
the Great Society, of an optimism about the role of government and the
rationality of the political process. 3°6 The general view was that legislatures
303 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 25, at 421-23; Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1290-
95. In addition, arbitration clauses are the type of contract term that laypersons are far
less likely to understand without investing significant resources toward the task of
evaluation. According to cognitive theory, they are unlikely to make such an investment
due to the bounded rationality of law consumers in this position. See id. at 12-15.
304 See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 31.
305 See id. at 70-80.
306 The "New Frontier," President John F. Kennedy's (1961-63) campaign slogan,
was designed to connote that he was younger and more vibrant than the President he was
replacing (Dwight D. Eisenhower) and that his administration would be active in "getting
the country moving again." See ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F.
KENNEDY 250-95 (2003) (describing Kennedy's political platform in the 1960
presidential campaign). The "Great Society" was the popular name for the set of liberal
social programs championed by President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-69), including
efforts broadly known as the "War on Poverty." See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW 539-51 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the Johnson administration's successful push for
Medicare and Medicaid); JONATHAN RAUCH, GOvERNMENT'S END: WHY WASHINGTON
STOPPED WORKING (1999) (describing the rise and fall of large government social
programs, including Johnson's Great Society).
Even prior to the liberal Democratic administrations of Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, the nation and society had been in something of an "era of good feeling" about
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were composed of reasonably intelligent, well-informed members, who were
collectively trying to make effective public policy in response to perceived
social needs. 30 7 Similarly, administrative agencies, although technically an
arm of the executive branch, were thought of as repositories of expertise that
could be deployed to solve the societal problems confronting the
agency. 308
Contrast the situation when Leff wrote with today's received intellectual
view regarding political institutions. Legislatures are thought to be the
captives of interest groups with their ability to respond restricted both by
interest group politics and the limitations of agenda-setting and voting
behavior, which may prevent the true preferences of the body from being
enacted into law. 309 Administrative agencies are thought to frequently be
government institutions, despite the looming presence of the Cold War with the former
Soviet Union and its allies. President Eisenhower (1953-61) was a hero of the Second
World War, which the United States had prosecuted successfully under the liberal
Democratic administrations of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman: a
time during which domestic policy and public opinion had been bullish on the role of
government and its institutions. This included the advent of the New Deal and its many
government initiatives and regulatory agencies, which were not curtailed by Eisenhower
(a moderate Republican who also was forced to deal with a U.S. Senate controlled by
powerful Democratic Majority Leader and pro-government liberal Lyndon Johnson). See
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1100-08 (describing governmental and agency
growth during New Deal era). In short, the 1960s was probably both the apogee and last
gasp of unbridled optimism about government activism by the legislature and
administrative agencies. But even then, the seeds of future criticism were sown and could
have been familiar to Leff at the time of the 1967 article. See e.g., MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79-97 (1955);
ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 84-97 (1967);
307The period from the 1950s through the early 1960s was also a time of relatively
little division in America over public policy and was even referred to as a time of the
"end of ideology." See e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 17 (2000); ROBERT
DAHL, PLURALISM 1-32 (1957); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979) (describing the earlier
era as something of a golden age, later replaced by legislatures unwilling to make hard
political choices and delegating authority to administrative agencies to avoid legislative
decisionmaking).
3 0 8 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
222-54 (1990) (noting both the promise and failure of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1671-76 (1975).
309 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP B. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13-17 (1991); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 114-25 (1965); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 31-34 (1982). Of course, recognizing
the impact of interest groups and deciding what might be an apt judicial response are two
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captured by the entities they are supposed to regulate, a process fueled by
familiarity, political pressure on the administrative experts, and the revolving
door process by which agency positions are filled.310
None of this is news today. Although perhaps excessively
pessimistic, 311 there is no doubt that today's intellectual view of the political
branches posits that legislatures and administrative agencies are limited in
their ability to intervene at all on behalf of contractually oppressed parties,
much less to intervene effectively and positively on their behalf.312 As a
result, it now seems unrealistic (at least to me) to take the position that
contract policing on the basis of unconscionability should be the near-
exclusive province of the legislature or executive agencies.
However, a preference for legislative or administrative contract policing
was far more defensible at the time of The Emperor's New Clause. The UCC
had been drafted by a seemingly responsible private legislature seemingly
untainted by interest group pressure. 313 Contrast this to the most recent
different things. Compare Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Intrusive Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE. L.J. 31, 48-101(1991) (arguing that public
choice and interest group theory do not justify a more active judicial review) and
Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219,
1289-90 (1994) (same), with Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223, 227-34 (1986) (suggesting that the implications of interest group theory
justifies a more searching judicial review and a greater effort to construe statutes in a
public-regarding manner) and Edward Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-64 (1991)
(same, but with more support for judicial intervention and emphasis on purpose-based
statutory construction).
3 10 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 503-11 (1989); Richard Pierce, Political
Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron
and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 484-89 (1990).
311 For a view contrary to the gloom-and-doom attitude toward the political process
reflected in much public choice scholarship, see STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC
POLICY: A HOPEFUL ViEw OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 227-31 (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1987); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 82 (1984).
3 12 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 80, at 50-60; ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF A
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 1-7 (1982); WILLIAM H. RIKER &
PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITVE POLITICAL THEORY 1-7 (1973);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523, 528-63 (1992).
3 13 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 132, §§ 4.1, 4.2; Allen R. Kamp, Between-
The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial
Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 371-97 (1995); Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code:
A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-54, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 415-24
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statutory efforts of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, where
model statutes on banking and computer contracts have been accused of
serving the industry with little regard for the public. 314 Public legislatures,
such as Congress, have been accused of becoming either gridlocked or even
captured by interest groups. 315 Seldom in recent years has Congress been
regarded as producing purely public-regarding legislation. Many of the
scholarly works symptomatic of this new view were not published until well
after Leff s article recommending that courts stay out of the
unconscionability business. 316
Administrative agencies have perhaps been even more tarred by
academic and political commentary in the years since Leff wrote. Richard
Stewart's seminal The Reformation of American Administrative Law, which
forcefully posited the case for agency capture by interest groups317 was not
published until eight years after The Emperor's New Clause. The ensuing
fifteen years saw an avalanche of commentary in this vein. 318 As with
legislatures, evaluating the product of administrative regulation is complex.
Agencies, like legislatures, have capable defenders who argue that the
processes are still public-regarding rather than private-regarding on the
whole.319
However, it seems beyond doubt that both the intellectual community
and the broader political community have become far more pessimistic about
the performance of the legislative and executive branches than was the case
when Leff launched his attack on judicial use of the unconscionability norm,
unguided by neither specific administrative nor legislative guidance. The
(2001); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the UCC: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV.
275, 306-13 (1998).
3 14 See Scott J. Burnham, Perspectives on the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 603, 603-05 (2001); Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised
Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1711-
15 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View From the Trenches, 52
HASTING L.J. 607, 617-18 (2001).
3 15 See supra note 309.
3 16 See id.
3 17 See Stewart, supra note 308, at 1671.
318 See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice Foreword,
74 VA. L. REv. 167, 167-76 (1988).
3 19 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 28-30 (1979); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
984, 1054-60 (discussing the modem trend toward judicial deference to administrative
agency interpretations even prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in significant part because of expertise
and competence of agencies).
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intellectual development of public choice research and theory strengthens the
case for giving the judiciary a more robust role in policing contracts,
particularly arbitration clauses, according to the unconscionability norm.
Of course, as noted above, the judiciary has not escaped unscathed from
criticism during the years since publication of The Emperor's New Clause.
But in the main, the judiciary was removed from its pedestal much earlier as
a result of the legal realist critique.320 Since 1967, despite the popular
political attacks on "activist" judging, there has been relatively little serious
academic criticism of judicial performance. 321 To be sure, individual judges
may err, but this is not the type of problem on which I foCUS. 322 Adjudication
may be expensive. Lay jurors may pose competence issues or valuation
problems. But few serious observers have attempted to make a case that
courts fail to correctly decide legal issues most of the time. In addition, many
prominent scholars have forcefully argued that as a matter of institutional
competence, courts are the best situated of the three branches for making
decisions consistent with contemporary values.323
Although the issue is, of course, not open-and-shut, I read the literature
of institutional competence as suggesting that courts are indeed likely to be
superior to legislatures or administrative agencies in developing the contours
of a general unconscionability norm through the traditional common law
means as applied to particular cases. 324 As a matter of positive political
theory, a statute can direct judicial activity in this regard.325 An
administrative rule or interpretation is normally granted substantial deference
by the courts.326 If legislatures and agencies wish to address the problem of
arbitration clause unconscionability, they can and will, one hopes, do so in a
public-regarding manner and not as agents of vendors attempting to insulate
them from liability. But in the absence of such legislative or administrative
3 20 See KUKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 81, at 150-58.
3 21 But see Guthrie et al., supra note 267, at 777-89 (assessing survey data on
judicial decisionmaking, implicitly suggesting some shortcomings but also suggesting
that judicial performance is good on the whole).
322 For that reason, I do not include scholarly commentary that criticizes a particular
case or single judge as being an indictment of the "judicial system" per se.
323 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-30
(1982); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 261, at 691-95.
324 The argument of judicial advantages in this regard is particularly well made in
CALABRESI, supra note 323, at 16-30.
325 See Hart, Jr. & Sacks, supra note 258, at 165-67 (noting how legislation binds
courts absent unconstitutionality).
326 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
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guidance, there is nothing wrong or imprudent about judicial use of the
unconscionability norm to police arbitration agreements.
Further, to perhaps state the obvious, arbitration appeared not to be
considered by Leff at all in discussing unconscionability. In addition, when
Leff wrote, he could not have anticipated the aggressive pursuit of mass
privatization of dispute resolution that developed as the Supreme Court
ushered in the new era of more modem, pro-arbitration jurisprudence. 327 As
a result, the legal landscape of arbitration today is far different than it was
thirty-five years ago when the Leff criticisms of judicial use of the general
unconscionability norm were planted and took the root that today has grown
into an intellectual suspicion of unbridled unconscionability analysis.
In 1967, labor arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
and commercial arbitration among merchants were the only types of
arbitration receiving significant judicial attention. They were practically the
only types of arbitration, save for perhaps construction industry arbitration
and statutorily required arbitration of insurance claims. Today, this "old"
type of arbitration continues to exist and there is also a "new" type of
arbitration that has received the most legal scrutiny from arbitration critics.
New arbitration involves employees and consumers, including buyers of all
stripes and credit card users. Franchise agreements that require arbitration are
a mix of old and new arbitration in that the franchisee is not as "boundedly"
rational or unsophisticated as a typical consumer, but nonetheless has little
effective leverage against franchisers in most instances. 328
In total, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries present a
picture of arbitration and a more aggressive use of arbitration than could
have been imagined by Professor Leff and the others who debated the merits
of the unconscionability norm during the late 1960s. Leff may have won that
debate then. He at least inflicted significant wounds upon the
unconscionability concept. 329 But that was then and this is now. The anti-
unconscionability arguments of the 1960s, even if persuasive at the time, are
not persuasive today.330
327 See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
328 See Stempel, supra note 30, at 334-40 (coining and discussing the terms "old"
and "new" varieties of arbitration).
329 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing the unconscionability
debate in the wake of The Emperor's New Clause).
330 Sadly, Professor Leff died of cancer in 1981 at age 46. See Marcia Chambers,
Arthur A. Leff is Dead at 46: Professor at Yale Law School, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1981, at
A26. Although he continued to be an active and prominent scholar until the time of his
death, his scholarly interests had largely moved away from unconscionability and toward
general legal theory and legal ethics. See, e.g., ARTHUR ALLEN. LEFF, SWINDLING AND
SELLING (1976); Leff, Law And, supra note 194, at 1008-11; Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the development of the Supreme Court's
arbitrability doctrine and the rise of unconscionability as a counterweight to
the arguable excesses of that doctrine. In the wake of the Court's expansive
endorsement of a new regime of more common mandatory arbitration
controlled by federal law, lower courts were slow in applying
unconscionability analysis to arbitration provisions. Academic, doctrinal,
theoretical, political, and social forces were all combining to discourage
judicial use of the unconscionability norm at the same time that infatuation
with ADR and arbitration was driving the Court toward an extremely pro-
arbitration body of law. Only as the Court's zeal for arbitration wore thin did
unconscionability experience a resurgence, partly because the Court left little
other recourse for regulating arbitration terms and partly because courts were
confronted by a growing number of overreaching and unfair arbitration
provisions.
After nearly twenty years of aggressive pro-arbitration jurisprudence
from the Supreme Court, it appears that lower courts have gradually reacted
in a manner designed to achieve greater equilibrium between drafters and
nondrafters of arbitration terms. The vehicle for pursuing this equilibrium has
supra note 194. He was also working on a legal dictionary as well. See Chambers, supra
at A26. The Emperor's New Clause, however, remained identified in the minds of most
as Leff's most prominent and influential work. Grant Gilmore, a retired member of the
faculty, recalled Leff's the article, "It was both an extraordinary work of scholarship and
a remarkably profound analysis of the deep current in the law of contracts. He had
extraordinary originality." Id.
The one exception to Leff s drift away from contract law and unconscionability was
a four-page comment, Arthur Allen Leff, Thomist Unconscionabiliy, 4 CAN. Bus. L.J.
424, 424-27 (1980), an article described as "short but insightful." John-Paul F. Bogden,
On the "Agreement Most Foul": A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Unconscionability,
25 MANITOBA. L.J. 187, 187 (1998). Thomist Unconscionability appears consistent with
other post-Emperor writings of Leff on the subject. See Leff, supra note 186, at 140-47;
Leff, supra note 22. In Thomist Unconscionability, Professor Leff appears not to have
been moved by the intervening thirteen years of public choice and administrative law
writings. Perhaps the coming behavioral science and new legal process writings would
have made him more tolerant of judicially imposed unconscionability policing. Perhaps
the advent of new arbitration entities, which appear to strive for kangaroo-court status,
would have made him more charitable toward both the unconscionability norm and a
strong judicial role in its enforcement. Perhaps not. Regardless, one can certainly argue
that developments since 1967, particularly the Supreme Court's vigorous preference for
arbitration, coupled with the large, seemingly opportunistic drive by business interests
toward mandated arbitration for society's "little guys," ought to prompt some
modification or contraction of the Leff critique. See Sternlight, supra note 9, at 637-39
(framing mandatory arbitration as evolving toward a big-vs.-small conflict).
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been unconscionability analysis, albeit in restrained fashion, giving specific
focus on particularly problematic traits of some arbitration agreements rather
than emphasizing any general judicial power to police contract terms.
Unfortunately, unconscionability was given such a bad rap during the late
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that even today, commentators remain reluctant to
endorse broad judicial policing based on unconscionability grounds. 331
However, the answer of many courts to the new twenty-first century
problem of arbitrability has been the rediscovery and reinvigoration of a
venerable doctrine 332 that deserves greater respect and more frequent use
across the board. Continued use of the unconscionability norm would serve
contract law well generally and arbitration law in particular. The rediscovery
of unconscionability has softened the rougher edges of the Supreme Court's
arbitration formalism and made both the judicial and arbitration systems
more effective. The arbitration-unconscionability experience suggests that a
relatively less constrained version of the unconscionability norm should
continue to play a role in contract construction, both for arbitration terms and
other contract provisions.
331 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
332 See Knapp, supra note 247, at 797 n. 120 ("If nothing else, the arbitration wars
have brought unconscionability back to center stage."); Korobkin, supra note 25
("[A]rbitration clause jurisprudence is a good source of insight into the unconscionability
doctrine.").
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